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ABSTRACT
In the past two years, increased attention has been devoted to the
management of subsidized housing. From being the forgotten factor in
the economics of housing, management has acquired a central role in
policy affecting the future of federally subsidized developments. This
study concerns two issues related to the costs of managing publicly-
assisted, privately-owned rental housing: 221d3 and 236. The first is
an issue of expense: what are the costs to projects of administrative
requirements imposed by public agencies with authority over subsidized
housing? The second is an issue of income: what are additional sources
of revenue which could be tapped by projects with inadequate operating
funds, and how much money could they yield, under what circumstances?
The first, then, details an unintended and often expensive side effect
of American housing subsidies, while the second analyses deliberate
strategies to alleviate one deficiency in existing projects--insufficient
income.
Public agencies which subsidize housing act as regulators when they
monitor, review and control housing management. In Boston, agencies
with these dual functions are HUD-FHA, Boston Housing Authority,
Welfare Department and city Assessing Department. The study describes
the problems and expenses, in time and dollars, encountered by housing
managers while satisfying the administrative requirements and red tape
imposed by these agencies and by another agency which only regulates
housing: Boston Rent Board. It also details the conflicts and costs
that arise when two or more agencies demand supervision of the same
managerial activity such as rent increases or tenant evictions. The
total of all these expenses varies considerably among projects, ranging
from $35 to more than $215 per unit per year. At the higher end, projects
are spending more than their entire HUD allowed management fees. The
study attempts to pinpoint some causes of the discrepencies, including
kind of housing development, size and attitudes of management entities.
After presenting difficulties that are inherent in public regulation of
subsidized housing, the study projects some alternatives to existing
subsidy regulatory patterns that might reduce housing managers' costs
and friction of doing business with public agencies.
The second major portion of this study begins by outlining three
major sources of operating cost overruns in 221d3 and 236 projects: 1)
costs internal to housing projects such as excess utility bills attribut-
able to tenants' or managers' actions; 2) costs external to projects such
as rising prices for insurance, utilities or taxes; and 3) underestima-
tion of expenses during development, particularly due to HUD-FHA pro-
cedures. Then, twenty-five.potential sources of additional operating
funds for existing projects are discussed. These fall into two broad
categories: funds internal to developments which could be made available
immediately by restructuring their finances, for example, ballooned
mortgages or residual receipts; and funds external to projects which
would require further direct or indirect subsidies such as operating
subsidies or mortgage refinancing. The costs and benefits of each are
examined in light of the amount of money involved, the time pattern of
benefits, and the possibility of broadening fiscal responsibility for
projects. The analysis concludes that the most profitable sources entail
additional public subsidies and restructuring financial liability for
operating and maintenance costs to include project sponsors and investors.
It distinguishes between projects which could be saved by these incremental
additions of funds and projects with such severe fiscal or operational
problems that they cannot be helped sufficiently by tinkering with the
existing housing subsidy system. Thus, this portion of the study tries
to define the financial limits of existing federal rental assistance
programs: the limits to the dollars which could be leveraged through
these programs and the limited kinds of problems which these dollars
could resolve.
Thesis Superyisor: Langley C. Keyes
Title; Associate professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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Introduction
In the past two years, increased attention has been devoted to the
management of subsidized housing. From being the forgotten factor in
the economics of housing, management has taken on a central role in policy
issues affecting the future of federally subsidized developments. Escala-
ting costs in public housing, the financial impact of the Brooke Amend-
ement, rising levels of defaults and foreclosures of Section 221d3 and
236 developments resulting from soaring operating expenses have all been
instrumental in highlighting the critical significance of management.
Until the recent management crisis, both public and private housing
interests focused almost exclusively on production. This was encouraged
by repeated Presidential and Congressional statements pronouncing con-
struction of new housing as the solution to American housing problems.
It was fostered by a traditional indifference to management on the parts
of both the real estate industry and independent, public spirited
housers. Their joint awakening to the importance of management paralleled
a widespread arousal of interest in the larger question of how the exist-
ing housing stock can be conserved. Increasing abandonment in the central
cities focused attention on the need to save and use existing housing.
Since the total inhabitable housing stock at any given time is 97% old and
only 3% new construction, the existing stock must be maintained adequately
if all Americans are ever to be decently housed. Management is the key to
properly conserving housing.
Successful management is the product of many factors. It is
affected by many cryss-crossing lines of responsibility and influence
among all the participants in the housing process: tenants - managers -
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owners - builders - buildings themselves. In subsidized housing, public
agencies add another crucial component. In all housing, another critical
ingredient for management is money. The sources and amount of income,
the causes and size of expenses - all affect the interplay among the
participants in housing management.
Last year, while investigating the management and operation of
rehabilitated, 22ld3 housing in Boston, I became especially concerned about
two issues related to costs. The first was the impact that HUD and other
public agencies have on operating expenses. The second was whether sub-
sidized projects with inadequate operating budgets could avoid eventual
foreclosure by finding additional sources of revenue.
Discussions with housing managers made it clear that public agencies -
HUD-FHA, Boston Housing Authority, Welfare Department, and Boston
Assessing Department - which are subsidizing housing are also unintention-
ally increasing management costs by the regulations they impose. Agency
requirements that drive up operating expenses include paperwork and
meetings. They also, again unintentionally, include the need for housing
managers to mediate conflicting rules among agencies. Large expenses are
frequently incurred by managers who are caught in the middle of disputes
among agencies with different ideas about how managers should operate
subsidized housing.
It was equally clear to me that while everyone,-managers and agency
personnel alike--complained about bureaucratic red tape, no one really
knew how much it costs managers. One intention of this thesis is to
detail these costs and the problems managers incur while dealing with
public agencies. This discussion is taken up in Section 2, "The Friction
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of Doing Business with Public Agencies".
The second intent of this thesis is to explore additional operating
budgets. My previous study showed me that much of the financial crunch in
22ld3 and 236 housing is attributable to the way it was developed. I
began asking whether the subsidized housing system could mend the problem
it had created: insufficient operating funds. Section 3, "Alternative
Sources of Operating Funds", examines the implications of various sources,
including whether they are sufficient to salvage financially troubled
projects.
This thesis, then, concerns two cost-related issues in subsidized
rental housing. The first is an issue of expenses: what are the costs to
subsidized projects of doing business with public agencies? The second
is an issue of income: are there additional sources of revenues which can
be fruitfully tapped by projects?
Since both these questions are products of the public-private housing
partnership designed into many federal housing programs, I will begin in
Section 1, "Public Subsidies and Private Housing Projects", by discussing
some facets of this partnership.
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Section 1: Public Subsidies and Private Housing Projects
Chapter 1: Public Regulators and Private Managers
During the past fifteen years, federal housing policies have sought
to increase the participation of the private sector in publically sub-
sidized housing. Beginning with Section 202 of the 1959 Housing Act
(low interest loans to non-profit sponsors of housing for the elderly and
handicapped), an increasing number of federal programs have been designed
to attract private business into developing, sponsoring and managing sub-
sidized low and moderate income housing. A public-private partnership
has been envisioned, with the public side providing programs and funds,
including profits, and the private side providing expertise to create and
operate housing for families unable to afford decent, standard dwellings
in the market. A concise statement of the government's rationale was
given by the Kaiser Committee's study, A Decent Home:
American private enterprise, working at its peak efficiency,
cannot and will not succeed in building shelter for those
left behind by our economic system, so long as private enter-
prise is working alone. The economic gap separating millions
of deprived families from adequate housing can only be bridged
by government subsidies. Such subsidies can create an effec-
tive and real market demand to which private enterprise has
proved it will respond with volume production, providing
that there is opportunity for earning a reasonable profit.
This concept is part of a century-long American tradition that defici-
encies in the market should be corrected by government support and regula-
tion of private economic interests, rather than by government control and
A Decent Home, p.4 7 . The Declaration of Policy, Housing and Urban Develop-
ment Act of 1968, further specified: "There exist in the public and
private sectors of the economy the resources and capabilities necessary
to the full realization of this goal [of a decent home and suitable
living environment for every American family.]"
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ownership. The concensus behind public housing policy is that the private
housing market cannot supply adequate housing services, at a reasonable
price, to many American families. The government's programs are, then,
at attempt to rework market operations so that all families can purchase
adequate housing with a reasonable fraction of their income. With the
exception o-. public housing, the government has shied away from direct
ownership, preferring to use subsidies as incentives for private developers
*
and managers to supply needed housing.
This approach has been embodied in a number of multi-family, rental
housing programs, including 22ld3, 236, leased housing and rent supplement.
All use private business as the vehicle for distributing subsidies. Under
22ld3 and 236, private interests build and manage housing for which HUD-
FHA subsidizes mortgages, thereby reducing rents for tenants in the housing.
Under the leased housing and rent supplement programs, private owners
manage apartments for which local housing authorities (LHAs) and HUD,
respectively, pay part of the rent, while again tenants benefit from lower
**
rents.
In all these programs, the government is more than a funder of private
interests. It also controls recipients' use of public monies. HUD not only
pays part of the mortgage interest for 22ld3 and 236 projects, it also
*
During the last decade, even the public housing program has been modified
to encourage private business participation. Turnkey I (private construc-
tion of housing bought by LHAs), Turnkey II (private management of housing
owned by LHAs), and leased housing (private ownership and management of
housing leased by LHAs) are the latest public housing programs. They are
intentionally planned to reduce the dominant role of local housing author-
ities as intermediaries.
**
The origins and operation of these programs are described in A Decent
Home and Building the American City. Their statutes are collected in
Basic Laws and Authorities on Housing and Urban Development. (See Biblio-
graphy for complete citations).
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regulates their sponsors, developers and managers. Local housing author-
ities not only guarantee rents in leased housing, they dictate certain
administrative procedures to its managers. After giving subsidies, the
public agencies watch to make sure the money achieves its intended purpose.
They monitor private recipients to make sure they do not abuse public
funds. In effect, the agencies turn into public watchdogs, safeguarding
the purposes of government programs. Thus, on the one hand the public
agencies act as subsidizers of private managers, on the other hand they
act as regulators. This dual role is shared by other distributors of
public funds, such as the welfare departments.
Some of HUD's and LHAs' regulatory activities are analagous to those
commonly undertaken by government bureaus such as the Interstate Commerce
Commission and the Federal Communications Commission which are more fre-
quently regarded as regulatory bodies. Like these commissions, HUD
restricts charges which can be levied on consumers: just as ICC fixes
train fares, HUD fixes rent levels, Like these bureaus, it limits business
profits in order to keep the price of essential services at levels which
consumers can afford: just as public utility commissions circumscribe
electric companies' profits to ensure that most families can afford light,
the dividends taken by 221d3 and 236 sponsors are limited to 6% in order
to keep housing costs within the reach of many low to moderate income
families.
HUD's primary interests as a regulator of subsidized housing are:
1) ensure that public monies are well spent, by establishing
specifications for the production and operation of projects;
2) obtain the maximum return on publically invested funds, by
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limiting owners' profits and fixing projects' rent;
3) prevent itself from becoming owner of housing projects.
While the first two general goals are shared by many public bureaus,
the last is unique to HUD. Unlike most regulatory and subsidizing
agencies, HUD must take over supervised projects which can no longer
survive under its rules. It can never wash its hands of them. This is
not true of bureaus such as the ICC: if its rate structure forces a rail-
road into bankruptcy, the ICC does not have to run the railroad. If a
welfare department's subsidies are insufficient for a family, it does
not necessarily have to give more assistance. But if 221d3 or 236 housing
needs more operating funds, HUD either has to relieve its financial dis-
tress or become its owner. This is a foreboding prospect for an agency
without the capacity or desire to manage real estate. It would always
prefer having private interests retain projects than be forced into
taking them over itself. Thus, it is not an unbiased regulator who can
hold the general welfare above private interests: its own interests
intervene. Furthermore, like most regulatory agencies established to
promote the public interest, its neutrality is further eroded by over-
*
exposure and deference to the private interests being regulated. For
example, the higher a subsidized project's mortgage, the higher the
profits of sponsors and contractors and the higher government subsidies;
while the lower the mortgage, the lower tenants' rents and the lower
**
subsidies. The announced public purposes of housing programs suggest
*
For further discussion of how regulators serve those being regulated see,
for instance, Bernard Schwartz's "Crisis in the Commissions" in Krislov's
The Politics of Regulation.
The reason why higher mortgages mean higher profits for limited dividend
sponsors is discussed in Chapter 2, p. 2 2 .
-12-
that given a choice about the size of a mortgage, HUD should negotiate a
lower price in order to serve tenants better and reduce public costs.
But HUD often fails to do this when sponsors' interests would be threat-
ened. It frequently approves mortgage increases to cover construction
costs that are the liability of contractors and architects rather than
forcing sponsors to sue them for the money. It fears that if it forced
sponsors into suing, they would walk away from projects, leaving HUD to
own them. It accepts higher mortgages with the accompanying higher
rents and subsidies as the price for avoiding ownership. In effect, HUD
illegally shifts a financial burden onto tenants, in spite of its own
*
rules to the contrary. It is prompted by desires both to follow the
easiest course of action and, more importantly, to give sponsors financial
incentives to retain ownership. Keeping owners satisfied may thus take
precedence over tenants' interests in low rents and the public interest
in the best possible use of public funds.
The conflict between serving tenants and serving sponsor-managers
permeates HUD's intervention as a regulator due to its functions as a
subsidizer. As a subsidizer, in addition to benefitting tenants, HUD must
make it financially worthwhile for private enterprise to participate in
**
housing programs. Sponsors' benefits come through tax shelter subsidies
and development fees, particularly the so-called builder's and sponsorls
profit and risk allowance. Their tax shelter benefits are contingent
*
See Section 3, Chapter 8, pages 144 ff, for a detailed discussion of this
issue.
**
Large tax shelter subsidies are possible under the Tax Reform Act of 1969.
The BSPRA is a fee equal to 10% of construction costs in 22ld3 and 236
projects. It is included in their mortgages but given to builders and
sponsors as soon as mortgages are drawn down. It is essentially a means to
reduce sponsors' actual cash equity to as little as 1-2% of a project's
replacement cost.
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upon successful management of housing projects, with successful defined
as keeping the projects out of foreclosure or, in other words, out of
HUD ownership.
HUD, then, is motivated by at least three potentially contradictory
goals: promote sponsors' interests, keep projects out of foreclosure, and
provide adequate housing services to tenants. The latter two are the
only goals public/xly acknowledged, and sometimes only the last one --
housing services for tenants -- is admitted. In order to attain'the last
two goals, HUD dictates rules for the administration of subsidized housing
and scrutinizes housing operation. Management functions monitored by
HUD include all fiscal activities, upkeep of buildings, and management-
tenant relations. HUD specifies procedures for such activities as
accounting, rent increases, and tenant selection. To facilitate its
regulatory role, it requires that managers submit specified information,
including annual financial statements and tenant income certifications.
HUD is not the only public agency which jointly subsidizes and
regulates rental assistance housing. Local housing authorities, welfare
departments, and assessing departments also undertake these dual functions.
They often do so in HUD assisted housing when federal subsidies cannot
lower rents sufficiently for families within the income limits designated
by the 221d3 and 236 programs. In this situation, they may supply additional
subsidies to reduce rents. LHAs, for instance, may provide leased housing
subsidies. Introduced in the 1960's, leased housing (along with HUD's
rent supplement program) was originally intended to shore up private
housing markets by enabling low and moderate income families to pay
reduced rents in private dwellings. Both programs were advertised as ways
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of increasing the number of low and moderate income families who could
afford decent, standard market housing. However, both are now more
frequently piggy-backed on top of 221d3 and 236 production subsidies,
reducing the total number of families which benefit from government
programs but deepening subsidies for those families which do participate.
Other secondary subsidies have come from local, rather than federal,
government. State welfare departments sometimes provide extra direct
rent subsidies for welfare recipients. Many cities' assessing depart-
ments reduce the real estate taxes paid by federally subsidized housing,
as a local contribution in foregone tax revenues.
Each additional subsidizing agency further regulates housing projects.
When subsidies are doubled up, two or more agencies may assume supervision
of the same management function, leading to inter-agency conflicts. For
instance, if leased housing is added to 221d3 or 236 projects, both HUD
and LHAs demand the right to review and approve rents in the same dwellings.
They sometimes disagree about the amount or timing of rent increases,
forcing managers to mediate between them. If their dispute occurs in a
city like Boston where local rent control exists, a three-way agency battle
may ensue.
Thus, many agencies can intervene in the management of subsidized
housing. Many actors have "acquired legitimate roles in regulating
*
resources spent on behalf of the poor." It has often been noted that
these public personnel soak up much of the money allocated for subsidized
housing programs. This was described caustically by Rutledge Walker, the
director of Low Cost Housing, Inc., in Boston: "For every $10 put into the
* Quoted in Rolf Goetze, Conserving the American Housing Stock.
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pipeline by the government, only $1 of housing for the poor comes out.
*
Those cats get the rest."
But the money in agencies' operating budgets is not the only over-
head expense of the subsidizing and regulatory process. Regulatory require-
ments also impose overhead costs on housing project managers. Each pro-
cedure they must complete, each form they must fill out takes time and
money. When public agencies disagree, managers are sometimes caught in
the middle, unable to obtain approval for desired administrative actions
such as an eviction or a rent increase. Annoyed by regulatory require-
ments and delays, some managers have retaliated by abusing subsidies,
swindling agencies out of unearned subsidies. Their abuse convinces
regulators that they haven't kept close enough watch on projects. They
may demand that managers submit still more reports on their activities and
fiscal arrangements.
Disgruntled managers in Boston often complain that they are being
forced out of business by over-zealous government officials and require-
ments. They say their management budgets are overwhelmed by the overhead
cost of complying with agencies' requirements. These costs include both
the direct expenses of filling out forms and attending mandatory public
hearings, and the indirect expenses of rents or subsidies lost or delayed
through agencies' proceedings.
For all managers' griping, none have ascertained how much time and
money are actually expended responding to public requirements. A central
concern of this thesis is to detail the costs incurred by private housing
managers while complying with the rules of public agencies. In Section 2,
*
Quoted in Rolf Goetze, Conserving the American Housing Stock.
-16-
I will quantify the costs to managers of dealing with public agencies.
While both their direct and indirect costs will be detailed, this study
is not a cost-benefit analysis in any formal sense because it does not
attempt to determine the net cost of administering subsidized housing. It
concentrates on gross management costs. Thus, while it details the cost
of administering a real estate tax abatement, for example, it does not
then subtract the ensuing tax savings to determine the net cost or savings
of an abatement. Similarly, I have neither quantified nor discussed
management savings linked to subsidy programs. For instance, I do not
discuss whether, as is sometimes alleged, subsidies lead to a reduction
in tenant turnover, reducing management overhead. I focus on the costs
and problems of dealing with public agencies. These are the unintended
side effects of American housing programs. They are the frictional costs
of public regulation of subsidized housing.
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Chapter 2: Operating Costs and Public Policies
The overhead cost of dealing with public agencies is only one of
many problematic operating expenses for private managers of subsidized
housing. It is only one of many attributable to the design of government
housing programs. The federal rental assistance housing programs--22ld3
and 236--are designed such that operating costs tend rapidly to outstrip
rental income. The procedures for increasing rental income are such that
it can almost never catch up with expenses. The ensuing lag between
income and expenditures tends to increase over time, and it contributes
to the fiscal problems of many projects.
In Boston, average operating expenses, exclusive of taxes, in 221d3
and 236 projects rose 14.5% between 1969 and 1970. They crept up another
*
13% between 1970 and 1971. In a few projects, they increased by almost
300% over a three to four year period. .(Average operating costs and
percentage change for five representative projects of different sizes
are given in Table 1-1.) Rapidly rising costs can be attributed to three
causes. One group of causes is internal to projects, while another is
external to housing itself. A third cause is the development process
dictated by HUD itself.
The internal causes may be ascribed to any or all of the three direct
participants in housing projects: tenants - managers - structures.
Tenants may be guilty of poor housekeeping which contributes to higher
repair, decorating and cleaning costs. They may be responsible for con-
suming excessive amounts of utilities--electricity, gas, oil, and water--
through failing to turn off lights, using stoves for heating, running
*
Data from the Urban Observatory's Subsidized Housing Study.
Table 1-1: Operating Cost Increases, 1966-1971, in Five Boston Subsidized Housing Projects
projects:
expense Lproj
mainten-
ance
energy:
heat &
light
insur-
ance
manag-
ement
fee
other
adminis-
trative
payroll
other
TOTAL
(a)
ect "A"-5 d.u.
(b)
Project "B"-18 d.u.|
(b)
Project "C"-43 d.u. Project "D"-92 d.u.lProject "E"-108
1967 1971 % 1966 1971 % 1966 1971~ % 1966 1971 % 1966 1971 %
change change change change change
$ 19 $102 +546% $ 70 $315 +350% $ 67 $329 +391% $ 3 c)$141  +340% $143 $312 +118%
111 163 + 47 94 332 +253 84 383 +356 133 198 + 49% 213 (d)26 7 + 26%
49 83 + 67 56 78 + 39 40 75 + 87 40 92 +130% 79 65 - 18%
44 49 + 12 48 47 - 2 54 56 + 3 48 48 0% 77 100 + 30%
6 155 +2620 7 14 +100 7 13 + 86 2 19 +850% 48 96 +100%
16 69 + 330 40 72 + 80 60 30 - 50 26 32 + 23% 84 147 + 75%
21 46 + 119 21 27 + 2-9 21 25 + 19 71 0 -100% 8 20 + 75%
$266 $667 + 151%|$336 $901 +168% $333 $929 +179% $352 $530 + 51% $652 $1010 + 55%
I
Notes to Table 1-1:
(a) Project operated by Greater Boston Community Development Corporation. Figures not available
for 1966.
(b) Projects developed under the Boston Urban Renewal Program--BURP--during which HUD-FHA sacrificed
all other considerations for the sake of production.
(c) Tenants pay for their own maintenance, with few exceptions.
(d) Oil heat; all other projects are gas heated.
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water continuously, or opening windows to cool apartments during the winter
rather than turning down the heat. Since utilities are included in the
rent in most subsidized projects, these tenant actions send up total pro-
ject operating costs.
Managers may escalate costs by poor maintenance or repair programs
which eventually lead to large deferred maintenance costs. If, for
instance, they fail to clean halls regularly, they may have to spend
larger amounts to paint them frequently. Managers, too, may push up
utilitj bills by failing to operate heating or water systems properly, or
by failing to instruct tenants in the proper use of appliances. Either
tenants and/or managers may not take care of buildings adequately.
Finally, buildings themselves may contribute to rising costs. Shoddy
construction, improperly designed or installed physical systems may lead
to excessive utility or repair expenses. Badly hung windows, for example,
may leak heat in winter, causing excess fuel consumption. Poor design
can also influence operating and maintenance costs. Public spaces may
be unnecessarily large, consuming too much heat, or they may attract
vandalism by being hidden from public view. If adequate access to trash
disposal is not designed, garbage may be scattered around the property,
leading to high collection costs.
Many of these costs might be cut by better planning, design, or
communication between tenants and managers. However, another group of
operating costs increases cannot be controlled by changes internal to
projects. They are caused by institutions or changes external to projects.
They include:
*
Oscar Newman's recent book, Defensible Space, discusses this concept at
length.
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1) Increasing Tax Rates have been described as the fastest rising
expense in subsidized housing by a recent independent study of federal
housing by the Carter Burgess Task Force. Because there is no federal
policy on tax rates for subsidized housing, projects are taxed at the
discretion Df local assessing departments. Most projects try to obtain
special, low tax assessments on the grounds either that they supply a
special housing service, like public housing, which the city should help
subsidize; or that the projects have little real market value and should
be taxed accordingly. While many special tax deals are arranged, few are
legally binding. (One exception is the so-called 121A Corporation in
Massachusetts). Many cities eventually feel that special deals are under-
**
mining their tax base, and they raise taxes. In Boston, for instance, a
gentleman's agreement to limit taxes on subsidized housing to 15% of gross
potential income was unilaterally upped by the city to 17%, beginning in 1973.
2) Increasing utility rates have also been described as the largest
operating cost increase in subsidized housing, by the Acting Director of
HUD Housing Programs, Fred Pfaender. In Boston, at least, rising prices
for gas, electricity, oil and water & sewer have strained the budgets of most
projects. All four went up in less than four years. Water and sewer rates
rose 67% in April 1972. Oil rates doubled, partially due to clean air
requirements which forced the burning of higher grades of oil. Electric
rates were twice adjusted upward, again as a result of clean air regulations
that forced Boston Edison to use more expensive fuel. Gas rates also increased.
Interview with Larry Gandel of the Carter Burgess Task Force.
George E. Peterson, Arthur Solomon, et.al, A Study of the Property Tax
and Urban Blight, p. VI-7.
Interview with Fred Pfaender, March 13, 1973.
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3) Escalating prices for the services of private vendors, especially
insurance, also troubles many projects. Insurance is generally the most
expensive service purchased privately. During the late sixties, most
developments in inner city areas could not purchase any insurance on the
private market. Insurers were afraid that riots, crime and community
opposition would quickly destroy structures. The only alternative for
many projects was the government sponsored FAIR plan, which guaranteed
insurance coverage but at a price two to four times that of private com-
panies. One project in Boston, for example, had budgeted $3,300 annually
for insurance, while its FAIR premiums ran $12,700.
Fortunately, during the last 18 months, insurance costs have begun to
drift down as insurers realize their fears were unfounded and subsidized
housing is not more risky than conventional housing. The project mentioned
above, recently lowered its insurance costs $40 per unit per year by going
off the FAIR plan and onto private coverage that costs only $10,100 per
year. Nevertheless, this amount is still almost three times its original
allocation for insurance.
4) Vandalism has increased repair and replacement costs in many projects.
One 300-plus unit inner city development in Boston recently spent $7,700 to
replace almost 400 light fixtures destroyed by vandalism, $32,000 to replace
86 doors wrecked by a combination of vandalism and the weather, and $14,800
for security screen in first floor apartments; or a total of almost $320 per
unit in extra repair costs.
5) The cost of dealing with public agencies, as discussed in Chapter 1,
is also rising with the large number of public agencies that have some
authority over subsidized housing,
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But the most common reason why operating costs outrun rental income is
that these costs were underestimated during development. During the pro-
duction of a project, operating costs and mortgage amounts are computed.
Rents must be sufficient to pay for both. Under 221d3 and 236 production
procedures, rent limits are set independently of mortgage and operating
expenses, so that if either cost increases, the other must be reduced in
order for rents to cover both.
HUD-FHA housing programs implicitly encourage developers to bring in
the highest possible mortgages by linking the amount of developers' profits
to the size of their mortgages. Three profits tied to mortgages are (1)
the Builders and Sponsors' Profit and Risk Allowance (equal to 10% of
construction costs); (2) tax shelter benefits (tax savings depend on the
amount of depreciation allowed, and depreciation is a function of mortgage
amount); and (3) income from the sale of syndication (the price of syndi-
cation is a percentage of the mortgage; hence a larger mortgage means a
larger price and larger profit). As a result, many developers try to over-
estimate their construction and mortgage costs, while underestimating oper-
ating costs. Frequently they run up additional mortgage expenses during
construction through community opposition, labor strikes, contractor mis-
management or misrepresentation, or general inflation. Whenever mortgages
increase, for whatever reason, a greater portion of rents has to be devoted
to debt service and less is available for operating expenses.
In the past, HUD-FHA officials have permitted developers to increase
their mortgages, while correspondingly underestimating operating costs in
order to keep developers satisfied and make projects appear financially
feasible on paper. HUD urged developers to make projects feasible for
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constructiona even when it knew they couldn't be managed on projected
budgets. Deficient operating budgets are widespread in projects planned
during the 1960's and very early 1970's because HUD focused almost exclu-
sively on production, practically ignoring management issues in subsidized
housing. It permitted construction of many projects whose operating
budgets were deficient by the time the first tenant moved in. The result
is glaringly evident in Boston where a representative sample of 30 221d3
and 236 projects had initial operating cost overruns that ran from a low
*
of $105 per unit per year to a high of $622 per unit per year.
In addition to approving projects with insufficient budgets, HUD
approved still more whose operating budgets were sufficient on opening day
but which lacked any financial cushion to absorb increases in operating
expenses. In these projects, the slightest inflationary increase or extra-
ordinary expense can set off a downward spiral that is likely to destroy
projects' financial viability. A nationwide HUD Audit of the 236 program
in 1971 concluded that operating costs generally were 20% above advance
**
estimates. The five Boston area projects presented in Table 1-1 had
costs which rose 51% to 179% over projected costs during the first four
years of occupancy.
Around 1971, the HUD Audit,coupled with an alarmingly steady rise in
defaults and foreclosures of subsidized housing, shocked HUD-FHA into pay-
ing more attention to management issues throughout the planning and develop-
ment of 221d3 and 236 housing. HUD's own national audit of the 236 program
in 1971 revealed that insufficient management planning was threatening the
*
Urban Observatory data.
**
Interview with Fred Pfaender, March 13, 1973.
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viability of many projects around the country. HUD moved to correct its
earlier programmatic deficiencies by requiring new housing developments
to be planned with realistic operating budgets. While in 1967 it had
approved projects with budgets as low as $333 per unit per year, in 1973
it speaks about budgets of $850-1,000 per unit per year, But what about
existing projects, already occupied, whose budgets are frozen?
On numerous occasions, government officials have acknowledged the need
for more operating monies. Former HUD Assistant Secretary for Housing
Management, Norman Watson, once listed half a dozen possible sources of
*
additional operating funds for 221d3 and 236 housing, but he never pur-
sued them before leaving office. In the third section of this paper, I
will examine potential sources of additional operating funds for 221d3 and
236 projects. I will discuss their implications in some detail, outlining
their costs, both immediate and long-term; identifying who would ultimately
pay for the funds; describing their potential secondary effects on housing
projects; and citing those which could attack some of the causes of cost
increases. This examination will test whether it is possible to restructure
existing housing projects to yield sufficient operating monies, or whether
they are inescapably trapped in a cost squeeze that will inevitably move
them toward foreclosure.
This discussion is not meant to imply that money alone is the solution
to all problems in federal rental assistance housing programs. Clearly,
the government and housing sponsors cannot simply buy their way out of
all the problems of subsidized housing or even out of all the management
problems. The first chapter of this study raised the issue of difficulties
*
Norman Watson, Remarks . .. , p.5.
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inherent in public regulation of private housers: money alone will not
solve these considerations. Furthermore, as the Urban Institute's
extensive management studies conclude, good management is the product of
many factors, key among them being relations between management and
tenants. This study shows that when relations between the two are good,
*
operating costs tend to be less than when they are bad. This observation
means that better managed housing tends to have lower 0 & M costs than
poorly managed housing. Nevertheless, many housing projects clearly need
more money in order to operate adequately. Unless managers have suffi-
cient funds to provide tenants with decent services, it is hard to imagine
that relations between them could be harmonious. If inflation continues,
the number of even well-managed properties that need more operating funds
will also increase.
*
Robert Sadacca, et.al, Housing Management: Second Progress Report.
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Section 2: The Friction of Doing Business With Public Agencies
Chapter 3: The Cost of Dealing With Public Regulators
Private developers and managers of publicly assisted housing are
regulated by public agencies which administer and oversee the private
application of housing subsidies. These agencies include HUD, local
housing authorities, city assessing departments, and local rent control
boards. They supervise not only initial decisions about projects'
location, design and financing, but also continuing management of the
housing. As additional subsidies and their administering intermediaries
are linked to projects, an increasing number of managerial functions
become subject to public scrutiny and control: tenant selection and eviction,
rent levels, maintenance, decisions on rennovation, and bookkeeping.
Agencies have intervened in these functions in an attempt to control the
use of subsidies. They watch over private housing managers in publicly
assisted projects to ensure that the intended goals of subsidy programs
are achieved. While this intent is laudable, considerable regulation
ensues, and satisfying all regulatory requirements is very costly to sub-
sidized projects.
Not only do projects sustain large costs to obtain and administer
individual subsidies, but when subsidies are doubled one on top of another
the costs of coordinating them further increase. Since each subsidy is
under the jurisdiction of a different public department or agency, each
has a separate set of rules and regulations, not to mention other admin-
istrators. The manager of any subsidized housing project must fulfill the
requirements of each intermediary and then orchestrate his dealings with all
of them. For instance, the manager of a 236 housing project with leased
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housing and rent supplement has to screen his tenants according to three
different sets of requirements, complete three kinds of application and
income certification forms. If he wants to increase rents, he has to go
to both HUD and the local housing authority for approvals; if he is in a
city with rent control, such as Boston, he may also have to submit the
rent increase request to the local rent board. All these submissions
demand much paperwork and energy to chase through the bureaucracies.
Furthermore, if all the agencies do not give the same ruling on his
request, he may have to turn mediator and attempt to make them cooperate
on his behalf. Since agencies are often jealous of their own perogatives,
this may be a difficult, aggravating and time consuming task. For instance,
one 300 housing unit project in Boston was granted a rent increase by HUD
after nine months of petitions only to spend another 24 months persuading
the Boston Housing Authority to pay the increased rents for leased housing
tenants. In the interim, it spent three months justifying the increase to
the Boston Rent Control Board. During the 33 months it took to get the
increase, its cash flow was destroyed and five to ten hours of the manager's
time, each week for two-and-a-half years, was consumed by the negotiations.
These constitute part of the friction of doing business with public agencies.
While the federal government has assumed that private ownership in
*
partnership with public subsidies could be successful, it has not asked
See, for instance, the Kaiser Committee report, A Decent Home: "The Principal
charge of this Committee was to find the necessary incentives and mechanisms
for attracting more private participation in the development of subsidized
housing." (p.5) And the "Declaration Policy", Housing and Urban Development
Act of 1968: "There exist in the public and private sectors of the economy
the resources and capability necessary to the full realization of this
goal [of a decent home and suitable living environment meant for every
American family]." (Complete citations are in bibliography).
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what costs this partnership imposes on management. No one has examined
how much time managers spend dealing with public agencies; how many hours
they use, for instance, to gain federal and local agency consent for rent
increases or rennovations. No one has questioned how long it takes
managers to receive payments for leased housing from local housing author-
ities. In short, no one has examined the expenses that managers incur in
order to fulfill the requirements of public regulators.
The government has structured housing programs to contain sufficient
financial incentives to attract private developers, and then assumes that
developers are "economic men" who will participate only if the financial
rewards are worthwhile. Their participation is taken as sufficient proof
that the costs of handling public subsidies are not too high. However, no
one has examined the costs bourn not during development but rather through-
out the operation of housing projects. These are the unintended, external
costs of present housing subsidies -- their invisible price. They are
expenses to managers of doing business with special subsidy programs.
The overhead cost to the government of subsidy programs has frequently
*
been described. It has been quantified, in some detail, by at least one
writer, Arthur Solomon in The Cost Effectiveness of Subsidized Housing. He
points out that the real expenses for each subsidy include not only the
amount of benefits given to the recipient, but also the amount spent by
the government to administer them. My contention is that the real price
also includes the amount spent by housing managers to administer subsidies
within housing projects. These costs are not incurred by managers of
private, market housing which does not receive subsidy benefits. They are
*
See, for instance, Bernard Frieden Improving Federal Housing Subsidies,
p.15; and The Economics of Federal Subsidy Programs, p.113 ff.
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felt only in subsidized projects.
Doing business with the government may bring benefits to projects,
sometimes very sizeable ones. In many cases, housing developments would
never have existed without public agencies and their subsidies. But these
benefits come at a price.
This price is one contributor to the operating squeeze of subsidized
housing described in Chapter 2.
projects, costs that are almost
are initially planned. For one
236 rehab., the cost of dealing
$170-$215 per unit per year, or
*
allocated for management fees.
The intent of this section
housing projects, in Boston, of
examines the costs and benefits
that provides a subsidy. Costs
It adds large administrative costs to
never accurately assessed when projects
Boston non-profit sponsor of 221d3 and
with public agencies has run as high as
two to three times the amount initially
is to outline the expenses to subsidized
dealing with public agencies. It
of doing business with each intermediary
are given in the form of time and dollars
actually expended by managers: they are not reduced to the limited amounts
acceptable to HUD for accounting purposes. This study, however, is not a
formal cost-benefit analysis since it does not compute the savings or net
costs of public subsidies and regulation. It focuses only on the gross
costs of doing business with public agencies. Since this study was under-
taken in Boston, these agencies are the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, the Boston Housing Authority, the Massachusetts Welfare
All figures on management expenses, except where noted, are based on an
average cost of $5 per hour for administrative time and overhead.
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- *
Department, and the City of Boston Assessing Department. Each managerial
function that they regulate will be discussed. Under HUD, these functions
include, for instance, projects' financial record-keeping and management-
tenant relations. One public authority that does not give a subsidy is
also discussed: the Boston Rent Board. The overhead expenses attributable
to the Rent Board are not unique to subsidized housing. They are inccured
by all housing under the Rent Board's jurisdiction which encompasses the
great majority of rented dwellings in Boston. Although the costs associated
with Rent Board requirements are shared by much market housing, they are
discussed nevertheless, because they are very costly to managers of sub-
sidized housing and complicate their dealings with subsidizing agencies.
For example, when managers want to raise rents, they must obtain approval
from the Rent Board in addition to HUD and, if leased housing is involved,
BHA. The existence of a Rent Board review can affect approval procedures
at the other agencies.
Data on the actual costs of dealing with public agencies is generally
difficult to ascertain since HUD permits projects to take only 5% or 6% of
rents for general management and administrative expenses. No managers whom
I contacted kept records of real administrative time costs because under
HUD's regulations they have no way to recoup that expense. Since most
*
Public utility departments provide subsidies to some housing projects in
the form of special, low rates, but since they are quasi-public businesses,
rather than actual government bodies, I will not discuss them.
In Boston, the number of other public agencies whose functions touch
housing without providing any subsidies has recently proliferated. These
agencies, with the noted exception of the Rent Board, will not be dis-
cussed here, even though subsidized projects sometimes have to do business
with them. They include: Board of Appeal, Boston Redevelopment Authority,
Building Department, Health and Hospitals, Housing Inspection Department,
Office of Public Services, Public Facilities Department, Public Improvement
Commission, Public Works Department, Real Property Department, and the
Zoning Commission.
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managers share their administrative staff and resources with non-project
activities, they do not record separately the time consumed while working
on public agencies' requirements. Managers with multiple parcels often
centralize their administrative functions and cost accounting, so they
lack records of overhead expenses in individual projects. In order to
determine real management costs on a per project and per unit basis, I
drew on six main sources. Three of these are management entities whose
staffs I interviewed repeatedly and at length to ascertain their real
expenses. They estimated the number of hours and any direct expenses
(such as legal fees or postage) associated with regulated, administrative
activities. (In general, administrative time was estimated to be worth
$5 per hour). From this information, I complied a base of comparative
costs in three different kinds of projects. Each represents a distinct
kind of development and a distinct kind of management organization. The
three are:
1) Greater Boston Community Development - a public interest
organization that manages small (3-25 unit), non-profit projects.
2) Mr. Brown - an independent manager who handles, on a contractual
basis, medium-sized limited dividend projects with 50-150 units.
*
3) State Management - a wholly owned management subsidiary of a
large development company with large, 500-1,000 unit, limited
dividend developments.
The information from these three was complimented by less intensive
interviews with other managers in the Boston area - the fourth major source
*
"Mr. Brown" and "State Management" are pseudonyms. They stand for an
individual manager in a small management company and a management team
in a large company who asked that their real names not be used.
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for this paper. In particular, two sponsor-managers who participated in
the Boston Urban Renewal Program (BURP) in the late 1960's were questioned
about a variety of issues.
The fifth source for data about projects' costs is the Boston Urban
Observatory. With principal investigator Vince O'Donnell, it is conducting
a study of government assisted private housing in Boston, The Subsidized
Housing Study. This study is examining "the extent of and reasons for
financial and social difficulty in federally subsidized rental housing
projects". It has interviewed managers and owners in a sample of 27
projects and conducted a financial analysis of the projectsIdevelopment
and operating costs. Vince O'Donnell has kindly allowed me to review this
*
material, and I have drawn on it for many examples and figures. The
Urban Observatory study will be finished in September, 1973.
Another major source of information about public intervention was the
staffs in public agencies. I interviewed people in HUD, BHA, MHFA, and
the Boston Rent Board in order to get their side of the picture. (See
"List of Interviews", p.190 for a complete record of officials interviewed).
Based on these diverse sources, I have compared the costs of different
low and moderate income subsidized projects and tried to ascertain why
management costs vary greatly -- as they do -- among different developments.
A fuller understanding of these costs would depend on knowing comparable
overhead expenses in market and middle class housing. While this study
shows that subsidized housing managers must undertake many costly, regulated
activities which market managers do not encounter, the formers' expenses
Since this data has not been published yet, it will be footnoted simply
as "Urban Observatory data."
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could be seen in better perspective if the latters' costs were available.
Useful comparisons between subsidized and market housing would be, for
example, the cost of obtaining a tax abatement versus the cost of admin-
isterizing tax payments at standard assessments. Still more interesting
would be comparisons between overall administrative costs in low income
and middle income housing. While there is speculation that overhead
management costs are always higher in low income than in middle class
housing --even when both are on the private market--actual discrepencies
do not seem to be documented. If they were, then it would be possible to
know whether the costs discussed in this study are part of a consistent
pattern of high overhead in low income developments or whether they are
atypical.
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Chapter 4: Federal Regulator: HUD-FHA
Although 221d3 and 236 are considered housing production programs,
the federal government's involvement in them does not end when construction
of buildings is completed. If anything, its intervention increases once
buildings are finished and occupied. The government always remains heavily
involved financially and politically. Financially, it pays major subsidies
for tenants and for developers throughout the life of the mortgage. For
tenants, it reduces the interest paid on mortgages to 1% (in 236) or 3%
(in 221d3), effectively decreasing rents. This amounts to an annual sub-
sidy commitment of approximately $450 to $1500 per unit per year for the
forty year term of mortgages, with an average yearly subsidy in Boston of
$975/unit in 236 projects and $722/unit in 221d3.
This lowers the monthly rent on a typical unit by $81 in 236 and $60
in 221d3. For developers, a major attraction is the possibility of sub-
stituting foregone development fees for any real cash equity. Then they
can "mortgage out": "borrow enough to cover all out-of-pocket costs - and
*
sell to final owners having made little or no investment in cash". Final
owners receive substantial government subsidies in the form of tax shelter
benefits under federal income tax laws, particularly the 1969 tax reform
act which greatly increased the tax value of depreciation on low and
moderate income housing.
In return for these benefits, tenants and sponsor-managers, but
especially sponsor-managers, agree that HUD can regulate certain managerial
functions in the housing projects. These functions include:
*
Henry Aaron, Shelter and Subsidies, p.132.
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1. Keeping records on projects' financial status: HUD dictates
the format for projects' financial accounts and then reviews
them periodically.
2. Changing projects' fiscal arrangements: HUD reviews and
must approve any changes in projects' financial status,
including rent increases and mortgage modifications.
3. Maintaining projects' physical condition: HUD inspects
projects periodically and must approve any major
rennovations.
4. Maintaining management-tenant relations: HUD puts certain
restrictions around these relations, requiring the use of
approved leases defining eligibility rules for tenants.
In some projects, HUD provides a double subsidy in the form of rent
supplement payments. Along with the payments come additional HUD regula-
tions for the management of projects. However', while the basic 22ld3
236 programs institute subsidies and regulations which are binding on all
tenants in a given project, rent supplements lower rents only for selected
tenants and accordingly carry regulations which apply only to a portion of
the tenants in any project. Managers have the job of keeping track of
which tenants receive the second subsidy.
Table 2-1 summarizes the tasks which management must perform in order
to satisfy HUD regulations under mortgage interest rate and rent supplement
subsidies. It also presents the costs in administrative time and overhead
that GBCD, Mr. Brown and State Management have incurred while fulfilling
each requirement. As the totals indicate, GBCD is spending more than its
total management fees simply in order to fulfill all HUD's regulatory
Managements' Dealings with HUD and Their Costs
management's dealing with HUD
*
Management firm and costs
GBCD - small projects
5 - 25 units
avg: 10 units
per project
per year
records financial status according
to regulations:
keeps accounts in accordance
with format in FHA 2230
keeps monthly accounts avail-
able to HUD, on demand
has yearly certified audit &
prepares profit & loss state-
ment
computes, collects & records
residual receipts
keeps separate bank accounts
for rents & security deposits
maintains up-to-date rent
schedule
send escrow accounts for
taxes, insurance & replace-
ment reserve to GNMA; request
them when expenditure required
*
All costs are computed on a basis
negligible,
regulations
negligible
$300-500
$84 or
1-1/2 hr/mo.
$120 or
2 hr/mo.
per unit
per year
provided
$21-30
$7
$5-24
$5
$15 $0.60-3
5% of replacement
reserve value lost
Brown - medium projects
40 - 140 units
avg: 60 units
per project
per year
per unit
per year
State - large projects
400 - 1000 units
avg: 500 units
per project
per year
per unit
per year
books are initially establibhed according to HUD
$2000-2500 $18-50 $2500 $2.50-6
$90 $7
$180 or
3 hr/mo.
$1.30-
4.50
$5
$30 $0.20-
.75
$500 or
2-3 hrs/mo.
.25
$0.50-1.00
$350-400 $0.40-.95
$10
$10-20 negligible
of $5 per hour for management time, including overhead such as typing, etc.
0i
Table 2-1:
Table 2-1, Con't.
management's dealing with HUD
formally requests changes in
project's financial status:
requests rent increases &
pursues them
requests expenditure of
replacement reserve
requests mortgage modifi-
cation
has physical condition of
buildings mQnitored:
HUD inspects buildings yr'ly
deals with tenants according to
regs:
rents-up according to regs,
including'tenant certification
recertifies tenants -
bi-annually in 221d3
annually in 236
administers rent supp. program***
certifies tenants as eligible
recertifies tenants
GBC's.cost
project/yr.
$500-700 for
10 small pro-
jects, or
$100 if done
singly
$50-100 per
,request
N.A.
unit/yr.
$5-10*
N.A.
negligible
$500-
2500
$12-62
$50-250
$ 5o-150'
$100 or
20 hours
$2.50**
$10
$10-15 or
2-3 hr.
$5-15 or
1-3 hrs.
Brown's cost
project/yr.
N.A.
unit/yr.
N.A.
$200 + $200 $3-5
for title search
negligible
$2000-
7000
$100-350
$210-
100
$100-350
$50 or
10 hours
$2.50
$7-10
$2.50
Y2 hr.
or
$75
State's cost
project/yr.
$2000-5000
N.A.
N.A.
$25
$40,000-
100,000
$2000-7000
$2100-
10,000
$2000-7500
$600.
unit/yr.
$2.50*
N.A.
N.A.
negligible
$100
$5-7$7-10
$10-15 or
2-3 hr.
$2.50 or
Y hr.
* ro-rated as one increase every two years
** pro-rated across two years to get yearly figure
assumes half of tenants on rent supp. Per otr% -os3 es e as are a pp.
+-~ 1 ve C)~~C. Tre-VvC !SQPC3.
04
Table 2-1, Con't.
GBCD's cost
management's dealing with HUD project/yr.
administers rent supp.
program
certifies tenants as
eligible
recertifies tenants
keeps records of
tenant occupancy
bills HUD monthly
receives HUD payments
a month late
keeps tenants in appro-
priately sized units
$100-150
$50-150
$50 or
10 hr.
$60
unit/yr.
$10-15 or
2-3 hr.
$5-15 or
1-3 hr.
$4-10
$4.50-11
5% of value of rent
supp. payments lost
$400-700
per move
Brown's cost
project/yr.
$100-350
$75
$50 or
10 hr.
$60
unit/yr.
$2.50 or
1/2 hr.
$1-4
$1.65
$0.90-3
negligible
$50-200
State's cost
project/yr.
$2000-7500
$600
$50
$50
unit/yr.
$10-15 or
2-3 hr.
$2.50 or
1/2 hr.
negligible
negligible
00
negligible, but cash flow
disturbed
$116-120+
$15 in mgnt.
time
assumes half of tenants on rent supp. Per unit costs only for units with rent supp.
**
assumes 10 tenants on rent supp.
-39-
requirements. Its total fees for nine small projects run $6,445 per year,
while it needs $825 - 1,125 annually to cover each project's federal
requirements. For GBCD, fees are not sufficient to cover all its
obligations to public agencies; they hardly cover GBCD's federal dues.
In contrast, Brown and State can pay for all their regulatory obligations
out of management fees, although in Brown's case insufficient money is
left over for other management duties such as supervision of housing
services and rent collection.
HUD Regulates Projects' Financial Status
When HUD commits a federal mortgage interest subsidy to a 221d3
or 236 project it guarantees that subsidy for forty years, the life of the
mortgage. Having locked itself into a subsidy for four decades, it
maintains the right to oversee the project which is benefitting from
reduced rents. It keeps track of the recipient's financial status and
records, first, by dictating an accounting format which provides HUD with
all the information it desires. (This format is given in Handbook of FHA
Requirements Governing Fiscal Operations, Accounting and Financial Reports
*
for Multi-family Housing Projects, FHA No. 2230.) All three managers
interviewed at length said this requirement had negligible costs, since
their books were initially set up according to HUD outlines. However, if
any had first organized its books on different accounting principles, it
would have had to shoulder the expense either of converting its books or
keeping two separate sets of books, one for the government and one for
its own in-house use. A few developers have chosen the latter option.
*
Cooperative projects use a slightly different format.
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Second, in addition to stating that these books must always be
available on demand, HUD requires that 221d3 and 236 projects be audited
annually, again in accordance with its format. This has imposed extra
costs on GBCD. If HUD's format were waived, GBCD director Bob Whittlesey
estimates that its audit costs would be halved, reduced from $300-500 per
project -- depending on size -- to $150-300 per project. Mr. Brown's
audit costs have been considerably higher, up to $2050 in a 65 unit project
and as high as $2,500 in larger projects. The four reasons for his
higher costs are, one: his projects are larger; two: his projects are not
non-profits, so audits include more computations to determine and certify
limited dividend distributions; three: his audits include the completion
of tax returns for the limited dividend partnership; and, four: he employs
a prestigious auditing firm which charges high overhead rates. When
asked what this company would charge to audit small, non-profit projects
like GBCD's, Mr. Brown replied, "Around $1000" -- still two to three times
GBCD's costs. If an independent auditor were employed, he said the cost
might go down to $500, or the same as GBCD's costs with a large, national
auditing firm. The conclusion I draw from this is that it would pay
project managers to shop around for outside vendors, like auditors,
because their costs are not always comparable. State Management, whose
projects are far larger than Mr. Brown's, quoted a similar figure for audit
and accompanying legal costs: $2500 per project. State's bookeeper said
that approximately $1000 of this amount could be attributed to the audit
itself, while the rest went for legal fees. Evidently, it has not had
to pay more than Mr. Brown for larger projects. State's costs were
echoed by another large development-management company which has
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rehabilitation projects in many cities.
State's director disagrees with Whittlesey's statement that auditing
costs would be halved if HUD rules were eliminated. His costs for
audits of for-profit housing projects are the same irrespective of whether
they are BUD subsidized or private financed.
One of the primary difficulties with audit costs is that in the
vast majority of subsidized projects, little or even no monies are
allocated for audits in initial operating budgets. FHA-HUD's form for
the calculation of operating and mortgage costs, #2264, does not even
contain a line for audit expenses. If a project has budgeted nothing,
its first audit may cause a mad scrambling of the budget to identify the
needed $500 - 2,500.
A third fiscal matter under HUD's control is residual receipts.
Residual receipts are net income from: 1) unexpended ANPO funds, 2)
net rents received prior to cost certification, 3) in 22ld3 projects the
portion of rent paid by an over-income tenant which exceeds the basic
**
rent.
Residual receipts must be recorded on particular HUD forms and then
deposited in a special bank account. A manager is not allowed to spend
them without HUD approval. In 236 projects, excess rents are not part of
residual receipts. Instead, they must be recorded on special HUD forms
and then remitted monthly to HUD.
*
Urban Observatory Data.
**
Insured Project Management Guide, pp.1 89-191.
***-
The different handling of excess rents in the two kinds of projects is
not whimsical. The difference is based on the distinction between 221d3
and 236 subsidies. In 221d3 projects, the federal government provides a
fixed subsidy amount per dwelling unit, regardless of who occupies a unit,
while in 236 projects its contribution decreases as the income of tenants
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Since residual receipts impose extra obligations on management, Mr.
Brown has tried to prevent them. That is to say, he has avoided over-
income tenants in order not to have the administrative expense of handling
excess income. Surely HUD did not intend its administrative rules to
turn into a tenant screening device!
GBCD has not consciously avoided over-income tenants. But it has
only one and hence only one residual receipt of $7 per month. GBCD's
bookeeper, Dotti Rosette, estimates that almost the same amount, $7, is
needed to pay for the administrative time used in processing the residual
receipt. Approximately an hour per month, or $60 per year, is absorbed
by recording,depositing and notifying HUD of the receipts. Because it
seems absurd to spend the equivalent of the residual receipt administering
it, GBCD does not deposit it in a special account, as officially required.
It leaves the $7 with other rent receipts and spends it like any other
income. Although this is technically illegal, it seems the more
sensible action, particularly since the project is losing money.
With twenty times as many units as GBCD under management, State
has many tenants paying residual receipts. Approximately two to three
hours per month, or $500 per year, are its estimates of the cost of
handling this income according to the book.
HUD's books also detail the handling of two other kinds of project
income: residential rents and security deposits. Each must be placed
in separate bank accounts. The individual record-keeping for each
Cont'd.
increases. Thus, as tenants' income and then their rents rise, the increase
in rent is to be remitted to the federal government to reduce its contrib-
ution.
*
HUD's Management Handbook, Insured Project Management Guide.
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account probably adds to administrative costs two hours per month or $120
per year at GBCD, while Mr. Brown's cost runs slightly higher: 3 hours
per month or $180 per year, For State's large projects, this cost
increases to $350-$400 per year. State's higher cost is partially
attributable to a more complicated in-house financial system. Each of
its projects sends all receipts to the main office which makes all
deposits and draws all checks. This centralized disbursement of funds
is not uncommon in large management companies, nor is it unique to sub-
sidized projects. State's director pointed out that his market projects
also have to keep separate accounts for rents and security deposits
because recent court decisions make it mandatory to pay interest on
security deposits.
Projects' expenditures, as well as their income, are subject to HUD
rules. Procedures are specified for paying insurance, real estate taxes,
replacement reserves, and water and sewer bills. Escrow accounts for
each must be established with Government National Mortgage Association
(GNMA) in Philadelphia, and deposits made monthly. When a project wants
to expend funds in the escrow accounts, it must formally request GNMA to
disperse them. Since GNMA does not pay any interest on these accounts,
projects are deprived of the 5% of their value which could be earned if
**
funds were deposited in ordinary bank accounts. At GBCD, roughly one
hour per project per year has gone into each escrow account, or a total
of $15 per project, at a minimum. The time is used to arrange for GNMA
*
GNMA is the final mortgagee for 221d3 projects, while FNMA (Federal
National Mortgage Association) is usually the final mortgagee for 236
projects.
**
GNMA recently changed its rules so that projects can earn interest, but
only if they specifically request it.
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to make the appropriate disbursements. Sometimes this turns into a
complicated procedure, and then the cost increases. For instance,
GBCD deposits its tax escrow reserves at GNMA. The City of Boston
annually issues tax bills to both GBCD and GNMA. Since the tax bills
are often computed incorrectly, GBCD has officially requested GNMA not
to pay the tax bill directly, but to remit the tax escrow funds to
GBCD which can then negotiate the proper bill with the city and pay only
the correct amount. Unfortunately, GNMA has not always honored this
request; sometimes it has gone ahead and paid the tax bill which it
received. Then GBCD has had to spend considerable time at City Hall
trying to have any over-payments returned or credited against the
following year's accounts. Straightening out the tax bill has been
further complicated by GNMA's consistent failure to notify GBCD when
it paid the bill, despite repeated GBCD requests that it be informed
whenever GNMA disperses any of its escrow accounts. These same diffi-
culties repeat themselves when insurance companies submit bills. Thus,
although the escrow deposits are supposed to improve subsidized projects,
financial balance and simplifj their bill payments, in fact they have
caused GBCD considerable administrative expense.
GBCD's bookkeeper, Dottie Rosette, points out that the small size
of GBCD's projects is a disadvantage in dealing with GNMA because they
cannot absorb the expense of long distance calls to Philadelphia when
problems arise. A large project could afford a phone call to settle
problems because the call's expense could be spread over a large number
of units.
GBCD disputes with GNMA over handling of water and sewer escrow
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accounts finally prompted it to withdraw this escrow from Philadelphia
and maintain it in a local, private bank account.
These problems with GNMA do not seem to be typical of subsidized
housing, however; neither Mr. Brown nor State nor any of the managers
interviewed by the Urban Observatory has been perturbed by GNMA. They
seem to have been able to rationalize disbursements from GNMA-held
escrow accounts. State has all tax and insurance bills sent directly to
itself; it pays them, and then requests GNMA to reimburse it from escrowed
deposits. The State staff say that the cost of this procedure is
negligible, perhaps $5 to $10 per year for the time spent writing the
reimbursement request to GNMA. It can afford to advance payment because
its large projects produce sufficient cash flows. While Mr. Brown's
medium sized projects do not generate enough revenues to pay in advance,
he has all bills sent to him, and he reconciles them before forwarding
them to GNMA for payment. He estimates that perhaps $15 per year is
spent on each escrow account in his projects.
It is worth noting the discrepancies among GBCD's, State's, and
Mr. Brown's costs and problems in meeting HUD's fiscal requirements. The
larger projects have a lower per unit cost for each requirement because
they can amortize costs over a large base. (See Table 2-1 for figures).
GBCD seems to have had more difficulty dealing with GNMA and HUD, perhaps
because no single staff person there has had continuing responsibility
for dealing with public authorities.
HUD Reviews and Approves Changes in Projects' Financial Arrangements
No subsidized housing project can increase its rents until it
obtains approval from HUD. Once rents are set at initial occupancy, they
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can be raised only to cover documented cost increases such as higher
utility bills, increased tax assessments, or increased repair and main-
tenance costs. As I indicated in the previous chapter, the majority of
subsidized housing projects (in the Boston area) have suffered from increased
costs that cannot be covered by project income. In order to obtain HUD
approval for a rent increase, managers must submit documentation of
increased costs, along with projects' annual profit and loss statements.
Because increases are granted only for costs already incurred and
documented, they never catch up with present costs. HUD's rules require
that projects incur operating deficits before they can obtain more rental
income. While HUD's procedure is based on an understandable desire not
to permit unnecessary rent hikes, it enforces a considerable time lag
between rises in expenses and approval of additional rents to cover them.
Since costs are rising constantly with inflation, the effect of HUD's
requirements is that project income is always behind current expenses.
The result is a constant shortfall in operating funds. This is one of the
major administrative problems for subsidized projects. It is aggravated
by the lengthy amount of time required to obtain HUD approval for rent
increases once costs are documented.
Although HUD regulations state that all rent increase requests shall
be handled with utmost speed, obtaining approval is a long and expensive
procedure, according to managers. Managers say that requests are
frequently delayed in local HUD area offices.
Bob Whittlesey estimates that it has cost GBCD $500-700 to obtain a
HUD-approved rent increase, or over 100 hours of management time in order
to chase a rent increase through the HUD bureaucracy. These costs are not
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atypical: a manager of a 140-unit, limited dividend 236 project says it
costs him $600-700 to file for a rent increase. State claims costs of
$2,000-3,000, and occasionally up to $5,000 in its largest projects, to
obtain and implement rent increases. Implementation includes computing
new rents for each tenant, notifying him., and preparing new bills and
rent schedules.
The energy and persistence required to push a rent increase through
HUD are even larger than the dollar costs. Mr. Brown, for instance,
recently spent eight months obtaining a rent increase. He filed the
required papers in May and sat back to wait for HUD's ruling. When he
had heard nothing by July, he called the local HUD area office to
see what was happening. After being reassured that he'd hear soon, he
waited again. When HUD's silence continued into September, he tried
calling HUD repeatedly to no avail. So he finally called the HUD area
Director, whom Brown knew from other activities, and demanded a meeting.
This was speedily arranged, and Brown urged the Director to put some
pressure on his staff. Then within a couple of weeks, Brown's request
was processed in Boston and forwarded to the central HUD office in
Washington. By November, Brown felt Washington had had a long enough
time, so he called the Boston office to see whether his request had been
returned. When informed that no one there knew, he angrily called
Washington only to learn that his application had been approved and sent
back to Boston. Another call to the Boston area office. After he said
he'd spoken with the Washington staff and knew his request was okayed,
someone in Boston found it. Brown asked how much of an increase he'd
*
It is not a typical procedure for rent increases to go to Washington, but
it was necessary in this case due to the extraordinarily large amounts
being sought by Brown.
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been granted, but the HUD bureaucrat refused to tell him over the tele-
phone. So Brown repeated the figures he'd been given by Washington; the
HUD person admitted they were accurate. In that case, asked Brown, could
he implement the increase immediately, since the project was losing money?
No, came tae reply, not until he was officially notified in writing by
the Area Office. That letter finally came a month later, on December 28.
I have recounted this episode at length in order to suggest the
amount of paperwork and politicking sometimes required when dealing with
an inflexible bureaucracy.
Despite the lengthy period HUD holds requests for increases, it
generally subjects them to only a cursory examination. Neither cost
submissions nor the future impact of rent increases are carefully
scrutinized. For instance, new rents are computed on the basis of the
previous year's real estate taxes, in spite of the fact that higher rents
*
will push up the tax bill. Sometimes HUD has approved increases based
**
on double entries for the same item.
a
While reviewing manager's submissions, HUD does not give equal
weight to all cost categories in deciding whether a rent increase is
justified. A management showing significant losses from administrative
expenses would not be granted an increase as readily as one that showed
loss resulting from operating or maintenance costs. Developers and
managers are aware of this. They sometimes knowingly juggle their figures
*
Urban Observatory data, "Summary" 3/21/71, p. 4 .
**
Urban Observatory data.
Karlis Zobs, Study of Management Operation and Administrative Costs of
Moderate Income Rental Housing, p.5.
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to conform with HUD's perception of need. Thus, some administrative
*
expenses may be passed off as operating or maintenance costs in the
interests of securing a rent increase. This occurs because HUD does not
acknowledge the real costs of administering subsidized housing.
Given this attitude of HUD and rapidly rising costs, GBCD and
many other subsidized housing managers around Boston file for rent
increases continually. As soon as one increase is granted, they file
for another, anticipating that 12 months will elapse before the second
one can be implemented. The longer the processing time, the greater the
gap. With rapidly rising costs, approved rents are always behind actual
project expenses, according to Whittlesey. Continual filing for increases
is the only way he can hope to keep project income close to actual costs.
Several other housing managers said that they do not file so
frequently only because their tenants could not afford to pay rent
increases if they were approved. Caught in a squeeze between rising costs
and tenants on fixed or limited incomes, the managers are reluctant to
undertake the expense of obtaining a higher rent if much of any increase
will be consumed in the process. State Management claims that often half
the yearly value of an increase will be spent to obtain it.
The Director of Management in the Boston HUD Area Office, Irving
Solomon, acknowledges that rent increases have been terribly delayed in
his office. But he blames the delay on insufficient staff and says that
recently the Management Department hired several new people who can help
speed up the process. He also reports that as of May 15, 1973, a
*
Karlis Zobs, Study of Management Operation and Administrative Costs of
Moderate Income Rental Housing, p.5.
**
Urban Observatory data.
-50-
directive from the HUD central office ordered that all rent increases be
*
processed within 30 days.
Another change in projects' financial status which must have HUD
approval is expenditure from their replacement reserves. These reserves
are "designed to assure that funds are available to replace installed
**
items in a project." These items include stoves, heaters, floor tile,
roofing, and so forth. In order to spend replacement reserve funds,
projects must file a statement on why the funds are needed and how they
will be used. In addition, if a manager wants to suspend deposits to
the replacement reserve, either because the project is short of funds or
because a substantial reserve has already been compiled, he must request
permission. GBCD has expended between $50 and $100 on each request to
use part of its reserves.
A third change in project financial status that requires HUD approval
may, unlike the previous changes, bring special benefits to subsidized
projects. This is a modification of the mortgage.
If a subsidized housing project cannot cover all its operating
costs, it may request a temporary suspension or reduction of mortgage
principal payments in order to use the money to correct its operating
problems. Projects around Boston have been granted mortgage modifications
in order to repair such latent construction defects as leaky roofs and
foundations, in order to repair damanged units in compliance with housing
codes, and in order to pay accumulated, outstanding bills.
*
Interview with Irving Solomon, May 16, 1973.
**
Insured Project Management Guide, HUD No.4351.1, p.1 8 7 .
Urban Observatory data.
-51-
Obtaining a mortgage modification is no simple matter. It may require
up to six months of negotiations, according to Brown. HUD often delays
its response to requests, leaving managers puzzled about their obligations.
Before amodification is granted, managers must pay for an up-dated title
search, which adds a couple hundred dollars of expenses. Mortgage payments
must be current when a modification begins, so if any payments have been
skipped, they must be made. One of Mr. Brown's projects was granted a 12
month modification, but only after its general partners contributed $19,000
to bring the project current on its mortgage, pay the management fee, and
hire someone to repair the project during modification. Brown estimates
that $200 worth of his time was expended obtaining the modification from
HUD.
Although mortgage modifications entail costs, they also bring special
benefits to subsidized projects. Ordinary market housing could not get
permission to waive principal payments. If it ever failed to pay the
mortgage, it would be foreclosed. But HUD is very anxious not to own
subsidized housing. So it established modification procedures as a way
of enabling projects to ride out temporary periods of financial difficulty.
HUD is not the only party which must consent to a mortgage modification.
Mortgages must also approve them since they are the institutions which will
not be paid during the modifications. Since GNMA is the final mortgagee
for 221d3 and FNMA for most 236 projects, their consent has not been too
difficult to obtain in the past; although as the number of projects
requesting modifications increases nationwide, they may become more re-
luctant to give approval. Both them and HUD have been anxious to accommo-
date mortgage modifications when they seemed the only way to remedy
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operating problems because all three agencies have considered keeping
projects out of foreclosure a higher priority than consistent mortgage
payments. HUD, in particular, does not want to be saddled with foreclosed
housing projects that would revert to its ownership. With an increasing
number of foreclosures in many HUD assisted housing programs, it is
doing everything in its power to avoid becoming the owner of last resort.
So housing projects may benefit from HUD's fears, even though this bene-
fit comes only at the expense of considerable management effort. As
mentioned earlier, non-subsidized market housing is not eligible for
either the costs or the benefits of mortgage modifications. With few
exceptions, if a market housing project defaults on its mortgage
principal payments because the money is needed for repairs, its mortgage
will be foreclosed.
HUD Monitors Projects' Physical Condition
A third aspect of subsidized housing projectswhich HUD regulates is
the physical condition of projects. During the development and construc-
tion of projects, it approves their plans and specifications. It sends
out its own inspectors to ensure that construction is completed according
to plan. (See Section 3, pp.1 4 4 ff. for further discussion of HUD's
involvement in construction). After occupancy, HUD is supposed to make
an annual physical inspection of all projects. If any defects are seen,
it is supposed to push management to repair them. However, according to
GBCD and other managers in the Boston area, these inspections often do
not occur. When they do, they do not themselves cost projects anything,
since they are made without notifying managements. (Of course, if defects
are turned up, their repair will involve maintenance costs.) In several
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Boston projects, HUD inspections occurred only after tenants went to HUD
to protest inadequate conditions in their apartments. (Section 3, pages
144ff., discusses other ramifications of HUD inspections.)
HUD Regulates Management-Tenant Relations
Management-tenant relations are conditioned by some HUD regulations.
When projects open initially, rent-up must be done according to HUD rules.
These include provisions for equal opportunity advertising, cooperation
with local public service agencies which might know potential tenants,
HUD approval of all leases signed with tenants, selection of tenants
according to HUD determined priorities, and screening of tenants accord-
ing to HUD rules for income eligibility. Management is also responsible
for certifying that tenants are within income limits for subsidized
projects. In 221d3 projects, a two page FHA form (No.1705, Total Family
Income Certification) and in 236 projects, a three page FHA form (No.3131,
Application for Tenant Eligibility) must be completed for each applicant.
One manager of many 236 projects in the inner city of Boston estimates
that his firm spends an average of 20 hours renting each apartment or
double the time required to rent a market apartment in the absence of HUD
rules and requirements. GBCD's Bob Whittlesey and State Management
concur with this estimate. However, Brown said that his rent-up time
averages only 10 hours, or $50 in administrative costs. A large firm
which handles rehabed projects nationwide cites still lower costs: $21
or $22 per family, or around 4-5 hours. Its lower costs may be attributable
to a specially trained staff person who works primarily on rent-up.
After rent-up, management is also responsible for re-certifying
tenants' incomes every two years in 221d3 and every year in 236 projects.
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If management really sits down with each tenant to verify his current
income, it might spend half an hour to an hour with each 221d3 tenant
and an hour to two hours with each 236 tenant, according to Whittlesey.
(The difference in time is attributable to more complex forms for 236
tenants.) Even more time might be required if management had trouble
contacting a tenant and had to visit or call several times before obtain-
ing the required information. Again using a basic administrative cost
of $5 per hour, recertification would cost between $2.50 and $10 per
unit. In a 100 unit project, this is a cost of $250 to $1000.
These figures are echoed by State Management, while Brown finds
them a bit too high. He seems to have less trouble completing forms
with tenants than either of the other two managers. Another manager of
a large 236 project said that he spends $3.50 per apartment to verify
tenant incomes, a figure more in line with Brown's cost. Still other
managers have said that they refuse to spend the time and money re-
certifying tenants when they have no way of knowing whether the infor-
mation obtained from tenants is accurate. They admittedly fudge the
information. They point out that tenants have no incentive to be honest.
If their incomes have risen, they are supposed to pay more rent. Few
families will willingly pay more if they think they can pay less. If
tenants' family size has changed, they may have become eligible for a
different sized apartment, and management then has the responsibility of
trying to have them move into an appropriately sized unit.
If family size has decreased, what incentive does a family have
for telling someone who will then ask it to move into a smaller unit?
Of course, the reverse situation may exist: a tenant's income may have
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declined or his family size increased. In these cases, he would have an
incentive to recertify his financial status.
One manager summarized the recertification process: "it's tedious,
expensive and embarassing." In the opinion of many managers, these same
three adjectives could also be applied to another HUD form, the annual
occupancy report, form 9801. This form asks for information which is
not permitted to be part of tenants' applications and income certifica-
tions, according to federal guidelines on these forms. The right hand
of HUD seems not to tell the left hand what it is doing. As a result,
the information for 9801 is difficult to compile. Bob Whittlesey also
regards it as an infringement on tenants' privacy and so he refuses to
submit it. Another manager's complaint was that filling out the form
was a waste of time "because the government pays no attention to it".
He says he's tempted to write "ridiculous information" just to see
whether anyone in HUD ever notices.
Another management obligation, mentioned above, is to keep tenants
in appropriately sized units. HUD specifies how many people can live in
apartments with various numbers of bedrooms. GBCD's Whittlesey reports
that he does not abide by these HUD rules. Many of GBCD's units have
extra tenants after their initial residents take in family or friends
who need a place to stay. He regards his projects as "housing of last
resort" for these families and refuses to force them out or pay more
rent for larger units when they cannot afford the cost.
HUD officials are not unaware that its program requirements impose
extra costs on management. As its concern with housing management has
increased in the last several years, more words and time have been given
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to these costs. For instance, when it changed the re-certification of
236 tenants from a biennial requirement to an annual one, it announced:
It is recognized that it may be necessary to adjust
management fees to compensate for additional work-
load resulting from more frequent recertifications.
This matter will be covered by a separate issuance
after sufficient experience is obtained to make
possible a realistic evaluation of the actual costs.
(HUD circular HM 4442.22, 9/26/72)
Unfortunately, the rhetoric of this statement was never implemented,
according to the Boston Area HUD Office. Irving Solomon, Director of
Management, in that office, said that no other circular has ever been
issued. He acknowledges that the 5% or 6% management fee approved by
HUD is not sufficient to cover management's costs, but he "takes a hard
line" on any request for additional fees because he is "reluctant to
increase tenants' rents to put more money into the hands of management."
In particular, he is unwilling to increase management fees for limited
dividend projects: their sponsors are receiving enough benefits from
tax shelters, Solomon believes. They can dip into their own pockets to
cover administrative costs. When I asked whether he would allow increased
management fees for non-profit or cooperative projects,whose sponsors
presumably do not have their pockets lined with tax shelter benefits,
*
Solomon replied that he might, "if he were pushed to the wall." But
no one has yet pushed him to the wall, so he has not approved more funds
for any project. (The related issues of whether and how more management
funds could be made available to projects is discussed further in Section 3.)
HUD Provides and Regulates Rent Supplement Subsidies
HUD provides double subsidies to some housing projects. These take
*
Interview with Irving Solomon, May 16, 1973.
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the form of rent supplement payments. In the Northeastern part of the
United States, the rent supplement program is used primarily in 22ld3 and
236 projects. Here it has not untangled the federal government from
*
housing production programs, as it was originally intended to do. Instead,
it has become a means of assuring that the construction programs could
serve the low and moderate income families for whom they were designed.
It also has become a means of assuring federally assisted private developers
that they would receive sufficient rents to sustain carrying charges. It
became, in effect, an operating subsidy. One program was used to mend the
defects of another, without any thought about what administrative problems
**
would be created.
*
The rent supplement program originated in 1965, when it was offered as a
substitute for the 22ld3 program. Under rent supplement, a family pays 25%
of its income toward rent, while the federal government pays directly to
the landlord the difference between the rent and the tenant's contribution
(A Decent Home, p.64). However, rather than becoming a substitute for mort-
gage interest subsidy programs, rent supplement became an addition to them.
This shift in its use came in the late sixties, when it became apparent
that many tenants in 221d3 and 236 projects were spending a higher percent-
age of their incomes than they could afford (See HUD Audit Report of 236).
Construction and operating costs in 221d3 and 236 projects rose so high that
many tenants whose incomes fell within prescribed limits could not sustain
the rents on 25% of their incomes. So HUD piggybacked rent supplement onto
the production programs, in order to lower rents to 25% of tenants' incomes.
**
And also without much thought about whether the proposed mend was suffi-
cient to repair the gap between incomes and rents. Rent supplement has not
been sufficient. First, it still does not enable the lowest income families
to live in 22ld3 or 236 projects because it stipulates that no tenant may
receive a supplement which exceeds 70% of the fair market rent of the unit.
If 25% of a tenant's income is not sufficient to cover 30% of the rent in
an assisted unit, he cannot afford to live in the unit. For a typical 2-
bedroom unit with a rent of $140, no one with an income below $2016 could
pay the price, unless he paid more than 25% of his income.
Second, as operating costs have climbed, rent supplements have not
increased fast enough to cover them.
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The administrative burden for management increased with the double
subsidy. Every tenant who receives rent supplement support must be
screened, certified and re-certified annually according to rent supplement
guidelines, in addition to being screened and certified and re-certified
according to 221d3 or 236 guidelines. During rent-up, managers are also
responsible for verifying all information supplied by rent supplement
tenants and for determining whether they are eligible for rent supplement
under any of the five criteria specified by HUD:
1. Displaced by government action
2. Living in substandard housing
3. Had a dwelling destroyed by a disaster in a SBA
declared disaster area
4. 62 years of age or older
5. Physically handicapped.
At GBCD the initial certification of rent supplement tenant adds an hour
or two onto initial rent-up time. The annual recertification of tenants
takes another one to three hours at GBCD. Both Brown and State Management
cite less time for recertification, half an hour to an hour, although they
agreed that initial certification takes one or two hours per family.
Management must also keep separate occupancy records on rent supple-
ment tenants, filed according to specific HUD procedures. GBCD spends
approximately ten hours per year per project to maintain these records, or
another $50 per year in management expense.
Unlike interest rate subsidies, rent supplement subsidies are not
remitted automatically by HUD. Management must submit a bill for them
at the end of each month, specifying how many days each rent supplement
tenant was in residence. Then HUD pays for the previous month. While
the actual billing cost is negligible at GBCD, receiving payment six
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weeks late, rather than in advance, disrupts projects' cash flows.
Another cost of the rent supplement program is that HUD pays its
share of the rent at the end of the month, not the beginning as does the
individual tenant. Whittlesey complained about this, saying that he was
losing 5% of the value of all his rent supplement subsidies: this is the
amount of interest he could get if HUD paid the rents on the first of the
month, and he deposited them in a bank account for the month. Instead,
HUD gets the use of the money for that month.
State Management was not bothered by this loss, but it did say
that late receipt of rent supplement payments disturbed its projects'
cash flows and made it impossible for them to pay bills on time, causing
them to lose any available discount for early payment.
Late payment of rent is not the only HUD rule that has unintentionally
created costs for projects. A seemingly innocuous rule is that tenants
should be kept in appropriately sized apartments, that is, in apartments
with no more bedrooms than they need. However, both GBCD and State said
special expenses grew out of this requirement.
GBCD recently had a rent supplement'who moved in with his wife and
two children. After two years, the tenant's children left home and his
wife died. Suddenly, one man was living in a three bedroom apartment.
Since he then only qualified for a one-bedroom apartment, GBCD waited
until a one bedroom unit was vacant and asked him to move there. He
refused. After several discussions failed to persuade him to move volun-
tarily, GBCD is evicting him, hoping that legal proceedings will prompt
him to move. Meanwhile, it has had to keep the one-bedroom apartment
vacant for two months, losing rent. If and when the man does move, it
-60-
will have to pay to redecorate his old apartment, so another tenant can
move in, producing more management costs. (See discussion of Boston Rent
Board, pages 94 ff, for costs of eviction.) Whittlesey estimates that
GBCD is losing between $400 and $700 in the attempt to move this one
tenant into an apartment which is appropriate, according to HUD regula-
tions.
State Management has never had an instance of a tenant refusing to
move, but it computes that each move made to keep a tenant in the right
sized unit costs $116-120 - the cost of normal apartment turnover - plus
$15 in management time to explain the move and process accompanying paper-
work.
While it is understandable that HUD does not want to subsidize empty
bedrooms, it does not provide any way for management to cover the over-
head costs of participation in the rent supplement program.
For three different management entities these costs average:
GBCD - $160-260 per project per year or $16-26 per unit per year
Brown - $185 per project per year or $ 3-10 per unit per year
State - $710 per project per year or $1.45 per unit per year.
HUD-Summary
After providing the subsidy which enables 221d3 and 236 housing to
exist, HUD watches over occupied projects to ensure that they are managed
in accordance with federal rules. Managers must file numerous reports,
requests, claims and certifications to demonstrate their compliance with
HUD's requirements. These filings impose large time and dollar costs. In
small projects they can consume more than the entire HUD-allowed 5%
*
See page 74 for a discussion of the discrepencies among these figures.
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management fee. Larger projects can spread overhead costs across a large
number of units. This is illustrated in Table 2-2 which gives the manage-
ment fees and the administrative costs for three managers.
This table cannot show the non-pecuniary costs imposed by HUD
requirements. There is no way to measure the frustration and anger
aroused by a large, sometimes cumbersome, and often slow bureaucracy.
Nor is there a measure to assess how much management energy is diverted
by HUD away from the provision of services to tenants. This last, non-
quantifiable cost may be one of the most detrimental side effects of
HUD's many requirements.
Table 2-2: Summary - Costs of HUD Requirements
cost of fulfilling cost of rent total cost of management
management firm basic HUD require- supplement all HUD fees
(avg. no. of ments* requir ents requirments
units per pro- per project per unit per project per unit per project per unit per project per unit
ject) per year per year per year per year per year per year per year per year
GBCD $825-1,125 $82.50- $160-260 $16-26 $985-1,385 $98.50- $560-960 $56-96
(10 units) 112.50 138.50
Brown $2,850- $47.50- $185 $3.10 $3,035- $50.60- $5,040 $84(60 units) 3,350 55.80 3,535 58.90
State $6,365- $12.75- $710 $1.45 $7,075- $14.20- $42,000 $84
(500 units) 7,925 15.85 8,635 17.30
Notes to Table 2-2:
*
Cost of rent increases pro-rated as one increase every two years;
does not include rent-up costs;
does not include occasional costs such as mortgage modifications or expenditures of replacement
reserve; therefore these figures represent minimum costs.
**
Estimated cost; exact figures not available.
I%
Compared to Management Fees
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Chapter 5: Local Regulators
Although 221d3 and 236 are federal subsidy programs, local government
agencies are also often extensively involved in particular projects. For
most Boston area manager, local public authorities have been the source
of three additional subsidies. The first is leased housing subsidy which
comes from the Boston Housing Authority; the second is direct rent pay-
ments from the State Welfare Department; and the third is a special, low
tax assessment fixed at only 17% of gross potential rent by the city
*
government. Like the federal subsidies, these have had a double-edged
impact on subsidized housing. On the one hand they have been essential
enablers of projects: without them, rents could not be held to prices
within the means of low and moderate income families. Furthermore, as
will be explained below, the first two guarantee a portion of the rent
roll for housing managers. On the other hand, they have been a source
of problems, including increased administrative costs.
The Boston Housing Authority and Leased Housing Subsidies
Like the rent supplement program, the Section 23 leased housing program
was originally promoted as a means of subsidizing low-income families in
privately owned real estate. Again like the rent supplement program, in
Boston the leasing program has been diverted from its original goal of
shoring up private rental markets. In Boston it is usually piggybacked on
**
top of federal interest rate subsidy programs. However, while the rent
supplement program is administered directly by HUD, the leased housing
*
Until April 1973, the tax assessment rate for subsidized projects was
only 15%.
**
Interview with Pat Claire, former director of Leased Housing, BHA,
March 28, 1973.
-64-
program is in the hands of local housing authorities (LHA s) which receive
annual contributions from HUD. The LHAs are responsible for selecting
units, negotiating contracts with housing managers, and disbursing the
subsidy. The subsidy is calculated as the difference between a unit's
rent and the amount of rent which a tenant would pay in public housing.
*
The tenant pays his share of the rent directly to the housing manager,
while the LHA pays the manager the difference between the tenant's con-
tribution and HUD approved rents. Nowhere in the private housing market
could they obtain such secure rental income. While many housing managers
in Boston have complained about the administrative costs connected with
leased housing, their gripes must be tempered with the fact that they,
as well as tenants, are benefiting from the subsidy.
Insofar as the leased housing program lowers rent for tenants, it is
a consumer rather than a producer subsidy. However, the program does not
enable tenants to shop for the best possible housing. The payments, like
236 paymentsare linked to particular units as well as to particular
tenants. The units must be certified as adequate by the BHA, just as the
tenants must be certified by the BHA as within prescribed income limits.
Furthermore, the subsidy is tied more closely to the unit than to the
tenant, for if a certified tenant moves out, he cannot take the subsidy
with him. The subsidy remains linked to the unit. If another qualified
tenant is identified and moves into the unit, the subsidy continues coming
to the manager and the new tenant benefits from the lower rent. Thus,
the manager has more assurances than tenants that he can continue bene-
fitting from the leased housing program.
*
Since passage of the Brooke Amendment, his share is 25% of his income.
Table 2-3: Managements' Dealings with BHA and Their Costs
management's dealings with BHA
must have inspections of units
before occupancy & at BHA request
negotiates leases and contracts
reviews BHA bill each month
receives BHA payments during
the month, not in advance
may be owed arrears by BHA
must submit rent increase
requests; BHA may not pay a
HUD approved increase
management firm (avg. size pro!ect) and co-st
GBCD (10 units) * Brown (60 units)
project/yr. unit/yr. project/yr. unit/yr.
$60 or $12
1 hr./mo.
$200-300 or $40-60
40-60 hr.
$60 $12
5% of payments value
lost
$200 $40
$320 owed $64
by BHA
$60
$125-150 or
25-30 hr.
$60
negligible
N.A.
N.A.
$2
$41-50
$2
N.A.
N.A.
State(500 units) *
project/yr. unit/yr.
negligible
$5500
$60
negligible
N.A.
N.A.
$22
negligible
I'
ON
N.A.
N.A.
*
Assumes half the units per project are under rent supplement; per unit costs computed only for that
number of units.
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BHA Inspects Apartments
To obtain these benefits, what costs must a manager bear? As suggested
above, he must have his units inspected by the BHA before initial occu-
pancy, when tenancy changes, and when he asks for a rent increase. Gail
Schubert of GBCD has estimated that GBCD staff spend as much as five hours
a month or $25 per month per project showing units to BHA inspectors and
making whatever repairs are necessary. Mr. Brown, however, says that his
staff probably spends only a third to half this time handling BHA
inspections. While several managers interviewed by the Urban Observatory
complained about these inspections, Brown said that they are never un-
reasonable, although they are often annoying because the inspectors demand
that even the smallest repairs be completed before new tenants can occupy
apartments.
On a few occasions, BHA's inspections have brought it into conflict
with other public agencies, while managers have been caught in the middle.
One large Boston project recently had many construction problems with a
modular, concrete slab structural system. After many construction delays,
the buildings were finally completed, and HUD approved them for occupancy.
But when BHA inspectors examined the premises, they refused to approve
them on the grounds that too many leaks remained. So new leased housing
tenants could not move in, even though other tenants were arriving and
the project had been finally closed in HUD-FHA's books. The manager
acknowledged that buildings could be in better shape and so he felt BHA's
determination was fair. But meanwhile his mortgage had been drawn down
following HUD's approval, so he needed rental income in order to meet his
*
Table 2-3 itemizes managements' costs of dealing with BRA.
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debt service payments. Without leased housing tenants, he was short of
money. HUD did not regard the shortfall as a valid reason for not meeting
mortgage payments. The result was that he slipped into default before
full occupancy could be attained. This episode had a happier ending than
many, for eventually units were approved and leased tenants did move in.
BHA Negotiates Leases with Managers
Managers also needtD negotiate and sign leases with BHA. Different
managers have painted very diverse pictures of this task. A negative
view is given by GBCD's Whittlesey who has been trying to sign a lease
with the BHA for four years while disagreements over its terms have
prevented its signing for that entire time. State's managers also com-
plained that it was "almost impossible" to negotiate a satisfactory lease
with BHA. One of them claimed to have spent $10,000 over two years,
trying to draw up a mutually satisfactory lease.
A contrasting positive view is given by Mr. Brown, who says he has
never had any trouble arranging leases with BHA staff, provided he gives
them a reasonable amount of time to do their necessary (bureaucratic)
paperwork.
BHA Pays Rents and Tenant's Arrears
Other managers have protested BHA's payment policies. According
to its regulations, BHA:is supposed to pay its regular rental contributions
by the 15th of the monthfor which they are due. Managers are supposed to
bill BHA for tenant arrears at the end of every month, and BHA is supposed
to remit payment the following month. However, according to Brown, State
Management and other managers, the arrears are generally two months late,
so that even if a manager does not actually lose any rent on them, his
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cash flow is temporarily destroyed. If the arrears are past due at the
end of the year when project accounts are being audited, the late payment
makes it difficult to reconcile books, increasing sudit costs. GBCD
estimates that it spends an hour per month per project ($5/month or $60/
year) billing BHA for arrears and checking bills submitted by BHA for
regular leased housing payments. These figures are corroborated by Brown.
However, while Brown says he has never had trouble collecting arrears from
BHA, given the two month late payment, GBCD staff say that BHA has some-
times failed to make up tenant arrears. In addition, they say that BHA has
failed to pay for vacancies in BHA leased units, even though one of BHA's
guarantees to management is that it will pay for vacancies if it selects
*
the tenants who move into leased units. Approximately $2,000 is owed by
BHA to GBCD for tenants arrears incurred between September and April 1973.
Another $3,200 is due on a rent increase HUD approved in September 1972,
but BHA never paid. Whittlesey claims he has.spent "hours" trying to
collect this $5,200 and that even if BHA pays up, perhaps a third of it
will have been spent in the process of collecting it.
BHA Pays "Waste" Claims
Other housing managers have complained to me about the cost of
collecting waste payments from BHA. "Waste payments" are the monies paid
by BHA for damage caused by tenants. BHA and managers have sometimes been
**
unable to agree who is responsible for damages. For instance, if a
*
Alternatively, managers can retain the right to select tenants for leased
units, but then BHA does not guarantee reimbursement for vacancies.
**
This problem loomed large in the BURP projects several years ago. BHA
staff thought managers were trying to squeeze it for funds to repair
items which were improperly installed during rehabilitation. Managers
claimed tenants were destroying their property.
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disposal is broken, is that the tenant's fault, as the manager claims, or
is it management's fault for failing to instruct the tenant in the proper
use and care of the disposal, as BHA claims? Who is to blame if tile
falls off bathroom walls: was it installed improperly or did tenants
break it? GBCD staff related that once after a "particularly messy"
tenant moved out, BHA demanded that the apartment be repainted before a
new tenant moved in. GBCD felt that painting was needed only because of
the previous tenant's poor housekeeping and that BHA should pay for the
painting as a waste claim. BHA regarded it as a normal turn-over cost and
declined to pay.
There used to be no way to negotiate such disputes. Recently, BRA
has tried to institutionalize a third, independent party to rule on them.
Before this, several large managers complained that they had to shuffle
operating funds to pay for repairs for which BRA never compensated them.
But, as with most mattersconcerning BHA, another perspective is
presented by other managers. A few managers have said they never had
trouble settling waste claims with BHA; the need for them seldom arose,
and when it did, BHA made a reasonable settlement.
BHA Approves Rent Increases
One administrative cost which cannot be collected from the BHA is
the cost of obtaining its approval for rent increases. BHA has reserved
the right to approve rent increases in leased housing units, even when
the increases are approved by HUD. It maintains this right since it
usually picks up the increased tab for leased housing tenants. Further-
more, BRA staff feel that HUD often fails to inspect units and approves
increases when buildings are in unsatisfactory physical condition. BHA
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personnel believe that their own inspection of units, when rent increases
are requested, safeguards tenants' interests in safe and decent housing.
Some housing managers complain bitterly that the BHA should be bound by
HUD rent approvals, just as the ordinary tenant is. They protest the
cost of filing for a rent increase at the BHA and then chasing it through
BHA hierarchy after they have spent much time and energy drawing an
approval out of HUD. Naturally, they become particularly annoyed when
their request is not granted. Sometimes BHA's denial is voluntary and
sometimes involuntary. In the voluntary situation, BHA has sometimes
refused to pay rent increases when it thought that managers had allowed
subsidized housing to deteriorate. In 1969, a number of rehabilitated
221d3 projects in the Boston Urban Rehabilitation Program requested
increases which HUD had granted. BHA officials denied the increase,
declaring that managers would have to repair their units up to housing
code standards and certify the increased operating costs with which they
were justifying their requests. The BURP developers refused. A long
political struggle resulted. It is worth noting that following its
refusal, BHA received conflicting pressure from different HUD sources.
The local HUD Area Office (which had given the initial approval) pressured
BHA to pay the increase, while the national Audit Division of HUD told
BHA not to pay until projects were brought back up to standard. The
Boston Mayor's office also intervened, and pushed BHA to approve the
increases. In this confused political situation, most developers tried
expediently to get the increases without repairing their units. Eventu-
ally, after several months of negotiation, they did make some repairs,
and eventually the BHA did approve the increase. Meanwhile, the projects'
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overhead costs for management time, legal advice, and repairs increased.
This situation is not atypical of the disputes which arise when
subsidized housing is under the jurisdiction of several public agencies.
The agencies disagree among themselves, and managers try to minimize their
costs. The tenants' interest may or may not be represented. On most
occasions, tenants lack any direct way of influencing the official net-
work of public-private decisions that determines what housing service
they receive, at what price. In the BURP case, BHA tried to represent
tenants' interests to the extent that it insisted units be repaired. But
during negotiations with managers, this representation became secondary
to BHA's attempt to remain independent of pressures from other agencies.
Tenants eventually paid the price for repairs through increased rents.
I mentioned earlier that on occasion BHA's refusal to pay rent
increases has been involuntary. These were the times when BHA failed
to get suggicient federal or state appropriations. Now Brown, for
example, has just spent nine months getting a rent increase from HUD,
only to find that BHA has no money to pay its share of higher rents.
Since the increase is in a project where 57% of the apartments are leased
by BHA, the project is now receiving less than half the newly approved
funds. Brown does not blame BHA, but neither can he stop pressuring its
staff to find the money for his rent increase. Even though BHA is not
at fault, the costs to the project of dealing with BHA's problem will be
considerable. This is not an isolated case. One of the five largest
sponsor-managers of subsidized housing in Boston claims that his firm was
once owed $50,000 in arrears by BHA. BHA wanted and intended to pay, but
it had run out of money itself. Unfortunately for the manager, the
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$50,000 represented roughly one month's combined debt service on his more
than 1,000 units of subsidized apartments. Without BHA payments, he
was forced to default on his mortgages. When HUD asked why he hadn't
paid his debt service, his reply was that the fault began with HUD's own
failure to allocate sufficient funds for BHA. This kind of viscious
circle has trapped many managers whose projects subsequently slid into
default.
Other BHA Dg0 ings
From time to time, extraordinary circumstances further complicate
managers dealings with the BHA. Sometimes problems arise which are
outside the control of either, and which neither can readily resolve.
For instance, in January 1972, a leased housing tenant in one 221d3
project died leaving no next-of-kin. In the absence of any heir, the
manager was unable to remove the former tenant's possessions from his
old apartment until a court order authorizing him to do so could be
obtained. Now the manager wants BHA to reimburse him for the rent during
those four months. But BHA has no policy covering such a contingency,
and it has declined to make the payments. The manager acknowledges that
BHA hasn't had any policy or procedure for this situation, but he
insists that the BHA must, as a minimum, share the rental loss with him.
Another example: a woman with several children moved out of her unit
turning it over to her daughter and the daughter's children, without
telling the landlord. For several months, neither the manager nor BHA
realized the change had occurred. When they did find out, BHA did not
want to pay rent for the daughter, since she had never been certified as
a leased housing tenant. But the manager did not want to lose rent on
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the unit.
The BHA has been slow to respond to such complex, individual problems
that inevitably arise when a large number of tenants are subsidized. For
their part, BHA officials point out that in these cases, a landlord of
private housing would never have any chance of collecting rent, whereas
the manager of leased housing at least has the possibility of reimburse-
ment throughthe BHA. The formerdirector of leased housing at BHA, Pat
Claire, has also indicated that some developers managers have abused the
BHA subsidy. In the past, two managers dunned both the BHA and the
Welfare Department for tenants? arrears with neither agency knowing the
other was being billed. In several cases, the two agencies both paid
the arrears, which the managers quietly pocketed. Only later, did the
agencies accidentally discover what had happened and demand reimburse-
ment of the double payments. On other occasions managers failed to
notify BHA when leased tenants moved out, moved in a tenant who could
afford the basic 221d3 or 236 rent, but continued collecting BHA sub-
sidies. This practice has incensed BHA and convinced it that projects
must be closely scrutinized to ensure that tenants in leased units are,
in fact, eligible.
Sometimes housing managers have abused the leased housing subsidy
with less malice but the same result. Once a manager bills BHA for
tenants' arrears, he is supposed to forward to BHA any payments made
by tenants toward the arrears. However, some managers, frustrated by
BHA's slow payment, have kept tenants' money. Then, when BHA finally
paid the manager and tried to collect the arrears from tenants, tenants
could not understand why they were being dunned for money already paid
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to managers. GBCD has been guilty of this, complicating its negotiations
with BHA for other monies.
In summary, five major problems have arisen between BHA and sub-
sidized housing managers. These are disputes over leases, BHA payments
for "waste", rent increases, management abuse, and evictions; (evictionas
are discussed later on pages 99 ff.)
BHA-Summary
Brown has estimated that 25-30 hours per year are spent dealing with
BHA. This time includes negotiating leases, filing for rent increases
and arrears, following up any problems which develop with BHA, and so on.
Translated into dollars, this is $125 to $150 per year. A higher estimate
comes from GBCD which has had more difficulties at BHA. Whittlesey
estimates that GBCD staff spend between 40 and 60 hours per year, or
*
$200 to $300, on BHA business. The total cost of obtaining and admin-
istering leased housing subsidies is still greater due to administrative
costs within the projects. The costs claimed are:
GBCD - $560-660/project/year or $56-66/unit/year
plus $390 in lost rent plus $39 in lost rent
Brown - $245-270/project/year or $410-450/unit/year
State - $5,560/project/year or $11-12/unit/year
The great differences in the average per unit cost are attributable to three
factors:
1) The better personal contracts a manager establishes wihin an
agency, the lower his costs of dealing with it. Brown appears to have
*
An interesting comparison is a figure on the government's cost of admin-
istering the leased housing program. It has been estimated at $12/unit/
month or $144 per year. (The Economics of Federal Subsidy Programs, p.650.)
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worked harder at this than either of the other two.
2) The larger the number of units administered, the lower the per
unit costs since costs can be spread over a large base. It costs just as
much, for example, to negotiate a rent increase for five units as it
does for five-hundred. State's large projects (400-1,000 units) give
them an edge over Brown and GBCD.
3) Different managers experience different problems with BHA and
have different perceptions of the expenses caused by the housing author-
ities. Thus, GBCD's Whittlesey sees himself losing 5% of the value of
BHA paid rents, while the other two managers do not. State feels it has
lost much money due to BHA's failure to reimburse waste claims, while a
few managers have been able to negotiate compensation.
Managers' overall perception of BHA varies as much as their costs.
State, along with many other large sponsor-managers, criticizes BHA for
*
an "outmoded pro tenant bias." They say that BHA is overly sympathetic
to tenants' complaints about, for instance, conditions in apartments,
while it fails to understand the manager's difficulty in getting enough
income to cover all expenses. One sponsor-manager of two-thousand sub-
sidized apartments in Boston is so incensed at BHA and its paperwork that
he is trying to charge BHA extra rent. He says this is the only way he
can hope to recoup his expenses. In constrast, Whittlesey and Brown both
compliment BHA's attempt to represent tenants. Whittlesey thinks BHA's
stance is appropriate even though he criticizes its administrative pro-
cedures. He has suggested that the cost of the leased housing program
could be reduced for both managers and BHA if the agency would change its
rent payment procedure; BHA should collect all rents directly from
*
Urban Observatory data.
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tenants and pay the total rent to managers. This would simplify payment
of arrears, rent increases and waste claims. It would clarify eviction
procedures. It might enable BHA to cut down on manager's abuses of
leased housing. But it is uncertain whether this change could ever be
negotiated through the BHA bureaucracy.
In closing, it may be useful to compare the costs to managers of
both the leased housing and the rent supplement programs since both are
direct rent subsidies. (See Table 2-4).
Despite the lower overhead cost of the rent supplement program,
some managers prefer leased housing which gives them some back-up guaran-
tees for their rent roll. With leased housing, they at least have the
potential of collecting tenants' arrears and vacancies from BHA. With
Rent Supplement, the tenant is the only recourse for collection. Thus,
the managers favor the program which gives them the greatest subsidy
benefits.
The Welfare Department
Another local source for double rent subsidies is the Welfare Depart-
ment. It makes direct rent payments for some welfare recipients. That
is, it takes the amount of their rent out of their regular welfare support
and sends it directly to the person's designated landlord. Since these
monies never pass through the hands of their beneficiaries, they are sub-
sidies direct to projects' management. In order for direct rent payment
to be made on a welfare recipient's behalf, he or she must request the
Welfare Department to do so. Usually tenants make this request only after
they have frequently been unable to make their rent. They conclude that
the best way to ensure full monthly payment is to have the Welfare Depart-
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Table 2-4: Comparative Cost of Leased Housing and Rent Supplement
Management Leased Housing Rent Supplement
Per project,
per year
GBCD $320-420*
Brown
State
$245-270*
$5,560*
Per unit,
per year
$32-42
$8-9
$22-25
Per project,
per year
$160-260**
$185**
$710**
Per unit,
per year
$ 16-26
$5.70
$2.40
*
Does not include BHA arrears, which for GBCD now average
$104 per year, or the money lost thru late monthly pay-
ment of rent, which averages $39 per unit per year for
GBCD.
**
Does not include extraordinary cost of moving rent
supplement tenants when family size changes.
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ment pass the funds directly to their landlords. Once they submit such
a request to the Welfare Department, six months to a year may elapse
before the Department processes all its required paperwork.
Managers' reaction to Welfare payments is generally favorable.
GBCD and State find that they are the best way for them to receive
Welfare tenants' rents on time and in full. They noted that once
direct payments are arranged, Welfare pays promptly, without exception.
Mr. Brown also acknowledged the efficiency of the Welfare Department.
But he added that although in the past he sometimes encouraged tenants to
obtain direct payments from Welfare, a while ago he realized that he was
essentially asking tenants to give up control over their own finances.
He decided that this was not an appropriate position for him to advocate.
Since then, he does not encourage tenants to shift to direct payment,
although he will accept it if they so choose.
The Welfare Department's record is not entirely unblemished in the
eyes of managers. GBCD related that one of its tenants used to con-
sistently pile up arrears over each six month period, and then request
the Welfare Department for a special hardship grant to make her rents
up-to-date. This practice used to bring GBCD her rents, however incon-
veniently late they arrived. Then, in the Spring of 1973, Welfare
finally decided it was tired of making repeated special grants for rent
on her behalf, and they said they would not do so anymore. A Welfare
worker suggested that she request direct grants for her rent. While the
tenant agreed to this, she still owed several months back rent. GBCD
was threatening to evict her, so the Welfare Department agreed to pay her
arrears in order to give her a clean record. But after GBCD spent many
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hours filing vouchers for the money, the Welfare Department is now saying
that it will not pay the arrears. Meanwhile, too much time has elapsed
for GBCD to be able to evict the tenant through the Boston Rent Board
on the basis of these arrears.
Another GBCD tenant with direct Welfare rent payments initiated
another round of paperwork for the GBCD when she listed her rent with
Welfare as $170 per month, rather than the actual$177 per month. In
order not to be underpaid, GBCD has had to complete a lengthy series of
forms, in addition to arranging for the tenant to re-submit her state-
ments to the Welfare Department.
Such managerial requests may be subject to more scrutiny than
managers like because of past abuses of the Welfare system by a few
managers. A few Boston managers have collected rents from Welfare for
tenants who had moved out of their projects. Apparently the tenants
never notified Welfare that they had left, so the managers continued,
illegally, to accept money on their behalf. One manager ended up owing
the Welfare Department $30,000. Such exploitation of a subsidy system
prompts the administering agency to establish more controls and regula-
tions of its benefits. The viscious circle is perpetuated: controls
lead to management costs lead to resentment and abuses lead to more
controls.
The City Assessing Office and Tax Abatements
The third local government subsidy that comes to subsidized housing
is reduced tax assessments. Since 1965, the City of Boston Assessing
Department has informally agreed to limit real estate taxes on all feder-
ally subsidized limited-dividend, non-profit and cooperative housing --
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including 22ld3 and 236 -- to 15% of gross rental income. This percent-
age was increased to 17% in the Fall of 1972. This compares with the
usual tax rate of approximately 22-25% of income for privately-owned,
multi-family dwellings. The difference between the two tax rates
amounts to about $11 per month (or $132 per year) on an apartment that
rents for $140 per month, an average price for a subsidized two-bedroom
apartment. By applying the lower tax rate, the city has helped keep
down rents and thereby has subsidized the year-to-year provision of
housing service to tenants.
The lower tax rate is not fixed by any formal, written agreement.
Instead, it represents a gentlemen's agreement between the City and
housing projects. To qualify for the lower tax rate, managers must
formally file abatement papers each year. The annual cost of filing is
between $30 and $50 per project, according to GBCD and Mr. Brown. (Table
2-5 itemizes this cost). This figure covers the time for the four steps
needed to obtain a yearly abatement. These steps are:
1. In early spring, obtain (from Assessing Dept.) and complete
a form estimating gross potential rent in the project.
Also compute estimated tax based on 17% of gross potential
rent.
2. Submit this form to city which reviews it and computes
its tax bill. (City assessors are supposed to check the
structures to determine whether the abated amount represents
an appropriate assessment.)
3. In fall, receive actual tax bill.
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Table 2-5: Managements' Costs of Obtaining Tax Abatements
Steps Required of Management to Obtain Abatement
In spring, file forms giving projected project
income and estimated tax
Submit this form to city
In fall, obtain tax bill and amend it, if
necessary
Pay the bill, processing it through GNMA and
City Hall, as needed
Cost
$5-10 or 1-2 br.,
depending on size of
project.
negligible.
$5 or 1 hr.
$20-35 or 4-7 hr.
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4. Pay the bill by either (1) sending money to the city and
requesting reimbursement from mortgagee GNMA or FNMA
(where tax payments are escrowed) or (2) forwarding the
bill to the mortgagee and requesting it to dispurse the
money to the city or (3) requesting the mortgagee to
return the money and then pay the tax bill directly at
City Hall.
State Management has cited far higher costs for yearly tax abate-
ments. It claims $2,500 to $3,000 are spent by each project, every
year to get its tax abatement.
Such a high cost is partially attributable to the fact that it
hires a lawyer to do all its legal work, and lawyers command high prices.
It can afford counsel because legal fees can be spread over many apart-
ments. In contrast, GBCD and Mr. Brown never hire legal assistance for
tax abatements. They complete all forms and -do all the leg-work them-
selves. While this increases their personal aggravation, it helps keep
down costs.
Another manager with four medium-sized projects in Boston (70-170
units apiece) estimates that it costs him $100-225 per project initially
to obtain tax abatements from the city. These figures include the time
needed to document the subsidized status of the projects and to arrange
appropriate taxes during the first year of partial occupancy. Once
projects are established, his yearly abatement costs go down to $50-75
per project per year.
In the past, abatement procedures and costs in Boston were higher
for all managers. Before 1972, the City required that subsidized projects
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pay full taxes (at a 22-25% rate). Then the City abated an appropriate
amount and returned the excess. This procedure meant that projects had
to pay out more money, losing its use for several months until the City
returned the excess payment.
Occasionally subsidized project managers have forgotten to file
abatement papers. While the fault has been theirs, remedying it has
been a long, expensive process. For example, when the BURP program was
starting, two managers failed to file formal tax abatement papers for
1968, when buildings were undergoing rehabilitation. But the managers,
nevertheless, paid taxes only at the low, abatement rate.
In the Spring of 1970, the City threatened to foreclose BURP
properties for which abatement papers hadn't been filed. Foreclosure
could have been legally warranted for failure to pay the full 1968 tax
bill. The managers, however, refused to pay the formally owed back
taxes out of their own pockets, and the taxes could not have been taken
out of rents without causing rent increases that tenants could ill afford.
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether HUD would have approved rent increases
for this purpose. The managers accused the City of not honoring its
commitment to them and to HUD; (the City had confirmed its then 15%
tax policy with HUD while the projects were planned so that mortgage
commitments and rents were predicated on this rate). In reply, the
Assessing Department claimed that managers had failed to meet filing
requirements of which they were fully aware. The issue was finally
resolved only after two other city agencies, the Mayor's office and the
Boston Model City Agency, were called Into arbitrate. The resolution
required the Mayor's office to write the City Commissioner of Assessing,
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Theodore An4one, authorizing Anzalone to ask the State Tax Commissioner
*
to let him invoke the state law that would permit the city to waive the
formal abatement procedure. This was done. The managers paid the taxes
at the 15% rate, and everyone was satisfied.
This episode illustrates the extraordinary costs that occassionally
are incurred in order to maintain public subsidies.
The Boston Rent Board
Since 1970, a third city agency has been involved in subsidized
housing projects. Although it provides no subsidy, all managers agree
that it has demanded much time. Many managers claim that it has been
the source of problems that, in the words of GBCD's Whittlesey, "are
driving us out of business". This is the Boston Rent Board. After being
established by the Boston City Council, the Rent Board claimed the
authority to approve all rent increases and all evictions in the city,
including those in federally subsidized housing. It has also claimed
the right to overrule HUD approved increases. This means that managers
of subsidized housing must go through two and possibly three public
agencies to obtain rent increases: HUD and the Boston Rent Board, plus
BHA if leased housing units are involved. They have to go to two or
even three authorities before evicting tenants: the local courts and the
Rent Board, plus BHA in case of leased housing tenants. Since a reorgan-
ization in early 1973, the Boston Rent Board has also required that all
rental apartments in Boston, again including those in subsidized housing
be registered with it. (Table 2-6 summarizes costs of dealing with the
Rent Board.)
Unlike the agency requirements discussed previously, those of the
*
Section 8 of Chapter 58 of the General Laws of Massachusetts.
-85-
Table 2-6: Managements' Dealings with the Boston Rent Board and Their
Costs
managements' dealings with BRB
*
registers apartments:
prepares appropriate records
completes and files forms
postage and zerox
cost per project
$50 or 10 hr.
$200 or 4 10-hr. days
$50-75
requests rent increases
prepares and files request
goes through hearings &
appeals
**
requests eviction of tenant:
files request for eviction
goes through hearings &
appeals
legal costs
rent loss, 1-4 mo.
$150 or 30 hours
$35-70 or 1-2 days
$25-50
$25-50
$75-200
*
At GBCDcost of registration is for all nine small projects.
**
Costs given here are compiled from GBCD and Brown. However, other
costs from other managers have varied considerably. They have run
as low as $15, and as high as $200 in legal fees plus rent loss up
to $600-700. Such high legal fees are experienced by managers who
will not handle evictions themselves but hire a lawyer to handle
the entire proceeding.
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Rent Board also fall on most market rental housing in Boston. None-
theless, they are significant for this study both because they are very
costly in and of themselves and also because they complicate managers'
dealings with subsidizing agencies.
Registration of Units
Registration is required so that the Rent Board has records of
apartments' financial status on which to base its response to requests
for rent increases or reductions, evictions, or other action. "Recording
apartments is a time-consuming, expensive procedure," says Mr. Brown. In
order to register rents, managers must complete a three-page form on the
financial status of each building they rent, plus a two-page financial
statement on each apartment in every building. Copies of both forms
must be retained in their files and submitted to the Rent Board, while a
copy of the second form must also be sent to each tenant for the tenant's
verification. GBCD staff estimate that they needed fifty hours to
register 21 buildings with 93 apartments. This figure includes 10 hours
to prepare the data requested on the forms. Much of this time was
spent searching for the required information that was not kept by GBCD
and that, according to Whittlesey, is not usually recorded by any housing
manager. For example: how many square feet of grass are outside a build-
ing, or when was an apartment last painted? Whittlesey resents such
questions as "an imposition of a set of accounting procedures." He
insists that if new records must be maintained for the Rent Board, then
the Rent Board should raise rents to pay for them.
Once information for registration was collected at GBCD, forty
hours (or four ten-hour days) were spent typing registration forms,
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duplicating them, addressing envelopes and mailing them. The fifty
hours amounts to $200 in administrative salaries and overhead. In
addition, between $50 and $75 was spent on postage and xerox. This
comes to about $2.80 per unit. These costs were corroborated by Mr.
Brown. The Administrator of the Rent Board, John Grace, realizes that
registration requirements adds management costs although they are
small on a per unit basis. He has said that the Rent Board would be
willing to consider them as a legitimate management cost in projects
which request rent increases. This is an important consideration
because the Rent Board grants increases only on the basis of documented
costs. While projects can easily document external cost increases such
as rising taxes or utility or legal bills, they are often hard pressed
to certify that internal administrative costs have risen. The certifi-
cation requirement is especially hard on small landlords who often do
not maintain formal books on their projects. But for any manager, it
is difficult to document in-house cost increases, such as those result-
ing from a new set of government requirements. Even if the Rent Board
granted more rents to cover such costs, they could still only be
recouped a year after being incurred. For at least a year, management
would have to finance them out of fixed project income, straining avail-
able funds. Thus the Rent Board, like HUD, legislates a gap between
project expenses and income. The lag between the two causes one of
the most serious management problems arising from public regulation.
The procedure for obtaining a rent increase is this: projects fill
out a 4-page financial form, showing past and present operating costs.
Managers file this at the Rent Board and send copies to all affected
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tenants, along with a form letter which explains that they have the
right to contest the rent increase if they believe the figures are
wrong or conditions in their buildings have slipped below housing
code standards, in which case management must repair the building up
to code standards
before the rent increase will be approved. GBCD staff said
that filing for a rent increase at the Rent Board took them approxi-
mately 30 hours, or $150 in administrative costs.
If neither tenants nor the Rent Board contest a rent increase, it
is accepted on the recommendation of the Rent Board. However, if
either questions the increase, a hearing is held at which the landlord
may be required to document his claimed cost increases.
Rent Increases
Why does the Rent Board insist on controlling rent increases in
subsidized housing when, according to law and.regulation, all such
increases must be reviewed by HUD? Rent Board administrator, John
Grace, has said that the Rent Board regulates federally subsidized
housing because HUD review procedures do not sufficiently protect
tenants' rights. HUD does not give tenants an opportunity to question
either a proposed increase or the quality of services or conditions in
buildings; while Rent Board proceedings do provide such an opportunity.
Grace has said that if HUD would institute an adversary proceeding for
tenants, then the Rent Board might be willing to de-control subsidized
housing because "it really doesn't make sense to have two levels of
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*
public control." Conversations with Grace and Rent Board staff have
convinced me that the Rent Board's control of subsidized housing also
stems from their perception that HUD does not seriously examine the
figures submitted by managers to justify rent increases. The feeling at
the Rent Board (and, I might add, among some housing managers) is that
HUD officials do not thoroughlyinvestigate managers' claims of
increased costs. This contention has been substantiated by several
Boston area tenants groups which have found large errors in financial
statements submitted to HUD. For instance, they have identified double
entries for the same administrative costs, excessively high claims for
**
legal fees, double entries for utility bills, and high fees paid to
contractors wholly owned by projects' developers. The Rent Board does
not intend to permit rent increases based on such costs. The Rent
Board also takes a harder line than HUD on costs incurred to repair
latent construction defects. While HUD has usually accepted these as
legitimate operating expenses for which rent increases will be given,
the Rent Board feels that tenants should not have to pay for construction
*
defects attributable to developers' bad judgement. The Rent Board staff
think that it is developers' responsibility to check that subsidized
housing is properly built or rehabilitated in the first place. If
*
Interview with John Grace, May 2, 1973.
**
For example, one project that failed to pay its water and sewer bill in
1970, received a tax bill in 1971 that included both the 1971 tax bill
and the 1970 water and sewer bill. On its submission to HUD, the
composite bill was listed as its tax bill, so it appeared that the pro-
jects' taxes had risen. Increased taxes would have justified a rent
increase, while late payment of a water and sewer bill would not. The
mistake was not caught at HUD, until by chance an outside researcher
noted the error. Except for this chance, a rent increase would probably
have been approved.
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structures are not adequate, they contend, developers should get their
builders to make repairs as part of their contractual obligations. The
Rent Board does not want to saddle tenants with costs which are developers'
or managers' fault, an appropriate distinction which HUD has been less
willing to make.
(The question of who will pay for latent construction defects --
tenants through rents or managers-developers through pressure on con-
tractors -- is important in Boston where a number of federally subsidized
housing projects have had serious problems with construction defects.
This issue is discussed further in Section 3, pages 144 ff.)
While some managers contend that they will be driven out of business
if they have to subsidize the cost of repairing latent defects, the Rent
Board has acknowledged that sometimes rent increases are the only way to
get funds for repairs that will bring buildings up to housing code stand-
ards. It has usually made this concession for non-profit and community
managements that have no other sources of income.
The Boston Rent Board is the public agency most criticized by
housing managers. They have voiced a number of different objections to
it. A couple have said that it is inappropriate for a city agency to
invervene in a federally assisted program. GBCD's Whittlesey, for one,
has said, "The Rent Board has no right to police FHA". This sentiment
is shared by HUD staff who feel its reviews of rent increases adequately
**
protect tenants.
*
Interview with Bob Whittlesey, April 16, 1973.
**
Interview with Irving Solomon, May 16, 1973.
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Whittlesey and other managers have pointed out that most rent
increase requests take six to eighteen months to gain HUD approval. By
the time this period has elapsed, projects are desperately in need of
funds, since increases are granted only rectroactively, that is, on
costs already incurred, not on projected costs. If managers have to
file another request for another approval, an additional one to five
months will elapse before the increase can be collected. By that time,
seven to twenty-three months may have passed since the need for more
operating funds was first documented. This delay undoubtedly contributes
to the operating cost squeeze in some subsidized housing projects. Even
though the extra delay is designed to protect tenants and often does
give them a needed opportunity to question management, it contributes
to projects' financial decline. This delay is probably more the fault of
HUD than of the Rent Board, since the latter is usually faster to review
rent increase requests. Nevertheless, managers often complain more
about the Rent Board than HUD. Some managers can accept HUD reviews
more easily than Rent Board reviews because HUD is the agency which grants
them subsidies. For instance, while Bob Whittlesey resents accounting
procedures imposed by the Rent Board, he has not objected to those required
by HUD. He complains about Rent Board reviews of his projects' finances,
yet he wishes that HUD would institute stiffer reviews of all subsidized
housing. He thinks HUD should become a more active participant in the
operation of subsidized housing, while the Rent Board should get out of
it completely. Furthermore, although it may take much time to get a
rent increase approved at HUD, managers are rarely questioned as inten-
sively there as they may be at the Rent Board. Naturally, some managers
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are going to object to having their records closely scrutinized.
One manager has also accused the Rent Board staff of not understand-
ing that fiscal arrangements in subsidized housing do not allow developer-
managers to make money from operating projects; the profit is only in
development fees and tax shelters. Nevertheless, he continues, the
Rent Board tries to squeeze money out of managers for operations when the
money isn't there. There may be money in tax shelters, but the Rent
Board, as its own staff acknowledges, cannot examine those proceeds as
a alternative source of operating money. A more temperate opinion of the
Rent Board comes from Mr. Brown, who again seems to have less trouble
dealing with public agencies than most managers. He thinks the Rent
Board has gradually become quite knowledgable about subsidized housing
and handles it fairly.
Other objections come from managers who dislike dealing with any
public intermediary, especially one which sees its goal as protecting
tenants' rights rather than management or developers' rights. The Rent
Board has undoubtedly served as a vehicle for tenants' questions and
complaints in subsidized housing. Sometimes these have been minor
queries that were cleared up at the Rent Board's hearings. For instance,
one tenant of Mr. Brown protested a rent increase because she didn't
understand why her rent was higher than a neighbor's. The woman had not
known that her neighbor was receiving leased housing as well as 221d3
subsidy. Once this was explained to her, the protest was dropped. One
GBCD tenant protested a rent increase, not because she did not want her
rent raised, but because she wanted GBCD officially to acknowledge that
she, not GBCD staff, had painted her apartment. When GBCD gave her
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verbal credit for doing so, the protest was dropped. Bob Whittlesey
has complained that such trivial protests are too time consuming and
expensive because any time a hearing is called at the Rent Board, some-
one on the staff must spend a day preparing detailed records for the
hearing, plus a couple of hours attending the hearing, for a minimum cost
of $35. Although his complaint is understandable, the Rent Board's
assistance to tenants would be lost if it pre-screened for trivial com-
plaints.
Some subsidized tenants have used the Rent Board to seek redress
for substantial grievances. Usually their protests have focused on
conditions in buildings, rather than rent increases per se. Some tenant
objections have concerned items which are probably latent construction
defects, such as: exposed hot water pipes, poor drainage outside build-
ings, inadequate plumbing, leaky roofs, cracked foundations. Others
have concerned conditions that might be attributed to either construction
defects or poor maintenance by management or poor housekeeping by
tenants. These include: rates and roaches requiring exterminations;
holes in floors and walls; radiator leaks; broken windows; peeling walls
and ceilings; inadequate lighting.
A number of tenants in buildings rehabilitated during the late 1960's
through the BURP program have gotten managers to repair such deficiencies
by protesting at the Rent Board. Tenants in several projects owned by one
large Boston real estate developer, First Realty, are using the Rent
Board to obtain repairs of leaky roofs, buckling floors, bad drainage,
and heaving tile. Representatives of the tenants union have said that
when they took these complaints to HUD, they got not response. Since
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HUD approved rent increases anyway, First Realty tenants have questioned
rent increases as well as building conditions at the Rent Board. Mean-
while, First Realty is complaining that the Rent Board is driving it
out of business. But if its business cannot provide adequate housing to
subsidized tenants, perhaps its participation in subsidy programs should
be questioned.
Eviction Proceedings
As much as managers complained to me about Rent Board action on
rent increases, they complained even more about its eviction procedures.
One manager of a 150-unit project voiced the feelings of many managers
when he said, "The City is forcing projects to go under with its eviction
policies that don't help us to collect rents."*
Under the state and city laws which authorize the Rent Board, no
landlord or housing manager is allowed to evict a tenant until he obtains
**
a certificate of eviction from the Rent Board. A landlord applies for
a certificate by submitting a form which specifies why the tenant must
leave. A copy of this form is sent to the tenant who may request a
hearing to contest the eviction. A hearing is supposed to be scheduled
within twenty days. Within 30 days after the hearing, a Rent Board
officer decides whether or not the certificate shall be granted. If he
finds that the facts presented by the landlord are valid and he has a
valid reason for the eviction, the certificate is granted. If either
facts or reasons for the eviction are invalid, the certificate is denied.
*
Urban Observatory data.
**
Chapter 19 of the Boston City Ordinances of 1972 spells out the circum-
stances in which a tenant may be evicted. They include non-payment of
rent, violation of a provision of his lease, illegal use of rented space,
etc.
-95-
If landlord or tenant is dissatisfied, he can appeal the decision to the
Housing Court or to the District Court. If the certificate of eviction
is issued and not further contested, the landlord cannot yet evict a
tenant. He still must go to District Court and seek a legal notice of
eviction which formally, legally gives the tenant 14 days in which to
vacate. If he does not leave this apartment then, the landlord can
send a constable to forcibly evict the tenant. (A more complete
description of the eviction process is found in Table 2-7).
Before the Rent Board existed, tenants could be evicted solely on
the basis of a court order, and tenants could protest only by suing a
landlord in court. Part of the Rent Board's rationale for assuming
control of certificates of eviction was to establish an adversary pro-
ceeding in which tenants could confront landlords. Many housing managers
claim, however, that this proceeding doubles the amount of time required
to complete evictions thereby causing them to lose twice as much rental
income as formerly when a tenant has to be evicted. Since most evictions
are for non-payment of rent, lengthening the time required to move out a
tenant represents a serious financial loss for managers. One manager of
BURP buildings claims that the time to evict a tenant increased from
two-and-a-half to five months once the Rent Board entered the picture.
Bob Whittlesey said that the Rent Board lengthened the time from six
or eight weeks to three or four months.
He claims that most tenants who contest evictions are already
seriously in arrears on their rent, and that they make no economic
decision to protest eviction in order to gain more "free" time in an
apartment. This is a perception shared by a number of large managers in
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Table 2-7: Eviction Proceedings in Boston: The Actions Required to Evict
a Tenant
1. When a tenant is in arrears on rent or has given other cause for
eviction, manager sends him a legal notice terminating tenancy, along
with form E-0 from the Boston Rent Board, notifying him of his right not
to move out until after formal eviction proceedings are brought.
If the tenant moves out or pays his rent at this time or any other
point in eviction proceedings, the proceedings are terminated. Other-
wise they continue as long as the manager pursues legal eviction.
2. After 14 days have elapsed, manager files an application for
certificate of eviction at the Rent Board, Form E-1, stating the reason
for eviction.
3. Simultaneously, he sends a copy to the tenant by registered or
certified mail, receipt requested or he has it delivered by a constable.
4. On receipt of an application for certificate of eviction, Rent
Board sends tenant Form E-2, notifying him of his right to oppose eviction
proceedings and giving him an opportunity to file a reply.
5. Tenant can file a reply within 7 days, requesting a hearing.
6. Upon request from tenant or manager, Rent Board schedules a
hearing with 7 days to be held within 20 days. However, if its schedule
is busy, more time may elapse before a hearing is held.
7. At the hearing, either tenant or landlord can request a con-
tinuance. Within 30 days of the hearing, a decision is handed down. A
Certificate of Eviction is granted if the landlord has cause, as deter-
mined by a hearing officer of the Rent Board.
8. Within 7 days of a decision, the losing party may request a
reconsideration if he has acceptable grounds for a new hearing such as
new evidence
or, within 7 days, either party can appeal the decision to District
Court or the Housing Court.
9. If a Certificate of Eviction is granted and no appeal is made,
the manager can go to District Court and request a court hearing. 3 weeks
to 3 months are required to schedule a hearing.
10. At the court hearing, manager presents his cause for eviction.
If the court determines he has cause, an eviction notice is granted.
11. The notice must be served on a tenant by a constable.
12. If tenant still refuses to move out, manager can request legal
service of a notice of forcible eviction.
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13. This notice is served on tenant. If he still does not leave,
then his possessions can be 'forcibly removed' from his apartment.
Manager is required to store his possessions and pay for their storage
up to three months. If any of the tenants' possessions are damaged
while being moved or stored, the landlord is liable. After three months,
damage and storage are the tenant's responsibility.
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Boston. Even those managers who feel that the Rent Board is acting
appropriately in giving tenants a hearing say that it has not been able
to act quickly enough on eviction requests.
Figures on eviction costs vary considerably among housing managers.
They also vary according to how far proceedings must be carried before
a tenant leaves or pays his back rent. GBCD's costs include:
$25-50 to file a request for an eviction at the Rent
Board: Includes the time to prepare papers, file them,
deliver them to the Rent Board and to the tenant.
$25-50 to prepare for and attend hearings: Includes the
time to prepare the case, attend the hearing, file any
follow-up papers needed, possibly attend a second or a
re-scheduled hearing.
$75 for a lawyer and legal fees in court if the Rent
Board's Certificate of Eviction is not sufficient to
persuade a tenant to move or pay up, and a court notice
of eviction must be obtained.
$50 for a constable to deliver a notice of forcible
eviction if a tenant does not quit.when served an
eviction notice.
$300-500 for furniture storage if a tenant still refuses
to vacate and his possessions must be moved out and
put in storage.
Total: $25-225, plus up to $500 for storage costs,
depending on how far the tenant protests the eviction.
In addition, this process may take one to four months, equalling
one to four months rent lost, in addition to the loss of any arrears owed
by the tenant at the time eviction proceedings began. These figures
have been corroborated by Mr. Brown.
Higher figures come from a manager who does not handle evictions
himself, but who turns them over to a lawyer as soon as it becomes
necessary to go to the Rent Board. Due to legal costs, he estimates
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that evictions cost him a minimum of $200 plus lost rent. One housing
manager claims to have lost more than $5,000 in rent due to slow Rent
*
Board eviction procedures. Sidney Insoft, with more than 2,000 sub-
sidized apartments in Boston, claims that one man on his staff spends
almost full time filingfor evictions and going to the Rent Board
hearings. As for the paperwork involved, he says, "We fill eight file
cabinets every six months with papers for the Rent Board."
The Rent Board has sometimes tried to encourage landlords to keep
tenants who have gotten in arrears by arranging for tenants to pay back
rent over reasonable periods of time. For instance, if a tenant is
three months behind in rent for a total of $375, it might arrange for
him to remit it at the rate of $25 per month, in addition to his regular
rent. Managers say that such deals rarely work out because if a tenant
could not afford to pay rent initially, he usually can't afford to pay an
extra sum each month. Although the Rent Board issues a certificate of
eviction as soon as one of these deals breaks down, managers may lose
still more rent while going through court for a notice of eviction. If
they can't move out non-paying tenants quickly, they are stuck with large
deficits. One Boston manager feels so strongly about the inequity of
lengthy Rent Board procedures that he is refusing to pay city real estate
taxes on apartments for which he lost rent during eviction proceedings.
He says he is willing to go to court to make this point to the city.
If eviction proceedings are brought against a leased housing tenant,
they become even more complicated and more expensive as another public
agency intervenes: the Boston Housing Authority.
*
Urban Observatory data.
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Both local BHA and federal regulations on leased housing specify
that no leased tenant can be evicted without BHA approval. These regula-
tions contravene the Rent Board's authority to issue certificates of
eviction. They fail to specify how a local housing authority should act
in the presence of a rent board with legal control over evictions.
In theory, no leased housing tenant would ever have to be evicted
for non-payment of rent if the BHA's policy of paying tenants' arrears
were fully realized. However, as I pointed out in the earlier discussion
of BHA, this guarantee has sometimes broken down, and landlords have
failed to be reimbursed for arrears. In such cases, they have occas'ion-
ally instituted eviction proceedings. Eviction notices have also been
sought against BHA tenants for other reasons, such as prostitution or
refusal to move into an appropriately sized unit.
After managers have obtained certificates of eviction against tenants,
BHA has sometimes intervened, trying to stop an eviction which it hadn't
approved. This BHA action left landlords holding the bag for unpaid rents,
unless and until BHA paid arrears. If the cause of eviction was tenant
behavior other than non-payment, managers were stuck with a bad situation.
In the past, BHA had a tradition of never evicting a leased housing
*
tenant. This made its staff unsympathetic to managers' problems with
tenants. Hoping to avoid being caught between BHA and the Rent Board,
several landlords have recently invited BHA to attend eviction hearings.
Unfortunately, according to Rent Board staff, BHA has usually failed to
**
show up in this situation. On other occasions, neither the BHA nor the
*
Interview with Pat Claire, March 24, 1973.
**
Interview with Debbie Archer, Boston Rent Board, March 28, 1973.
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Rent Board has been aware that the plaintiff in an eviction case was a
leased housing tenant because the manager bringing suit failed to mention
this fact to the Rent Board, and BHA did not intervene on its own initia-
tive.
Neither the Rent Board nor BHA nor managers know who is responsible
in these complicated situations. They could be simplified if BHA rather
than tenants were the party evicted. This change would accord with the
BHA's acknowledgment of responsibility for tenants' arrears. However,
the change is unlikely to occur until the BHA agrees both that it will
pay up or move out tenants if eviction proceedings reveal arrears or
illegal tenant activities, and also that it will not pull all its
leased housing units out of a project, in retribution, if it is evicted
from one apartment. Greater cooperation between BHA and the Rent Board,
along with new lease agreements between BHA and managers would also be
needed. These changes do not seem imminent.- Simplifying relations with
*
BHA does not seem to be a priority at the Rent Board. Neither BHA nor
managers appear anxious to take the time to renegotiate leases. It is
a classic dilemma in which no one can spare the time to make the changes
which, in the long run, would save more time and money for everyone.
Interview with John Grace, May 2, 1973.
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Chapter 6: Managements' Response to Public Agencies
In this section, I have described the friction of doing business
with public agencies. Although I have concentrated on the costs of
dealing with public intermediaries, it is important to underline that
they also bring benefits. Most obviously, they provide subsidies which
enable low and moderate income tenants to afford 221d3 and 236 housing,
and which enable sponsors to benefit from tax shelters and syndication
of proceeds. Two agencies, the Boston Rent Board and at times the Boston
Housing Authority, also benefit tenants by providing them recourse
against inadequate or illegal management performance. When the BHA's
leased housing program functions properly, it also provides management
with a guaranteed rent roll. The Welfare Department also guarantees full,
prompt payment of some rents.
The extensive intervention of public agencies in subsidized housing
*
has been detrimental to management for two primary reasons. The first
is simply the costs to projects of this intervention. Since the budgets
of most subsidized housing projects in high priced areas like the North-
east are written without any leeway for increased expenses, the cost of
*
Public intervention may also have had a strong impact on tenant-management
relations. It may have altered management's perception of how responsive
it needs to be to tenants. It has certainly given tenants new means of
contesting management decisions and actions. An agency such as the Rent
Board has altered management's traditional right to evict tenants without
coming before an adversary proceeding. Many managers, including GBCD's
Whittlesey and State Management, feel that tenants have abused this and
other public proceedings such as the BHA's review of rent increases.
Whether this sentiment simply reflects manager's strong self-interest or
whether, in fact, tenants often do abuse them, I am not prepared to say
because I did not study particular cases in detail. Certainly some
managers have been guilty of abusing the subsidy programs.
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dealing with public agencies has considerably strained their budgets.
(A summary of typical direct expenses is given in Table 2-8.) Second,
public agencies' requirements have absorbed large amounts of management
time. Most managers feel aggravated and hasseled by public agencies.
Consequently, they have less time and energy left for the direct operation
of the housing itself.
Most federally subsidized housing projects are allowed 5% (of net
rental income) for management fees. Under the best circumstances, this
figure would be skimpy. When managers have to deal with many public
agencies, as in Boston, it is totally inadequate. With permitted manage-
ment fees of $59-96 per unit per year, GBCD is spending $162 to $215 per
unit simply to do business with public intermediaries. As high as these
expenditures are, they do not even include the cost of extraordinary,
non-recurring activities such as evictions or moving recalcitrant tenants
into appropriately sized apartments. Nor do they cover all indirect costs
caused by public intermediaries,such as loss of cash flow due to slow
payment by HUD. If these expenses were added, the total costs resulting
from public intermediaries might be even higher in some projects.
GBCD's necessary, minimum administrative expenditures actually run far
higher than $162-215 per unit per year. Many essential management activi-
ties are unrelated to public regulation. They include rent collection;
supervision of repairs, decorating, janitorial services, and contractors;
administration of housing services, and so forth. These activities are
also supposed to be covered by management fees. Clearly, fees are way
out of proportion to GBCD's actual administrative expenses.
The disparity is less great for Brown. His management fee, averaging
$84 per unit, could cover his routine direct, intermediary-related costs,
which run between $59 and $68 per unit. However, a single extra-
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Table 2-8: Summary - Managements' Direct Costs of Dealing With Public
Agencies
public management firm and costs
agency GBCD (10 units) Brown (60 units) State (500 units)
per project per unit per project per unit per project per unit
per year per year per year per year per year per year
HUD - basic $825 - $82.50- $2,850- $47.50- $6,365- $12.75-
programs: 1,125 112.50 3,350 55.80 7,925 15.85
221d3 & 236
HUD Rent 160- 16-26 185 3.10 710 1.45
Supplement 260
BHA Leased 460- 56-66 245- 4.30- 5,560 11.12
Housing 560* 270 4.50
Boston Asses- 30-50 2.60-5 30 0.50 2,500- 5-6
sing Dept. 3,000
Boston Rent
Board**
registra- 33-35 3.30- 40 0.66 2,500- 5-10
tion 3.50 5,000
rent 20-25 2-2.50 185- 3.10- N.A. N.A.
increase 200 3.34
TOTALS+ $1,578- $162.40- $3,535- $58.90- $17,635- $35.25-
2,055 215.50 4,075 68.00 22,195 44.30
Notes to Table 2-8
Includes BHA arrears and rent lost due to BHA
**
Figures do not include evictions
"N.A." means not available.
+These totals should not be read as exact annual summaries of cost, since
they include the non-recurring cost of registration of units with the
Rent Board but do not include occasional costs such as evictions. Nor
do they include all indirect costs such as rent lost due to slow pay-
ment by HUD. Furthermore, in reality, a given project might incur a
minimum cost at one agency but a maximum cost at another. There are
then typical figures, rather than precise ones.
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ordinary event could easily absorb the rest of the management fee in a
project. One eviction can run up an administrative bill of $200 plus
$500 for storage of a tenant's furniture, eating up most of the remaining
management fee. Even without evictions, the $16-$25 left over would
never cover all other ordinary management expenses.
State alone expends a reasonable portion of its management fee
in handling its public business. Roughly 40-50% of its management fee
goes toward these costs which average $35-45 per unit per year. However,
it should be noted that it has not yet negotiated a rent increase or an
eviction through the Boston Rent Board, two expensive processes. State
has lower per unit costs than the other two managers because it can
spread expenses over a large number of units. If, for instance, it has
to call FNMA in Philadelphia about its escrow accounts, the phone tolls
can be amortized over 500 or 1,000 units, while GBCD would have to
support such cals on the rents from only 5 or 10 or maybe 25 apartments.
This and other economies of scale benefit all large projects.
How have managers coped with high administrative costs? How have
they sustained these expenses? Many different ways. Some projects, of
course, have not survived. Many managers rhetorically blame public
agencies, especially the Rent Board and the Boston Housing Authority, "for
driving us out of business." While this overstates the case, the costs
of dealing with public agencies, along with other cost increases have
contributed to defaults and foreclosures.
Some managers sustain increasing administrative costs by tapping
other sources of funding. This is particularly true of non-profit and
cooperative sponsor-managers. GBCD, for instance, has funding from the
-106-
Ford Foundation for its other activities in housing. Out of these funds,
it pays the salaries of its bookkeeper, secretaries, and director. While
all these people spe many hours working on the requirements of public
agencies, their time is almost never paid out of rental housing income.
Limited dividend managers dip into other housing related income:
profits on non-subsidized housing or profits on tax shelter syndication.
State Management indicated that it supported its management team from
these sources. One of the three largest sponsor-managers in Boston has
just begun to reserve all his syndication sales proceeds against operating
cost increases.
A few managers try to pick up extra dollars from rent increases.
But rent increases have to be justified to HUD, and its regulations do
not permit managers to get a larger management fee for administrative
expenses. So they tinker with their cost submissions to HUD to make it
appear that other costs have gone up. One Boston manager, for instance,
reported that he paid $20,000 legal fees
the year when he went to HUD and the Rent Board for rent increases. He
insisted that these fees were incurred during his dealings with the
agencies, but it appears that his actual legal costs were much lower and
he was trying to pick up extra dollars to cover his own time. Another
manager reported both a 5% management fee and individual salaries for
**
his management staff. According to HUD regulation, the salaries should
not have been entered as separate items if the 5% fee were claimed.
While these and other managers have clearly been guilty of misrepresenta-
tion, the misrepresentation is unintentionally encouraged by HUD's
*
Urban Observatory data.
**
Boston Rent Board data.
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refusal to admit certain real administrative costs as legitimate bases
for rent increases or other adjustments in projects' financial arrange-
ments. Some managers have fudged their figures in an effort to cir-
cumvent HUD's unrealistic fee limits.
On one occasion HUD did respond to management costs by making more
money available. In lI'7Z it established the Supplemental
Management Fund. This provides money, up to $100 per unit, in the
mortgages of 236 projects for extra administrative costs during rent-up.
The money can be used for: the development and implementation of certain
supplemental management services during the construction and initial
*
rent-up. These services may include tenant counseling and organizing,
supportive economic and social services, efforts to achieve socio-
economic mix of tenants, and so on. If the fund is not exhausted on
these expenses, it cannot be applied toward other management expenses.
<ds0
ItmC.o be used to prepay the mortgage. Unfortunately, managers have
not always been able to obtain even this limited sum, for limited
purposes. According to Larry Gandel of the Carter Burgess Task Force,
a number of sponsor-managers around the country who asked to include this
in their mortgages were turned down by local HUD-FHA Mortgage Departments
**
that did not feel it was an appropriate mortgage item. Despite the
existence of a HUD statement authorizing the expenditure, the individual
Mortgage Departments were unwilling to relinquish their traditional
views on the acceptability of mortgage items. Managers thus were caught
between divisions of HUD: the Management Division told them they were
Supplemental Management Fund, HUD Circular HM4381.1, Supp.2, p.3.
**
Interview with Larry Gandel, April 19, 1973.
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entitled to $100 per unit for rent-up costs, while the Mortgage Division
said they had no such right. Managers were forced to try mediating
between HUD officials.
On paper, additional HUD regulations also seem to indicate that
managers needn more money to administer its programs can ask for
compensation. Its publications do acknowledge that some requirements
impose extra costs for which management should be compensated. Its
rules for the Rent Supplement Program state:
Allowance will be made in the operating and managerial
cost for expenses incurred by management in certifying
and recertifying of tenants for rent supplement eligi-
bility and for other administrative expenses imposed by
the rent supplement program in connection with housing
for low-income tenants.*
And, as mentioned earlier, when it changed guidelines for the 236
program to require that tenants be recertified annually rather than
biannually, it said:
It may be necessary to adjust management fees to
compensate for additional workload resulting from
more frequent recertifications.**
But these statements have never been implemented. According to Joe
Caliguri, who used to administer the Rent Supplement Program in the HUD
Boston Area Office, no manager has ever been allowed extra money to
support his participation in the Rent Supplement Program or to cover his
increased costs due to the annual recertification of 236 tenants. Nor
does Mr. Caliguri anticipate that extra money will be provided in the
future.***
*
FHA pamphlet No. 2509, "Rent Supplement Program: Management Outline", p.16 .
**
HUD Circular HM 4442.22, 6/26/73, p.
Interview with Joe Caliguri, May 16, 1973.
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The Director of the Management Department in the HUD Boston Area
Office has defended HUD's refusal to allow a management fee larger
than 5%. Irving Solomon has said, "I find it very hard to justify
raising tenants' rents in order to give management more money."* Solomon
says that he tells non-profit managers wiao complain about inadequate
management fees to "get another 100 units to manage. They can manage
another 100 units with the same staff while collecting more management
fees." And he tells limited dividend managers to talk to the projects'
sponsors: the sponsors can kick in some of their profits for the admin-
istration of the housing.
While Mr. Solomon finds it hard to raise tenants'rents to provide
higher management fees, he does not find it hard to raise tenants'
rents in order to pay higher taxes, higher heat bills or to repair
latent defects. Somehow he does not conceive that administration,
like heat and repairs, is a housing service, and it is not going to be
provided adequately if it is not paid for. Or, if it is provided, other
things will slip, such as the time and energy management gives to main-
tenance. Or, at some point in time, managers may decide they have no
more alternative sources of money to defray administrative expenses, and
they will pull out of the housing. The cost squeeze and the hassle of
dealing with public agencies are strong disincentives to many managers.
Sometimes managers try to reduce the costs of dealing with public
agencies by using personal or political influence to bypass legal
regulations or official procedures. Thus, Mr. Brown has expedited requests
*
Interview with Irving Solomon, May 16, 1973.
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for rent increases at HUD by using his personal connections with HUD
Area Director Richardson. Through Richardson he has pressured the
local HUD management office. Some developer-managers who contributed
heavily to the Boston Mayor's campaign funds have occasionally asked
him to intervene at BHA on their behalf. They have gotten the Mayor's
Office to pressure BHA to pay them rent increases.
The managers who seem least frustrated by public agencies are those
who have worked the hardest to cultivate personal contacts with agency
personnel. This is not to say that they try to illegally influence
the agencies, but that they try to find someone inside the agencies
who will be on their side: someone at HUD or BHA who can take a rent
increase request and move it from the bottom of a pile to the top;
someone in the City Assessing Office who will amend a report when the
city delivers an incorrect tax bill. Without such contacts, managers
are more likely to view the agencies as hostile. Brown and Whittlesey
illustrate this point. No single staff person at GBCD has consistently
dealt with public agencies, so the organization has few long term contacts
within them. Most of the GBCD staff consequently feel that the agencies
are unsympathetic to their needs. In contrast, Brown has admittedly
worked hard to develop contacts within the agencies. Through repeated
conversations with the same personnel, he has both gotten a better
understanding of their problems and also gained a more sympathetic and
responsive reception for himself. Brown seems to be exceptional in this
matter. Other managers who have made the same attempt have not always
been so successful, perhaps because they were never willing to admit
that good intentions could exist within the agencies, or that bureaucrats
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sometimes were stymied for reasons beyond their own control.
A few managers, for whom working with public intermediaries is
distasteful and expensive, have considered reducing their dealings with
public agencies. While in theory this seems like a potential solution,
it is not an actual possibility. If managers are to benefit from
subsidies, they must respond to the regulations of the organizations
that provide them. They cannot opt out of the Rent Board's jurisdiction,
except by leaving Boston. The only agency they might extricate from
their projects is the Boston Housing Authority. They could get it out,
if they gave up leased housing subsidies. A couple managers, especially
one or two in the BURP program, have said they would like to reduce their
number of leased housing tenants in order to lessen their business with
BHA. But they are worried that if leased housing subsidies were not
used to lower rents below the basic 221d3 rents, they could not find
enough tenants to fill the units. Other projects have such high rents
in relation to residents' income limits that many people with prescribed
incomes could not afford the housing without leased housing subsidies.
Some projects in Boston have been filled only by providing many tenants
with double subsidies and allowing all other tenants to have exception-
ally high incomes. A recent HUD Audit report of the 236 program nation-
wide found that the basic rents in most 236 housing are not competitive
with comparable market housing.* Only the addition of leased housing
*
"The market rents for Section 236 projects were generally higher than for
comparable conventional projects, because of certain allowances permitted
by law or regulation and ineffective administrative and operating
practices. As a result, HUD's interest assistance liability has been
significantly increased." (Report on Audit of Section 236 Multifamily
Housing Program, p.7).
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(and rent supplement) with accompanying lower rent for tenants attracts
residents.
Conclusion
The intervention of public intermediaries is an inextricable part
of existing housing subsidy programs. The programs provide narrow
subsidies--specific, limited devices--which are too specialized to
attain the broad, announced purpose of housing low and moderate income
families. The inadequacy of each individual subsidy has prompted
federal and local governments to piggy-back additional subsidies. Each
addition brings along the regulation and intervention of another public
agency. Thus, when HUD's 221d3 and 236 programs couldn't reduce operating
costs far enough, city governments applied tax abatements. When rents
were still too high for many intended residents, direct rent subsidies
were requested of local housing authorities, HUD, and state welfare
departments.
Each agency feels obligated to watch carefully over its donation to
ensure that its intended purpose is realized. Because the subsidies
are frequently insufficient, managers are tempted to abuse them. Their
abuse proves to the agencies that they must act as watchdogs. More
rules to prevent abuses are written; more rules lead to more supervision;
and more supervision leads to more costs in agencies and housing projects
alike.
Not only do agencies supervise projects' managers, they also try to
monitor other agencies. The Boston Housing Authority reserves the right
to review and reject HUD approved structures and rent increases. The
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Boston Rent Board also examines them regardless of HUD or BHA approvals.
It may demand repair of buildings or it may rescind a rent increase
which either or both of the other agencies sanctioned. One department
in HUD may even contravene the action of another HUD department, as
when the mortgage division refuses to permit a supplement management
fund requested by the management division.
These agency actions are too often protective and self-righteous.
Each agency sees itself as the one proper administrator of the public
interest in subsidized housing. Housing managers are caught in the
middle of agencies' disputes. For every public authority that claims
jurisdiction over subsidized housing, administrative costs within
projects increase. Managers see themselves "wasting thousands of dollars
dealing with callous, inflexible and incompetent bureaucrats."* One
manager recently lamented that he was "surrounded by controls" which
prevented him from doing the best possible job.* In his view, repeated
public attempts to repair the deficiencies of on-going public programs
create as many difficulties as they resolve.
Given the costs to both public agencies and private managers of
existing multi-tiered regulatory patterns, perhaps the federal govern-
ment should consider a policy of de-regulation.
De-regulation should begin with a consolidation of responsibility
among the agencies which oversee the same functions in subsidized housing.
Perhaps HUD should relinquish regulatory activities to local juris-
dictions when local agencies are willing to handle them. If a city rent
board is able to process rent increase requests, then perhaps HUD
could stop handling them. If a city inspection department is willing to
Urban Observatory data, intervies with managers.
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monitor buildings' physical conditions to ensure they meet housing code
standards, then perhaps HUD could turn its inspectors to other tasks.
Another approach to de-regulation would be for HUD to exempt small
projects from some reporting requirements. Projects with mortgages under
$200,000 might be relieved of financial reporting, except for certification
of tenants' incomes. They might be freed of most HUD scrutiny as long
as rents were kept within maximum limits for their geographic areas and
as long as debt service were paid. GBCD's Whittlesey promotes this as
the best approach to reducing unduly high administrative costs in small
developments. "If we could just have HUD go away," he has said, "then
we'd have a better chance of keeping our very small projects alive."
De-regulation would turn-around HUD's habit of promulgating new rules
and reviews when problems arise. Like many other public bodies, it has
become accustomed to thinking that only its own staff can adequately
monitor subsidized housing. This approach has become so costly that it
seems time for HUD to share responsibility with other organizations.
Any movement toward de-regulation is bound to be slow. It challenges
each public agency's self-image as the only one which performs adequately
and its self-interest in the jobs and power which accompany regulatory
activities. It also challenges many years of liberal thinking about
the proper relationship between government and private businesses. The
traditional liberal distrusts the perceived self-interest of the private
business sector when it becomes involved in government funded programs.
Traditionally, the government is regarded as the representative of the
"public interest" that can keep private interests from ripping off public
programs. This attitude has encouraged the growth of HUD's supervisory
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functions, especially after a loosely monitored housing development
program, 608, in the early fifties was abused by many developers.
Unfortunately, like most regulatory agencies, HUD is as likely to sway
under the pressure of the organizations which it is supposed to control
as it is to represent tenants, tax payers, or any other less well organ-
ized public. Furthermore, it is probably overly optimistic to assume
that federal regulation has the power and perspicacity to prevent, or
at least repair, all abuses by private interests. As will be discussed
in the next section, HUD too often fails to enforce its own rules about
the obligations of private contractors and developers of housing. Too
often, it accepts private activities that are less than legal when they
are in HUD's own self-interest.
Transfer and consolidation of regulatory authority at the local
level would not be a panacea for existing costs and conflicts. Local
agencies are as susceptible to abuse as federal bodies. But they might
be a first step toward reducing both projects' expenses of dealing
with public agencies and disputes among agencies. Implicit behind this
suggestion is a critique of the federal system of regulation which is
beyond the scope of this paper. The question of which level of government
can best regulate a publically subsidized activity is open to major
dispute and cannot be discussed here. Nevertheless, it does not seem
appropriate for housing projects to pay the price for the existing,
multi-tiered regulatory and subsidy system.
The intervention of public agencies in subsidized housing might
also be reduced by substituting a single subsidy for the many present
public supports. One proposal for a single subsidy program has come
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from William J. White, Executive Director of Massachusetts Housing
Finance Agency. He has recommended a rental allowance program geared to
production. "Under this program the rent charged for a housing unit
would be based solely on a person's ability to pay using 25% of a
person's income as the guide to housing expense. The difference between
the market rent and the person's percentage of income would be sub-
sidized through the single subsidy program."* Anyone with an annual
income below, say, $15,000 would be eligible. This program would save
public money on construction and regulation. It would also reduce
housing managers' costs of dealing with public agencies to the expense
of negotiating with one intermediary. The friction among agencies would
be eliminated. Potential friction within the single agency could not,
however, be eliminated. Intra-agency disputes would doubtless sometimes
cause problems for managers, just as disputes within HUD now do. The
agency would probably institute extensive certification of tenants'
incomes. If the job of monitoring incomes were passed on to housing
managers, as in the present 221d3 and 236 programs, then managers' admin-
istrative expenses would begin to climb. Disputes between managers
and the agency might arise over income certification, just as they do
now. Nevertheless, insofar as the agency would demand fewer forms,
reports and certifications from managers, housing administrative costs
could be reduced; and insofar as the agency had a single program suffi-
cient to provide housing for low and moderate income families, intra-
agency conflicts could be reduced.
A single subsidizing agency and a single regulatory authority
*
William J. White, The Single Subsidy Program, p.2.
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would be more efficient than the present pattern of multiple subsidies
and multiple intermediaries. Cutting down the number of agencies and
actors with legitimate roles in regulating subsidized housing would cut
the overhead costs of government and managers. These savings could,
hopefully, be passed along to taxpayers and tenants. If the friction
of doing business with public agencies were reduced, everyone would
save.
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Section 3: Alternative Sources of Operating Funds
Chapter 7: Alternative Sources of Funds for Management
The steadily rising foreclosure rate is ample evidence that many
projects are suffering from inadequate operating funds and cannot survive
with their present operating budgets. As discussed in Chapter 2, the
deficiency of operating budgets can be attributed to any of several
causes. Some of these causes are external to projects; others are internal.
The most widespread external reason is underestimation of operating
costs during the development phase when initial financial projections are
made. This has been given as the most prevalent cause nationwide for
foreclosure in all HUD subsidized programs. It can be blamed on HUD-FHA
development procedures which reward developers who have the largest possible
mortgages. The reward takes the form of larger front-end profits: bigger
BSPRAs and higher profits from the sale of "ownership" to limited partners.
In areas like Boston with high construction costs, even developers who do
not try to exploit these profits may be tempted to underestimate operating
costs in order to make projects feasible. In either case, larger mort-
gages mean higher debt service, and the higher the debt service, the
less rental revenues left for on-going management services.
Cost increases external to projects have also squeezed operating
budgets. Increasing rates for taxes and utilities cannot be accomodated
by the limited revenues from allowed rents. Inflation has pushed up
expenses for labor and supplies. The impact of price rises is exacerbated
by the original underestimation of operating costs which deprives projects
of any margin to absorb price rises. Inadequate construction can also
*
Stegman, Critical Issues in Property Management, p.17
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be blamed for causing operating expenses which frequently cannot be
covered by rents.
Cost increases internal to projects may be ascribed to any or all
of the direct participants in the housing: tenants - managers - builders -
developers. Tenants may be guilty of poor housekeeping, managers of poor
maintenance or operation, builders of latent construction defects, and
developers of insufficient budgets or structural problems.
Recently, the insufficiency of operating funds in 221d3 and 236 has
been recognized by HUD. It is moving to prevent operating deficiencies
in future projects by more accurate cost certification and review during
development. But what about existing projects? Will they inevitably move
toward foreclosure, or can more money for operating and maintenance by
found? Any of several actions could be adopted by the government and
housing managers. They could:
-Do nothing but operate projects as in the past, allowing them to
be foreclosed when costs became overwhelming. Then a new way of
managing and owning them would have to be identified.
-Actively encourage foreclosures as a conscious strategy. Then projects
could be refinanced or turned over to new owners with more realistic
operating budgets, and perhaps without the cost of debt service (if
the government were willing to sustain the loss) and without the
indirect, public expense of tax shelters.
-Re-structure the programs in mid-mortgage, perhaps changing the owner-
ship or management of projects.
-Cut operating costs within the confines of existing programs and
owners, hopefully lowering them enough to avoid foreclosure. This
might involve cutting services, which does not seem desirable, or
finding vendors with lower prices for insurance, auditing, heat, and
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so forth, which does seem a likely possibility.
-Find alternative sources of funds for operation and maintenance.
-Combine two or more of these strategies.
In this section, I will explore the fifth of these strategies:
additional sources of funds for operation and maintenance of existing
projects. There are potential sources of money in housing subsidy programs;
some could be tapped immediately, others would require minor administrative
changes; others would demand additional congressional funding.
This strategy deals with symptons--i.e., the need for more money to
pay increasing bills--rather than causes--i.e., why costs are increasing
and why projects lack the income to support them. But it includes a
broad examination of who should take financial responsiblity for projects'
economic difficulties. Builders and architects should be forced to make
good on construction guarantees that now are often meaningless. Perhaps
project owners and contractors should have greater liability for resolving
projects' problems than at present. Perhaps owners, who receiveIreturns
on their investments, and developers, who benefit from tax shelters and
syndication proceeds, should share the burdens of financial problems.
Shifting financial responsiblity to these people would amount to an
implicit restructuring of housing programs. But it would not depend on
new housing programs or new Congressional legislation. It would only
require that HUD redo its rules and regulations for the management of
subsidized housing.
Although in the past HUD has not looked upon builders, architects,
owners or developers as financial resources, it has examined some other
potential sources of additional operating monies. A number of these were
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listed by former Assistant Secretary of Housing Management, Norman Watson,
*
just before leaving office. Presumably the present HUD moratorium on
housing development will yield further suggestions for salvaging financially
troubled projects. There are strong incentives for HUD to find ways of
maintaining housing projects. If projects cannot cover operating costs and
are foreclosed, HUD becomes the owner. ;*f more operating funds cannot be
found, HUD could become the owner of hundreds-of-thousands of dwelling units
that it lacks the capacity to manage. Private sponsors and investors
stand to lose millions of dollars through recapture of tax depreciation
benefits.
More operating funds would provide benefits to most actors in the
housing system:
- More or, at least, continued housing services for tenants.
- More funds to work with for managers.
- Greater assurances of financial return for sponsors and investors.
- An up-side potential for mortgagors.
- More work and, therefore, more jobs for public intermediaries.
Lest this list paint too rosy a picture of the outcome of increased operating
funds, let me underline that the alternatives discussed here continue many
of the questionable characteristics of present subsidies, since they are
variations on existing schemes, not totally new designs for public
investment in housing.
- These are supply side, rather than demand side, strategies.
- They are linked to units, rather than tenants, thereby tying
tenants to a particular housing stock.
*
Norman Watson, Remarks . . ., p.5.
-122-
- Public agencies have an intermediary role between subsidies and
projects, which would sometimes create large unintended costs of
the kind documented in Section 2 of this paper.
- Subsidies are regressive because families with larger incomes are
*
eligible for larger subsidies, even while they pay a larger rent.
- They are so specifically defined that their application would be
strictly regulated, causing high costs of dealing with public
agencies.
- Investors in high tax brackets would continue benefitting from the
indirect subsidy of accelerated depreciation.
For the purpose of this discussion, I accept the presence of these
features, since my intent is to examine whether the existing system can
be amended to mend its problems, rather than to question whether a
different system, such as housing allowences, would eliminate its diffi-
culties. But I will examine in some detail the implications of alterna-
tive proposals for making available more 0 & M funds. Their costs and
benefits will be examined in light of several questions:
- How much money can each alternative provide, under what circum-
stances?
- Can sufficient funds be made available to meet inflationary costs,
or can operating monies be increased only marginally and thus
remain ahead of costs only temporarily?
- Who would pay for the funds: tenants through immediate or delayed
rent increases; taxpayers through government subsidies; sponsors,
or investors?
*
The maximum interest subsidy on a given unit is a direct function of the
unit's mortgage amount. The units' rent is also a direct function of
mortgage size. Since rent is also correlated with income, the larger a
family's income, the more rent it can pay. And the greater the rent on a
unit, the greater the interest subsidy paid by the government. (Cf. Jim
Wallace, Federal Subsidies in Rental Housing, p.10.)
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- When would funds be made available: immediately after construction,
throughtout the life of the project, or at some other point in
time?
- What would be the trade-offs: would the friction of dealing with
public agencies increase; would some existing reserve funds be
foregone?
- What would be the secondary affects? For instance, would owners
lose their tax shelter benefits, or would rents go up?
Hopefully, some of the sources discussed might even be able to attack
some of the causes of excess costs, reducing them while providing more
dollars. One of the most obvious sources of money, rent increases, will
not be considered. I presume that most tenants cannot afford to pay more
rent and, furthermore, that where they can, project sponsor-managers have
already requested rent increases. I do assume that since 0 & M has the
dual function of giving housing services to tenants and maintaining the
housing as an investment, that it is appropriate for investors and
sponsors, as well as tenants, to bear some of the costs.
Two broad categories of funds will be discussed:
- Funds which are internal to existing programs and could be made
available immediately through administrative reallocation of
their finances; for example, ballooned mortgages, or residual
receipts.
- Funds which could come from sources external to existing programs;
for example, operating subsidies or operating loss loans.
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(A complete list of these alternative sources follows, in Table 3-1)
Whether or not these funding sources would be sufficient to keep
projects financially solvent would depend on the amount and the causes of
their financial deficiencies. Projects needing only modest, limited
increments in operating funds probably could be helped. So could those
whose excess operating expenses are caused by repairable problems,
such as construction defects or insufficient building security, which
can be solved by a single input of funds. Projects whose initial oper-
ating expenses are greater than projected during development could be
helped only if initial cost overruns leveled out because most of the
proposed funding sources yield fixed sums which do not increase over time.
So they cannot keep pace with inflationary expenses. In projects
experiencing an every widening gap between income and expenses, inflat-
able sources of income are needed. This quality is not found in most of
the funding sources discussed here.
Figures in the text on the potential dollar costs and benefits of
**
these alternatives have been taken and extrapolated from many sources.
*
Other sources of funds could be applied to new projects by changing their
mortgage and fee structures during development. For example, management
fees could be re-done on a cost-plus basis or extra management fees could
be subsidized during the early life of a project. Mortgages could be re-
duced if the government subsidized outright certain non-recurring expenses
such as fees (for architects, builders, FHA, and so on). The government
might also indirectly reduce operating costs by subsidizing the cost of
higher quality construction materials. However, I will not discuss these
strategies for new projects, since my concern is whether existing pro-
jects can survive.
**
See pages 31-32 of Section 2 for a list of my primary sources.
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Table 3-1: Alternative Sources of Operating Funds
I. Funds internal to existing projects
A. Funds within projects' fiscal structure and held in the name of
projects
*
1. Replacement reserves
2. Residual receipts
3. AMPO funds
B. Funds within projects' fiscal structure but held privately by
sponsors
1. Limited dividend distributions
2. Syndication proceeds
3. Excess profits to wholly owned subsidiaries
C. Funds available through changes in mortgage financing
1. Ballooned mortgage delinquencies or principal payments.
2. Moratorium on principal or principal and interest payments
3. Operating escrows built out of deferred mortgage payments.
D. Funds available early in the life of projects, during and a&er
construction
1. Construction cost savings
2. Liquidated damages
3. Performance and payment bonds
4. Completion assurance funds
5. Construction guarantees
6. Escrow deposits for incomplete items
II. Funds external to existing projects
A. Operating subsidies
1. Straight operating subsidies
2. Tax payment subsidies
B. Federal mortgage subsidies
1. Partial payment of claims on mortgage insurance
2. Assignment of mortgage to HUD-FHA
3. Temporary substitution of HUD for project mortgagor
4. Operating loss loans
C. Refinancing of mortgages
1. Refinancing for longer periods
2. Refinancing at lower interest rates
3. Refinancing 22ld3 projects as 236 projects
D. Development cost escrow
*
These were suggested by Norman Watson in Remarks ... , p.5.
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In order to show their comparative dollar benefits, they have all been
computed for a single project. This is an actual 221d3 project outside
*
Boston, in Fitchburg, Massachusetts, that was completed in August 1971.
Most of the basic data on Meadowbrook came from Urban Planning Aid which
has been working with the tenants in the project. A summary chart of the
funds which could be earned by this project is given in Table 3-3, pages
172-173.
*
Although Meadowbrook was completed in August 1971, final closing was de-
layed for 16 months. The delay occurred because cost increases during
construction made the mortgage larger than could be supported from
allowed rents. Since HUD did not want to foreclose on the project, it
permitted the sponsor to postpone final closing until after the next
increase in HUD limits for rents and tenants' incomes. Then the new
rents were sufficient to support the required mortgage. Because of the
delay, no operating statements were prepared for 1971 and 1972, even
though apartments were occupied.
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Chapter 8: Avaliable Funds Internal to Existin Projects
Funds present within projects' fiscal structure and held in the name of
projects
The existing fiscal arrangements of 22ld3 and 236 projects contain
several accounts which might be tapped for 0 & M. These include replace-
ment reserves, residual receipts and AMPO funds.
Replacement reserves are monies taken out of rental income and
escrowed in a fund that can be used to replace and repair "installed items
in a project. This may cover a broad variety of items . . . ranges,
refrigerators, water heaters, air conditioners, floor tile, bathroom tile
*
and roofs among them. Since reserves are taken monthly out of rents,
they are paid by tenants. They are a percentage of the value of a pro-
ject's structures, as determined in the initial mortgage, and so their
**
monthly cost does not increase over time. However, no replacement reserve
is required in projects whose mortgage is less than $200,000. This means
they are not found in most small projects, such as those managed by GBCD.
Only one of GBCD's projects has a replacement reserve. It amounts to
$105.33 monthly in a 24-unit project whose mortgage is approximately
$380,000. During four and a half years of occupancy, a total of $5,584
has accumulated. At Meadowbrook, the replacement reserve is $10,852/year,
or $47.60 per unit per year. (It is interesting to note that when the
*
HUD Insured Project Management Guide, p.187.
**
This percentage used to be 0.5% of total improvements; but in 1970, it
was changed to 0.6% of the value of structures alone.
Other typical replacement reserves are: $1,182/yr. in a 28 unit rehab-
ilitation project, with a mortgage of $368,000; replacement reserve was
based on 3% of estimated gross income, rather than on the value of
structures because it was part of the BURP program which was trying to
reduce operating costs as much as possible. Other BURP projects'
replacement reserves were as low as $24 per unit per year.
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cost of Meadowbrook's structures increased during construction, the
replacement reserve did not increase. While technically it should have
gone up, HUD did not insist that it be increased since additions to
other operating expenses exhausted Meadowbrook's available rental income.)
Expenditures from replacement reserves must beapproved by HUD. While,
in theory, they are used to replace major capital items, HUD can exercise
wide discretion when deciding how they may be expended. One sponsor-
manager of BURP buildings was allowed to use his replacement reserves to
convert new gas heating systems back to cheaper oil heat (which had been
in his buildings before rehabilitation) because gas prices had risen so
much during three years operation that he could not afford the gas bills.
One large management company in Boston requested HUD's permission to apply
replacement reserves toward the purchase of trucks which it used to rent
(profitably) from its own wholly owned susidiary leasing company. The
same company is also asking that replacement reserves be applied against
*
the repair of latent defects.
HUD's management guide says that replacement reserves can be used
not only for specific operating and maintenance items, but also
on occasion to avoid default when the financial
difficulty is not the result of mismanagement or
diversion of funds. When unavoidable financial
difficulties arise, the owners may request that
the Fund be used or deposits to the Fund be sus-
pended for a period of time for a specific purpose.
Often when mortgage principal payments are temporarily deferred, payments
into replacement reserves are waived to make additional funds available
for current operating expenses.
*
Urban Planning Aid data.
**
BUD Insured Project Management Guide, p.187.
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If replacement reserves were cancelled and the money were instead made
available for general 0 & M, between $24 and $50 per unit per year, depend-
ing on the project, would be freed. This could not, by itself, make a
significant dent in operating deficits in most projects. In addition, its
expenditure for routine 0 & M would leave projects without reserves for
extraordinary expenses. Therefore, unless they were combined with other
funds, replacement reserves are probably better left as reserve funds.
Residual receipts are rents and other specified monies collected in
excess of basic project requirements. They include: (1) AHPO-Allowance to
Make Projects Operational-funds unexpended during rent-up; (2) net rents
received prior to cost certification, that is, rents from tenants who move
in during construction, minus the costs of providing them services such as
heat and light; since debt service is not paid out of rents during con-
struction, a considerable portion of these rents are unexpended; (3) excess
rents which exceed basic 221d3 rents. The third of these is the most pre-
valent source of residual receipts, particularly since net rents from the
construction period are first used to offset certified construction cost
overruns, before they become available for residual receipts. Even then, net
rents may be used for pre-paying the mortgage rather than for residual receipts.
As mentioned in Section 2, many projects do not have residual
receipts. Projects which do have them are supposed to deposit them in
savings accounts, until they request HUD's permission to spend them.
Residual receipts can be used for "additional amenities or capital improve-
ments for tenants' benefit.. .or... up to 50 % of the residual receipts
account can go to prepay the mortgage."* HUD also considers residual
*
Insured Project Mnagement Guide, p.190.
-130-
receipts from over-income tenants as a possible asset for 221d3 projects
in financial difficulty. It allows projects with financial problems to
waive income limits in order to move in over-income tenants who will pay
*
higher than basic rents.
236 projects differ from 221d3 in that they cannot deposit excess
rents from over-income tenants in residual receipts accounts. They are
supposed to remit excess income to HUD which then uses the money to offset
the federal government's payment of the mortgage interest. This pro-
cedure implements the original intent of the 236 program. The intent was
that the government's cost of subsidizing the mortgage interest rate should
be reduced as tenants' income increased and they became financially able to
pay higher rents. The government's original cost projections on the
236 program estimated that over twenty years, its subsidy could be reduced
to zero, with tenants paying the full interest rate.
Now it does not seem to make sense for the government to insist that
236 projects relinquish extra income when projects are sliding into
default. The rules of the 236 program should be changed, to accord with
the present regulations on 22ld3 that stipulate:
a project which is legitimately in financial
difficulty or facing default could not realistically
be required to deposit funds in the Residual
Receipts Account [or remit them to HUD], which
if held could help alleviate the critical situation.
What would be the impact of this change? Projects without residual
receipts clearly would not benefit at all. However, it seenspossible
that if increased rents were used to provide better housing services, then
*
Insured Project Servicing Handbook, Chapter 4, Se.2, p.3.
**
Insured Project Management Guide, p.190.
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some over-income tenants who presently conceal that fact in order to avoid
paying more rent might admit their incomes and pay. Unfortunately, it is
also possible that this change would encourage managers to select over-
income tenants in preference to other applicants in order to increase
their rent roll. This result would be unfortunate because any large
increase in the number of over-income tenants would subvert the intent of
the program to house low and moderate income families.
Nationwide, the percentage of over-income tenants ranges from zero
to 25%. On the average, 14% of all tenants pay between basic rent and
market rents, while 1% of all tenants pay market rents. In Boston, a
tenant paying full market rent could provide between $625 and $1100 extra
per year; higher rents would be linked to larger mortgages and 236, rather
than d3 projects. If tenants' incomes in Meadowbrook were distributed
according to the national average, and they paid appropriate extra rents,
approximately $1,215 more per year would be available for 0 & M.
Allowence to Make Project Operational, or AMPO for short, is a fund
of 2% of the mortgage which is supplied to non-profit sponsors. It is
intended to be working capital during final closing and initial rent-up.
After final closing, any unexpended AMPO monies go into the residual
receipts account, where they lose their identity as separate funds. In a
recent $1.6 million non-profit Tenants Development Corporation project in
Boston, $7,970 in unexpended AMPO funds were transferred to residual
receipts at final endorsement. AMPO funds are jointly paid for by tenants
and public subsidies since they are part of mortgages. They are not
available to limited dividend or cooperative projects.
-132-
Funds within projects' fiscal arrangements but held privately by owners
The three previous sources of funds are financed by tenants' rents.
There are other potential sources inside projects' fiscal arrangements
that would not come out of tenants' limited incomes. Instead, they would
come out of the profits of limited dividend projects' owners. They would
not be available to non-profit and cooperative projects.
Limited dividend distributions equivalent to 6% per year of sponsors'
presumed 10% equity are available as a cash profit to the partners of a
limited dividend project. In Meadowbrook, with a $4,056,000 mortgage,
annual limited dividend distributions could reach $2,435. However, the
sponsors of many projects subordinate dividends to basic operating needs:
they are not paid if the project needs the money for operating expenses.
This subordination is often formally included in partnership agreements.
Most limited partners consent to waive the 6% distribution since they have
invested primarily for the sake of tax shelter benefits. HUD could state
that all operating expenses must be given precedence over the 6% dividend.
This is already required by the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency,
*
although it is only beginning to be enforced. The one obstacle to this
change might come from the Internal Revenue Service which legally does not
permit investments made solely as tax dodges. 236 limited investments are
legitimized in the eyes of the IRS by the 6% distribution. If it were
legally waived by HUD, the IRS might object, although it has not yet
protested partnership agreements which relinquish it.
Syndication proceeds are a second source of income for limited
dividend projects' sponsors. Syndication proceeds are the monies earned
*
Interview with Stephen Rioff, April 23, 1973.
-133-
by sponsors when they sell "ownership" of a project to limited partners.
These proceeds are often very large sums of money, since sponsors typically
sell 95% of the ownership for, in the case of rehabilitation, 20-25% of
the mortgage value and, in the case of new construction, 12-17% of the
mortgage. On a $2 million rehabilitation project, this amounts to $400-
500,000, while on a new construction $2 million project, it is $240-340,
000. This money is all profit for the sponsor, unless he sold the syndi-
cation through a broker who might take 10-20% of the syndication proceeds
as a fee; or unless he incurred unanticipated development expenses that
could not be met through other sources.
Since developers are required to put up little cash, over and above
the government provided mortgage loan, in order to cover construction
and start-up costs, syndication proceeds represent a rather handsome fee,
earned at the outset of a project. The amount earned is arbitrary in that
it is "primarily a function of the tax laws and not of the amount which
**
[a developer] could demand for his services in a competitive situation."
It bears little relation to the quality of the structures or the services
provided to tenants.
*
Current federal income tax laws permit owners of new or rehabilitated multi-
family housing to take depreciation deductions on the entire costs of de-
preciable improvements, even though improvements are financed largely with
borrowed money. Most sponsors of subsidized housing sell part of the owner-
ship to wealthy limited partners who can then use part of the depreciation.
The limited partners play no role in the operation of a project--they are
often prohibited from intervening at all in the day-to-day management.
Their links to the project are simply financial; they bu. title to a frac-
tion of the ownership, then they declare depreciation of the project against
their other income. They can claim depreciation regardless of the project's
economic or physical condition, as long as it is not foreclosed. Depre-
ciation continues even when projects are in default, in poor physical con-
dition, or are assigned to HUD.
**
James Wallace, thesis, p.331.
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If these proceeds, or a portion of them were re-invested in a project,
then its sponsors as well as its tenants would bear some of the rising cost
of 0 & M. It seems appropriate for sponsiors to share these costs, since
they also benefit from proper upkeep of a. project. Adequate care of a
project maintains sponsors' investment, while sufficient 0 & M monies
ensure that projects won't be foreclosed, thus safeguarding investors'
tax shelter benefits from recapture. They also safeguard sponsors from
being black-listed by the FHA (i.e., forbidden to package any more sub-
sidized housing projects). Since sponsors, not tenants, are the ones who
benefit from avoidance of these penalties, they should pay part of the
price..
Unlike most the funds discussed earlier in this chapter, syndication
proceeds are fixed, limited amounts. They are only available once. They
do not accrue over time as do rents, replacement reserves, or residual
receipts. Although they could cover large cost increases for limited
periods of time, they would be exhausted with no potential for renewal.
In Meadowbrook, for example, syndication proceeds were $328,125. This is
equivalent to $1,483 per unit, or $12.35 per unit per month for ten years
(without computing any interest on the money). If syndication proceeds
were held in a 6% savings account, almost $19,680 could be generated
annually.
One tenant-owned limited dividend project in Boston with almost
identical syndication proceeds - $320,000 on a $1,700,000 mortgage - is
setting aside $100,000 of the proceeds for operating reserves. Placed
*
This is only 8.1% of the mortgage because Meadowbrook's sponsor him-
self kept a large portion of the project's ownership for his own tax
deductions.
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in an 6% escrow account, a minimum of $6,000 will be available annually
before the $100,000 principal has to be tapped.
Excess profits to wholly owned subsidiaries are another potential
source of 0 & M funds that would be paid by sponsors. Many large developers
own both management companies and service companies which are employed by
their projects. The latter subsidiaries are contracted for such services
as snow removal, trash collection, trucking, repair, and/or decorating.
Since HUD rules do not limit the profits which can be paid to vendors,
sometimes wholly owned subsidiaries are given work at non-competitive
rates which permit them to make excessive profits. These subsidiaries
become a ploy for developer-managers to earn extra profits, over and
above the 5% management fee. It has been alleged that at least one
developer-manager in Boston has profited by paying non-competitive prices
to his own companies.
The residents in this company's projects'formed a tenants union to
protest rent increases. While reviewing the company's financial data in
preparation for a rent strike, they discovered how its subsidiaries were
paid. Then they pushed it to disengage these subsidiaries from all pro-
jects under its management in order to reduce operating costs. In one
project, tenants presured the company to sell a wholly-owned laundry
which had producel a handsome profit. The proceeds from this sale were
used to offset some large repair expenses, delaying a rent increase which
*
was in the offing and saving tenants money. An outside laundry franchise,
Maytag, was brought in once it agreed to pay the project a slice of its
proceeds. $3-5000 of tenants expenditures will be coming back to the
*
Urban Planning Aid data.
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project yearly. This sum can be used for extraordinary expenses or
amenities which tenants could not afford.
Managers should be prevented from making extra profits on the business
of wholly owned subsidiaries. If they need this income in order to cover
their regular management costs, then more direct payment should be made in
ways which are less deceptive. While this is not an issue in many pro-
jects, in those where it does arise, the savings should be passed along to
tenants. Whenever legal kick-backs like that with Maytag can be arranged,
they will channel tenants' expenditures back into projects, supplying
needed operating funds.
Funds available through changes in mortgage financing
Balloon mortgage delinquencies or part of debt service payments.
Debt service is the largest single item paid out of rental income. It
could be reduced, freeing a larger portion of rents for daily 0 & M
expenses, if HUD and projects' mortgagees gave their approval. They could
agree that part of a project's mortgage principal could be deferred until
the end of the mortgage term; interest might or might not also be deferred.
In effect, part of the debt service would be ballooned, its due date post-
poned. Then it could be due in one lump sum, or the term of the mortgage
could be extended--perhaps by the addition of a second mortgage--until the
deferred amount was paid. Current mortgage delinquencies could also be
ballooned in this manner.
According to Larry Gandel of the Carter Burgess Task Force, which
recently completed an extensive study of HUD FHA mortgage processing, HUD
has already unofficially agreed to reduce principal payments in a few
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projects in order to keep them out of foreclosure. This has been donE. with
*
the consent of the mortgagee, GNMA. However, HUD's most common practice,
to date, has been not to reduce principal payments for the life of a mort-
gage, but rather to defer them for a limited period of time, six to thirty-
six months. During this time, projects are supposed to correct the finan-
cial problems which prompted the need for more operating funds. This type of
mortgage modification has two drawbacks which my proposal does not. First,
it only works if problems can be corrected with a brief input of extra
**
funds, and second, it presumes that projects can afford higher debt
service at the end of the modification period.
At the end of modification as currently allowed, projects are
supposed to begin repaying the deferments by increasing debt service. The
pertinant HUD regulation states that any request for a deferment should be
accompanied by:
a workable, realistic reinstatement plan.. .showing
(a) the operational improvements to be made, and (b)
the manner and time-frame in which the project can be
expected to reach an income level sufficient to meet
operating expenses, full debt service, and start to
repay delinquencies and advances.***
In one $9 million project that was granted a 36 month deferment,+
debt service increased $5.47 per unit per month, or a total of $23,893 per
year for the entire project. This can be covered only by a rent increase,
was requested to
causing tenants to underwrite the full cost of the deferment. This defermentA
*
Telephone interview with Larry Gandel, April 10, 1973.
**
According to Joe Caliguri in the HUD Management Office, the most common
repairable causes of mortgage modifications are construction problems,
such as leaky roofs or inadequate piping, and rent strikes! He said that
modifications have been given to projects while they waited out a rent
strike and obtained Boston Rent Board approval for higher rents. (Tele-
phone interview, May 29, 1973).
Insured Project Management Guide
Urban Overvatory data.
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release project income for repair of majorlatent construction defects.
Since these are non-recurring costs, a deferment can probably resolve and
eliminate them. However, other kinds of financial problems cannot be
solved by mortgage modifications. One very large project, after a year-
long deferment, was still unable to meet both full debt service payments
and operating expenses because all costs had been drastically underestimated
in the mortgage. The project manager says that the local HUD Management
Office told him off-the-record not to bother making any more mortgage
payments, since it was clear that the project would eventually be fore-
closed by HUD. Following this covert advice, the manager is putting all
income into 0 & M,on the grounds that it is better for the project to be
in good physical condition than to stay out of HUD ownership for a few
additional months. Projects such as this might benefit more from a
permanent reduction in the principal, although in this particular case
even ballooning the principal might not by itself be sufficient to make
it financially viable.
The amounts released by ballooning principal payments would vary
over the life of a project because early in the mortgage, most of debt
service goes to repay interest, while later on, increasing amounts go to
prepay the principal. Meadowbrook's annual debt service payment is
$174,666 on a $4,056,000 mortgage. After one full year of amortization,
only 1 54100 of this will be principal, while after 10 full years, $1)CC
will be principal. A comparative figure of $1,000 a month or $12,000/
year comes from a much smaller 65 unit project, with only a $1,123,400
mortgage, that actually is in modification for one year after 18 months
of occupancy.
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Ballooning debt service could occur only with the consent of both
HUD and projects'mortgagees, which in subsidized housing is usually
GNMA or FNMA. HUD has been eager to promote mortgage modifications
because it thereby avoids becoming the owner of assigned projects.
Although GNMA and other mortgagees have usually consented to mortgage
modifications in the past, it is unclear that they would continue doing
so if many projects tried to balloon a portion of their mortgages. If a
large number of projects reduced their principal payments, mortgagees'
income would also be reduced. Any large reduction in GNMA's income or
FNMA's income would disrupt their cash flow, interrupting their ability
to function in the mortgage market and purchase new mortgages. GNMA
and other mortgagees might demand projects' foreclosure or assignment
to HUD-FHA, particularly if interest rates rose and they could earn more
by putting out their funds at a higher rate. If interest rates were to
remain constant or fall, mortgagees might be more amenable to deferrals,
especially if they were convinced the deferrals would secure their invest-
ments in the long run.
Another, even larger uncertainty is what would happen at the end of
mortgages when the ballooned payments become due. Undoubtedly, few pro-
jects would be able to afford a lump sum reimbursement at that time.
Projects might pay by extending their mortgages or taking out second
mortgages, but this alternative would be feasible only if projects were
still habitable and capable of attracting tenants. At this time,
predicting the marketability of subsidized housing projects after the
year 2000 seems speculative at best and perhaps foolish. One might try
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predicting that by the time mortgages are due, the government would be
willing to make the balloon payments, but this is only a speculative
possibility. If ballooning of principal were adopted as a strategy to
free more money for operating costs, probably the method of financing
re-payment would be left for a future decision.
A moratorium on principal or principal and interest payments has
been proposed by at least one observer of federal housing, Michael
Stegman. He has proposed that "all developments should have a three-
month interim after final closing before debt service begins. Funds
accumulated during this period would be used as an operating reserve
*
funds." At Meadowbrook, a $43,666 fund could have been compiled this way.
Stegman has also suggested a moratorium--resembling the bank holiday of
1933--be declared
until a thorough investigation is conducted on the
operation of each subsidized development. The investi-
gation should begin with those developments that
currently are experiencing difficulties and continue
until it encompasses even the most solvent developments.
The funds accumulated by the individual developments during
the moratorium would become an operating reserve that
should be subject to use--with Secretary approval--in
various, specified emergency situations.*
The idea of operating escrows built out of deferred mortgage payments
may be more likely to happen than a formal holiday on payments. It has
also been suggested by former Assistant HUD Secretary of Housing Management,
**
Norman Watson, and at one time was also considered by the Carter Burgess
Task Force.
*
Stegman, Critical Issues in Property Management, p.3.
**
Norman Watson, Remarks. . ., Nov. 14, p.5, 1972.
Telephone interview with Larry Gandel, April 10, 1973.
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Before operating escrows could be built out of mortgage payments,
HUD and managers would have to make the following arrangements:
1) deferment of mortgage payments, plus the creation of escrow
accounts for the deferred funds. The approval of HUD and mortgagees would
be required. It might be hard for HUD to back a policy which promoted
defaults, albeit temporary, technical defaults, because mortgagees might
object, as discussed earlier. Mortgagees would have to be persuaded that
temporary deferrals would secure their investments for the next thirty or
forty years.
2) re-payment of missed mortgage payments. Payments might be
ballooned until the end of mortgages; they might be amortized over the
life of the mortgage by increasing all future mortgage payments; the
mortgage term might be extended; or the government might agree to subsidize
them. (Further implications of these re-payment strategies were discussed
earlier under "Balloon mortgage delinquencies or part of princi*'pl payments.")
3) a set of rules for the use of operating deficit escrows. It is
highly unlikely that HUD would agree to turn operating escrows over to
management without any restrictions on their use, since the escrows would
have been built at the expense of mortgagees. But if this could occur, it
would save HUD the expenses of watching over accounts and reviewing
expenditures; it would save projects the expense of requesting permission
for expenditures. If HUD kept the intermediary role, it would have to
write regulations concerning what expenses could come out of operating
escrows; when the escrows could be expended; where they would be deposited;
who would approve them, and so on. It might want to consider giving
tenants some say in the expenditure of the escrows, since their rent monies
would have provided the dollars.
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The funds in escrows could be substantial if an entire year's debt
service were devoted to them. The average debt service on a 22ld3 project
in Boston is $800/unit (based on a per unit mortgage of $18,600*), while
the average on a 236 unit is also $800/unit (based on a per unit mortgage
of $26,400*). In the representative 22ld3 project, Meadowbrook, the
annual debt service is $766/unit, or $174,660 for the entire project.
Invested in a 6% account, this could throw off $10,480 annually.
One objection to these operating escrows is that it seem illogical
to let projects go into default to guard against future defaults. While
the logic may seem peculiar, the numbers make it appear a good way to build
a hedge against future operating overruns.
Funds available early in the life of a project, during and immediately after
construction
Existing HUD-FHA regulations on construction financing contain several
potential sources of funds for operating expenses in occupied projects.
Several of these sources--escrow deposit agreements, completion assurance
agreements, and construction guarantees--are already available, but they
are not pursued with much vigor by either project sponsors-managers or
HUD. Other sources could be made available with only minor, administrative
changes in HUD rules; for instance, construction cost savings.
Construction cost savings, according to present HUD rules, are supposed
to be deducted from the originally committed mortgage, to result in a
reduced final mortgage. This produces lower fixed debt service payments,
releasing more rental income for current operating costs. It also reduces
the government's contribution for interest subsidies. However, if HUD
would allow construction cost savings to be included in the mortgage, then
*
Urban Observatory data.
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they could be applied toward operating costs in several different ways.
When construction on a recent TDC project was finished early, the
resulting savings were $96,932 on a $1,731,600 mortgage. TDC proposed
to HUD several applications of construction cost savings:
1) Establishment of a "Special Management Fund," set up so that
expenditures would be made semi-annually, with the authorization of the
HUD Area Office, for special management costs of a temporary nature, such
as management staff training, special tenant social services, capital
equipment, and payment of amortization (if ever required).
2) Prepayment of the replacement reserve. "This would make
additional funds available for a number of years (14.7 if the entire
savings were used in this manner) for management costs."*
3) Creation of a management fund. "This would enable TDC to use
that money for extraordinary management expenses as permitted by the
**
Commissioner."
HUD did not allow any of these uses of the savings. It insisted
that the money could go only to offset the originally approved mortgage.
In the interest of securing the project's financial stability for
forty years, HUD's refusal seems short-sighted. While a reduction in the
mortgage does release a larger amount of rental income for other operating
expenses, in this case the funds released were small on a yearly basis:
$3,000 or $30 per unit. In contrast, if the construction savings had
been included in the mortgage and then escrowed, almost $100,000 would have
been available for unanticipated operating costs. Since this $100,000
*
Unpublished letter from Marion Dawson, TDC President to M. Daniel
Richardson, HUD Area Director, June 20, 1972.
**
Letter from Dawson to Richardson.
Unpublished letter from Richardson to Dawson, June 27, 1972.
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was computed in the project's original mortgage, presumably it could have
been amortized without increasing tenants' rents. With inflation, a
large lump sum of money in-hand during the first few years of operations,
when most financial problems arise, would probably have been worth more
to the project than the slight increase in operating funds which did occur.
There are other potential sources of funds from the construction
period which would not need to be amortized by rents. These include
construction guarantees, escrow accounts for incomplete items, and
escrows for latent defects. These three are designed to guarantee that
contractors finish all construction work and mend any latent defects
which appear after buildings are occupied. Contractors' liability is
supposed to ensure that construction related repairs do not have to be
paid out of rents. However, if the experience of Boston is typical, many
subsidized projects are plagued by incomplete work and latent defects
which contractors are never required to fix. Instead, repairs are charged
against rents, frequently straining projects' budgets so much that they
have to seek relief by large rent increases or waivers of mortgage
principal. Incomplete work in one recent project included insufficient
*
flashing on the roof and inadequate calking of prefabricated wall panels.
Latent defects in another project, found by FHA inspectors after one year
of occupancy, included sagging drainage pipes which were backing up,
improperly installed sub-flooring in bathrooms which caused heaving of
floor tiles, and improperly laid exterior concrete walks where ice
**
accumulated at entrances to buildings.
*
Urban Observatory data.
**
Urban Planning Aid data, including a copy of the FHA annual physical
inspection report of the project discussed.
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Still other, even more serious latent defects and incomplete con-
struction items have been recorded at this development by an independent
physical engineer with twenty years experience, including four within
FHA, Allister Sheperd. After inspecting the premises, Mr. Sheperd
reported that:
-- heating systems were inadequate to provide "uniform,
safe and proper heating of the living units" in
"violation of FHA-HUD [Minimum Property] Standards.
- gas vents have been installed within one inch of
combustible material. FHA-HUD Standards and the
State Code "requires a minimum clearance here of
six inches." This constitutes a fire hazard.
- broken and loose bathroom floor tile could be
related to inadequate anchoring of toilets to the
floor. "Paragraph M714-1.4 of the FHA-HUD Minimum
Property Standards is intended to prevent the problem
that is being encountered".
- some interior walls are not anchored properly at the
floor. "It would appear that construction complying
with FHA Minimum Property Standards paragraph M713
would not result in the conditions that were noted."*
These are only a few of the many inadequate constructions items which
Sheperd noted. As the quotations from his report indicate, most of these
items should not have been present if FHA-HUD had enforced their own
minimum property standards as required by law. Nor should they have been
Allister Sheperd, unpublished report to Leslie Solomon, May 26, 1973.
From Urban Planning Aid files.
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present if the sponsor's HUD-approved contracts with builder and architect
were enforced. These contracts hold builders and architects liable for
constructing buildings in accordance with FHA-HUD property standards.
Although buildings deviated considerably from these standards, neither
FHA-HUD nor the project sponsor-manager pressured contractor or architect
either to make repairs or else provide the funds for repairs. Tenants are
now resisting a rent increase which the sponsor-manager says is necessary
to get the needed money. The bill would amo it to many thousands of dollars.
It should not be treated as a legitimate operating cost: it is attributable
to construction problems which could be resolved if HUD regulations on
contractors and architects were enforced.
HUD requires all architects on FHA insured projects to carry pro-
fessional liability insurance. This insurance is supposed to pay for any
design defects identified during or after construction. Any item in an
architect's specifications which proves inadequate or illegal is supposed
to be remedied by tapping his insurance. However, this does not happen
in many subsidized projects, according to Allister Sheperd and my own
examination of HUD construction documents. Instead, construction change
orders and additional mortgage money are frequently requested for inadequate
items. For example, if a heating system is incompletely designed on the
architect's specifications, does not meet local health or fire codes, or
does not satisfy FHA minimum property standards, the architect's insurance
should pay for any extra expenditures needed to make the system adequate.
Instead, nine times out of ten, the contractor requests FHA to approve a
construction change order amending the original plans. And nine times
out of ten, FHA gives its consent, increasing the mortgage and thereby
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increasing the cost which tenants must pay. These mortgage increases
represent a double burden to tenants: first, they are expenses which should
be paid by someone else, i.e., the architect's insurance or the builder;
and second, the FHA underwriting division usually allocates enough money
in the initial mortgage for construction up to code standards. This means
that sufficient money is usually included in the mortgage in the first place.
If contractors are able to have additional funds approved in order to bring
items up to code, very often they are asking for double payment.
In one recently completed 221d3 project outside Boston, change orders
amounting to many thousands of dollars were approved for construction grade
lumber, insulation, weatherstripping, and fireproofing--all of which by
law had to be included in the original construction specifications and for
which the FHA underwriting division had provided money in the original
construction contract. Thus, the mortgage was increased to pay for
"changes" already paid for once and which, furthermore, were the architect's
responsibility if they were not provided for the first time around.
This is a common practice at FHA, according to Sheperd. The FHA
department which approves change orders never considers whether requests
should be disallowed based on original mortgage specifications or whether
the money should be obtained elsewhere. The result is that mortgages are
increased at the expense of tenants and taxpayers who must jointly pay the
debt service. Contractors and architects save accordingly.
Tenants suffer yet another disadvantage from increased construction
costs due to the way cost increases cycle through a project. Higher
construction expenses cause larger mortgages. Larger mortgages lead to
* h
Interview with Allister Sheperd, June 1, 1973.
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higher rents. Higher rents push up the income limits of families which
can afford the housing. A 30% construction cost increase can push up
both rents and income limits by 14%. Thus, everytime HUD approves
additional construction expenses, rather than forcing sponsors or builders
or architects to come up with the money, it effectively excludes more low
income families from the housing.
Numerous conversations with personnel in the Boston HUD Area Office*
have convinced me that there are four major reasons why HUD and sponsors
sometimes fail to move against contractors and architects. First, in
many projects sponsors and contractors establish an identity of interest
which permits them to take advantage of the BSPRA, builders and sponsors
profit and risk allowence. Once this identity of interest has been estab-
lished, a project sponsor loses incentive to move against the builder when
he fails to perform adequately. Thus, HUD's own creation, the BSPRA, may
mitigate against the satisfactory completion of construction. This problem
has been acknowledged by officials of the Massachusetts Housing Finance
Agency which uses the 236 program. In at least one project, MHFA knows
that the sponsor has failed to push the contractor to repair construction
defects because of their financial partnership.**
Second, sponsors are reluctent to sue architects for money from their
professional liability insurance because of the legal costs involved.
Having HUD approve additions to the mortgage is much cheaper. It has the
added attraction of increasing the potential profits from sale of syndication,
since the sale price is based on the size of the mortgage.
See list of Intervies, p.190, for names of all HUD staff contacted.
**
Interview with AnneBromer, May 9, 1973.
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Third, HUD officials find it hard to move against contractors because
they perceive this as the responsibility of sponsors. If sponsors do not
bring complaints about contractors' performance to HUD (and as I stated
above, many are unlikely to do so for business reasons) then HUD does not
take the initiative to seek redress from contractors for inadequate work.
HUD personnel are reluctent to act, despite regulations in their own
manuals which clearly make this a responsibility of the HUD Management
Division.*
Fourth, responsibility for enforcing some of the HUD regulations seems
to fall between the lines of responsibility which are so clearly drawn
among the various HUD departments. Each department assumes someone else
is taking care.. One example: HUD requires that ever contractor
of a subsidized housing project either be bonded or sign a completion
assurance agreement with the owner and the construction lender. HUD
regulations further stipulate that 2-1/2% of the value of the construction
contract will be held by the bonding company or the construction lender
out of either the bonds or the assurance fund. This 2-1/2% is held for
one year after construction is completed. ("Completed" is defined as the
date of the 100% compliance inspection.) The 2-1/2% is to:
be held as a fund to guarantee against defects in
construction due to faulty materials or workmanship
or damage to the mortgaged premises resulting from
such defects, which defects or damage become apparent
within one year after the date of the aforesaid sub-
stantial completion. Said sum may be used for the
correction of such defects or damage in the event the
contractor's liability for such corrections is not
limited by the amount of such sum.**
*
Insured Project Servicing Handbook, all of Chapter 4, Section 6. Also
confirmed by Norman Babb, Area Chief of Finance and Mortgage Credit, on
May 29, 1973.
**
Completion Assurance Agreement, FHA Form No. 2450, p.2.
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The handbook used by HUD personnel when servicing insured projects
further states:
Completion of on-site and off-site facilities shall
be diligently pursued, both as to items to be
completed and as to time of completion, as assured
by the escrow agreements. Not until satisfactory
completion will the mortgagee be notified that all
escrow funds may be released. The Housing Services
and Property Management Division Director may extend
the time for completion, if, in his opinion, an
extension is warranted.*
Both the Chief Inspector and the Chief of Finance and Mortgage Credit in
the Boston HUD Area Office said that these regulations plus their own
knowledge of HUD clearly indicated that the Director of the Management
Department would be responsible for determining when and if the 2-1/2%
escrow against latent defects could be expended on behalf of a project.
But, the Director of Management in the Boston Area Office does not even
know what this escrow is! On two occasions he has said he does
not know anything about this escrow and has never used it,** although
he does acknowledge that a number of subsidized projects under his juris-
diction have had serious latent defects and problems finding the funds to
repair them. The outcome of this man's ignorance is that no one in the
Boston HUD office watches for this escrow, so it can never be utilized
to benefit projects.
If HUD wanted to pursue funds for projects more agressively, it
could tap them from the following construction-related sources:
1) liquidated damages
2) performance and payment funds
3) completion assurance funds
*
Insured Project Servicing Handbook, chapter 4, section 6, p.3 .
**
Interviews with Irving Solomon, May 16 and May 29, 1973.
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4) construction guarantees
5) escrow deposits for incomplete items
1) Liquidating damages clauses are found in construction contracts on
subsidized projects. They stipulate that if construction is not finished
within the time specified in the contract (or amended), then the contractor
must pay a fine of a stipulated amount per day. This amount is set by HUD
regulation at 24, per day for each $1,000 of the construction contract or,
for example, $900 per day at Meadowbrook with a construction amount of
$3,184,000. A one month unapproved construction delay would have yielded
$27,000 for Meadowbrook.
Any penalty levied under a liquidated damages clause takes the form of
a reduction in the amount paid to a contractor. In effect, it reduces the
price of structures. It is not intended to provide the funds for finishing
construction. Rather, it offsets other cost increases which result from
delayed completion. These cost increases might include interest on con-
struction loans and construction insurance. The structural costs offset
by liquidated damages are at least sufficient to compensate for these
other costs. In theory, they might even be enough to produce a decrease in
the final mortgage, which would mean a reduction in debt service, but in
fact few large benefits in the form of reduced mortgages and rents have
come from enforcement of liquidated damages.
If any tenants have moved into a partially completed building before
liquidated damages are invoked, the net rental income (i.e. rent after paying
operating expenses such as utilities) is used to offset the amount of
damages charged against the contractor. His liability is reduced by the
total of net rents on the grounds that since he did sufficient work for the
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building to be partially habitable, he should not be penalized for the work
he did finish.
This seems a weak rationale since tenants will continue to suffer the
inconvenience of living in an incomplete structure and since someone will
have to pay for the costs entailed by unfinished construction. The net
rents are monies which otherwise would go into residual receipts from
which tenants might eventually benefit. If the rents are used to offset
the contractor's penalty, then it works against the tenants two ways: one,
they lose the benefits of a reduced cost for structures and, two, they lose
the future benefits of residual receipts.
Liquidated damages have not been enforced often, in the past, according
to the chief of HUD Finance and Mortgage Credit in Boston. It seems
apparent that sponsors who have an identity of interest with a contractor
would not be likely to press their claims, and HUD has not acted as a
claimant in behalf of tenants or its own interest in projects.
2) Performance and payment bonds are supposed to provide the funds for
completing construction in case a contractor does not finish the job. The
payment bond is supposed to cover any outstanding liens against the con-
tractor, such as unpaid bills from sub-contractors, while the performance
bond is supposed to pay for someone else to finish construction. The
amounts of these bonds are set by HUD regulation. They are percentages of
construction costs, varying according to the type of structure:
type of structure performance bond payment bond
non-elevator, under $2 million 25% of construction 10% of construction
non-elevator, over $2 million 25% of construction 25% of construction
high-rise, elevator 50% of construction 50% of construction
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Again, HUD should offer assistance to sponsors or tenants, to ensure
that collections are made against these when construction is not finished.
HUD inspectors should be more careful not to certify as completed struc-
tures which still need extensive work.
3) Completion assurance fund is used by some contractors in lieu of
construction bonds. It, too, is a percentage of the construction cost. It
is a cash deposit or an irrevocable letter of credit equal to half the per-
*
formance bond of 10% the cost of construction, whichever is greater. As
mentioned earlier, both assurance agreements and bonding regulations specify
that 2-1/2% of the value of construction should be held for one year after
work is completed as an escrow to cover charges for repairing latent defects.
-4) Construction guarantees, in HUD's words, "cover defect, deviations
from approved drawings and specifications and faulty materials or workman-
**
ship, or damage resulting therefrom." Legal action by HUD or project
sponsors can be brought during the two years following the end of construc-
tion for defects discovered during the first year following the end of con-
struction. Thus, construction guarantees are not deposits of money, like
the other sources of funds. But they constitute the legal basis for seeking
whatever funds are needed. Several projects in Boston that have tried to
get repairs made under construction guarantees say that HUD has been uncooper-
ative and unwilling to help them press their claims against contractors.
If this allegation is true, HUD should change its posture to one which is
more helpful to sponsors. For instance, it might identify latent defects
while inspecting occupied projects. The change would be in HUD's own best
*
Completion Assurance Agreement, FHA Form No.2450.
**
Insured Project Servicing Handbook, Chpt.4, Sec. 6, p.2 .
Insured Project Servicling Handbook, Chpt. 4, Sec. 6, p.3 .
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interest, since it would reduce the liklihood that projects would go into
default in an attempt to pay for construction related repairs.
5) Escrow deposits for incomplete items are created by HUD when it
makes an inspection at the end of construction. After this 100% com-
pliance inspection, it takes out of the contractor's payment double the
amount which it estimates is needed to finish all incomplete items, up to
a maximum of 2% of the construction cost. If incomplete items total less
than 1% of the value of construction, double their cost is witheld; if
they are valued between 1 and 2%, their simple value is withheld; if they
are valued at more than 2%, their full value cannot be escrowed, although
then the HUD Inspection Department might consider not granting a final
construction inspection. According to Stanley L'Esperance, a chief inspector
for HUD in Boston, the items most commonly found incomplete are decorative
or finishing, such as landscaping, carpeting or interior painting. He
avered that in 12 years as a housing inspector, he had never known a sponsor
who wasn't able to have all construction finished by the contractor. Since
this contradicts the reports of numerous housing managers in Boston,** it
appears that HUD is not making escrow funds available to sponsors and
managers who need to get construction finished. The manager of one large
227-unit project has further criticized HUD for releasing a $19,000 escrow
fund to a contractor before incomplete items were finished. He also claims
that as a result of HUD's action, approximately $10,000 had to be taken
**
out of rents for the finishing work. If his story is true, HUD was
*
Insured Project Servicing Handbook, Chpt. 4, Sec. 6, p.3.
**
Urban Observatory data.
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responsible for making the $10,000 expenditure an operating cost.
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Chapter 9 Funds External to Existing Projects
Additional funds for 0 & M could come from sources outside projects,
as well as from inside their finances. Federal or local governments could
further subsidize projects experiencing financial difficulties. One
advantage to subsidies is that they would not be paid by tenants who
cannot afford to spend a higher portion of their income on housing,
except insofar as tenants are taxpayers and funds from the government
finally come out of taxes.
Operating subsidies could have many possible designs. One would link
them to tenants' incomes, as the Brooke Amendment did in public housing,
so that no one pays more than a fixed percentage of his income for rent.
However, after its experience with the Brooke Amendment, the government
would be extremely reluctant to establish a similar subsidy in 221d3 or
236 projects because it sees this kind of subsidy as an endless bog which
soaks up an ever increasing number of federal dollars. Norman Watson,
former Assistant Secretary for Housing Management, also criticized this
subsidy form for creating "adverse side effects that act as a disincentive
to economical and efficient management."* He implied that this subsidy
takes away tenants and managers' incentives to keep costs down. Why would
either be motivated to conserve on 0 & M if the government were picking
up the tab, whatever the price? A more extended critique of the public
housing operating subsidy was made in a recent Real Estate Research
Corporation report:
It radically alters the normal relationship between
management and occupants in a way that reduces the
*
Norman Watson, Remarks. . ., p. 1.
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management's ability to help sustain viable environments
in public housing projects. Many tenants pay no rent
at all; and in some cases, the management actually pays
the tenants each month (when very poor tenants pay their
own utility bills). This situation removes nearly all
economic incentive for careful property maintenance.
It also disrupts tenant morale by causing variable
rental treatment of tenants in identical units.*
Some of these problems could be avoided if operating subsidies were
linked to cost increases, rather than tenants' incomes. This second
kind of operating subsidy could take off from basic rents and operating
budgets established when projects were initially occupied. Subsidies
could be given for specific cost increases such as higher utility or
tax rates.
Three drawbacks to this form of subsidy are that it would pile
another layer of paperwork and cost certification on both managers and
HUD; it would be a disincentive to keep down operating costs; and it
might encourage managers to underestimate costs while preparing operating
budgets, with the rationale that cost increases could always be covered
by the government. The latter problem could be avoided if HUD really
insisted upon accurate cost projections. This is a task HUD is already
undertaking in an attempt to negate existing incentives for sponsors to
underestimate operating budgets.
The amount of money which could be allocated through operating
subsidies is limited only by Congress' willingness to appropriate funds.
HUD might limit them by setting a ceiling on how much a project or a unit
coLd. receive. For instance, it might say that it would pay up to a
maximum of $10 (or $50) per unit annually for certified cost increases.
*
Anthony Downs, Federal Housing Subsidies, p.23.
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It might establish separate limits in different parts of the country in
accordance with varied local expenses, just as it now approves diverse
mortgage and income limits in different places.*
Another option for determining operating subsidies would be for HUD
to pay any cost increases over, say, 5% per year.
Still a fourth variation on operating subsidies would be for the
government to provide a fixed amount per unit per year, nationwide. This
is essentially what was done when HUD approved the addition -of al00
per unit supplemental management fund for all projects, only in this case,
the tenants and not the general public paid most of the cost through
mortgage payments. HUD could compute the average annual cost of particular
tasks in subsidized housing--recertification of tenants would be one
possibility--and then donate this amount yearly to all projects. Let
me give a more detailed example, using recertification of tenants: the
average cost of recertifying a family in a 221d3 unit in Boston appears
to be around $5. In a 228 unit project like Meadowbrook, this would
require an annual subsidy of $1,140.
Tax payment reforms could constitute a special class of operating
subsidies. Increasing property taxes are a major cost increase nation-
wide. Under federal pressure, city governments might agree to collect
only a fixed amount of taxes from subsidized housing, if the federal or
state government paid the difference between that amount and the full
taxes due. However, it is unlikely that the federal Office of Management
*
The Urban Observatory's Subsidized Housing Study has documented operating
cost increases ranging from $12 to $125 per annum per apartment. If
HUD agreed to pay for all increases which couldn't be covered by, say,
a 5-10% rent hike per year, then it would end up financing anywhere from
$0 to $118 per unit, in these projects.
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and Budget (OMB) would support such a proposal because it could turn into
an open-ended subsidy once tax rates began rising. Cities might exploit
federal or state funds by upping projects' assessments. As I noted
during the discussion of the Boston Rent Control Board (see Section 2, pages
7?), some public officials adopt the attitude that if an expense in
subsidized housing is going to be paid by another public agency, not by
tenants, then it is appropriate to increase that expense since the burden
will be spread over the general, unidentifiable tax-paying public. It
seems likely that city assessors, who generally are charged with the job
of increasing city tax rolls, would increase the bill for subsidized
projects if they knew the federal or state government, rather than local
taxpayers and voters, were going to foot the bill.
If the opposition of OMB and/or states could be overcome, a subsidy
for taxes could lead to large savings within projects (and, simultaneously,
large expenses for taxpayers).
Like most operating subsidies, tax supports would entail much paperwork
for projects and governments alike. Both city and state or federal
officials would have to maintain records on every project's tax status, and
the projects would have to coordinate the reimbursement of their taxes
by the state or federal government to the city.
A variation on tax support would be for cities to collect only a
payment-in-lieu-of-taxes (PILOT) from 221d3 and 236 projects, just as they
do from public housing. A possible precedent for this may come from
Washington, D.C., where the Linda Pollin Memorial Housing Foundation is
suing the city for the right to pay only a PILOT. The housing project
contends that the city should extend to 221d3 and 236 projects the implicit
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subsidy of foregone taxes given to public housing. As of May 1973, the
Linda Pollin project had won its case in district court, but the city
was appealing the decision.
Federal mortgage subsidies could be applied in a number of ways.
If mortgages were ballooned, as described earlier, and the federal govern-
ment took over liability for the ballooned payment, that would be one form
of mortgage subsidy. If all the principal on Meadowbrook, for example,
were ballooned, it would need a subsidy of $4,056,000 (the total cost of
the mortgage), although if this amount were paid at the end of forty
years, its discounted present value would be less than $900,000 at a
5% discount rate.
Partial payment of claims on mortgage insurance could be a variation
on balloon payments. FHA could pay off part of projects' mortgages by
dipping into its reserve pool. This would not only reduce the amount of
debt service owed by projects, it would also cut down the government's
subsidies for interest. If Meadowbrook's mortgagee were reimbursed for
half the project's outstanding loan, it would receive $2,028,000 from
FHA. Meadowbrook's debt service could then be reduced either in amount
or in term: its montly payments could be cut from $174,666 to $87,333,
or the term of its mortgage could be shortened, while debt service pay-
ments remained constant. The government's total subsidy cost would be
halved. HUD's Acting Director of Housing Programs, Fred Pfaender,
believes this strategy could save a majority of the housing projects in
fiscal difficulty.*
*
Telephone interview with Fred Pfaender, March 13, 1973.
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A third strategy by which the government could prevent foreclosure
when projects couldn't meet debt service payments would be for HUD to
take title from the mortgagee, paying off the mortgage with insurance
premium funds, while allowing the owner to retain title. The mortgage
could, in effect, be written off and the project's entire income devoted
to operating expenses. HUD has already done this with at least one large
project in Boston. While taking title from the mortgagee is considered
a preliminary step to foreclosure, HUD could decide not to foreclose.
Alternatively, if HUD did not want the current owner to keep the project,
it could sell the project at a low cost. With lower mortgage, the new
owner might better be able to handle the project's operating cost overruns.
A fourth way that HUD might subsidize mortgages would be for HUD
to take title temporarily from the mortgagor. Currently, whenever HUD
acquires ownership of a project, FHA pays off the mortgagee and HUD
receives the mortgagee's title to the property. Instead, HUD might take
over from the mortgagor, paying debt service out of public funds until
the project became financially solvent. Then the housing could be
returned to its former owner, or a new owner could be found. This approach
would be successful only with projects whose fiscal problems could be
mended by a temporary input of funds. It is similar in this respect to
present mortgage modification practices, but it would leave projects
better off financially, since they would not afterward have to pay
increased debt service to compensate for missed principal payments, nor
would they have to sustain interest costs if HUD paid the entire debt
service. In Meadowbrook, this approach would free $174,666 per year.
This amount would not vary, no matter when during the life of a project
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HUD took over the debt service, since debt service has constant level
payments.
Whether or not legislative changes would be required before HUD
could substitute for morgagors is disputed. A former HUD lawyer, Larry
Gandel, says that existing laws would permit this, but HUD General
Counsel has not interpreted the law like Gandel. It has said that new
legislation would be required. A more extensive legal review would be
needed for a definitive opinion. A legal review would also need to
determine how HUD's take-over for the mortgagor would affect the position
of limited partners in a for-profit corporation. If the ownership switch
were reguarded as a sale by IRS, then limited partners would lose their
depreciation benefits and previous benefits would be subject to re-
capture. Under these circumstances, HUD would come under great pressure
not to remove the original mortgagor, and this strategy would probably
not be feasible until 236 projects were at least ten years old. (After
ten years there is no re-capture of accelerated depreciation in 236
projects).
Another federal mortgage subsidy could be obtained through a little
used provision of the National Housing Act, Section 223(d which authorizes
HUD to issue operating loss loans. ** These loans can cover losses
experienced during the first two years of operation of a multi-family project.
Recoupment is limited to the amounts by which disbursements
for taxes, interest, mortgage insurance premiums,
property insurance premiums, and expenses for main-
tenance and operations (exclusive of all capital
improvements) exceed the income from the property.
*
Telephone interview with Larry Gandel, April 10, 1973.
**
Basic Laws and Authorities on Housing & Urban Development, pp.8 2-8 2 .
Insured Project Servicing Handbook, Chpt. 4, Sec. 16, p.l.
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These loans at first appear to be a sound device for helping projects
survive the problematic first years of operation when most fiscal dif-
ficulties emerge. But there is one hitch to their utilization. They
must be coterminous with the original mortgage; they cannot be tacked onto
the end of the original loan. Nor can they increase a project's debt
service above the statutorily established limit. Therefore, projects
whose mortgages are already up against statutory ceilings cannot avail
themselves of operating loss loans. In high-cost areas like the North-
East, almost all projects are excluded by these provisions. To date, no
operating loss loans have been issued by the Boston Area Office of HUD
for this reason, although one is now being tentatively considered.*
The benefits of an operating loss loan would not be available to
Meadowbrook, because it is at mortgage limits.
Re-financing mortgages could leverage more monies for 0 & M. It
could be done by extending mortgage terms or lowering their interest rates.
A special form of re-financing could be used in 221d3 projects: they could
be re-financed as 236 projects.
The Chief of HUD Finance and Mortgage Credit in Boston has said, "If
there is one thing sacred in FRA, it is the mortgage term."* But if FHA
would give up its attachment to forty years as the maximum mortgage term
and projects could be re-financed for longer periods, then monthly effective
debt service could be lowered. If Meadowbrook were re-financed for fifty
years but kept its 3% interest rate, its debt service would fall by almost
$18,000 to $156,720 per year, or413,060 per month.
The term of FRA mortgages is supposed to represent three-quarters of
*
Telephone interview with Norman Babb, May 29, 1973.
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buildings' economic life. Since the allowed term for multi-family
dwellings has gradually been extended from twenty to twenty-five years,
then to thirty, and finally to forty, FHA's concept of economic ife has
been malleable. At the present time, forty year mortgages are often
politically determined, rather than practically. For instance, sixty
year old buildings in declining neighborhoods may survive another fifty-
five years after rehabilitation, but the odds are sufficiently long to
make the forty year term a gamble. It is permitted simply in order to
facilitate production's economic feasibility. A decision to extend
mortgage terms to fifty years would be political, rather than economic.
Lowering the interest rate would also be a political decision. If
HUD and Congress ever wanted to, they could subsidize the entire interest
rate on 221d3 and 236 mortgages. If interest paid by projectswere
reduced to zero, but principal were still repaid at the rate of a 3%
mortgage in 22ld3 projects, an average of $558/unit would be released during
the first year. If the same conditions were applied to 236 projects,
except that amortization were at the rate of a 7-1/2% mortgage, then an
average 236 unit would have $789 released during the first year. In
later years, less money would be released, for principal payments increase
over time. Meadowbrook is a 221d3 project; under the conditions
specified above, its debt service could be reduced to an average of $131/
Ing
unit during the first year, fre $635/unit. If the government paid all the
interest but applied level annuity payments to the project's amortization
of principal, debt service would become $101,420 per year, $73,246 less
than at present.
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Refinancing 221d3 and 236 projects for more funds does not seem a
possibility in most projects because it would lead to higher debt service,
given that little of their principal has been amortized. But after ten
years of operation, refinancing for more money might be possible because
/ S7o of the initial principal would have been re-paid in 221d3 projects
and 6% in 236 projects (with market interest rates of 7-1/2%).
One special way to lower the interest rate on 221d3 projects would be
to convert them to 236s. (Table 3-2 summarizes the major differences between
the two programs). This conversion would lower their effective interest
rate from 3% to 1%. On a typical 221d3 unit witha mortgage of $18,600,
the annual debt service would be reduced from $800 per year to $555 per
year. In Meadowbrook where the mortgage averages $17,789 per unit, the
annual debt service would be reduced from $766/unit to $540/unit per year,
a savings for the entire project of $51,428 per year. This savings could
go toward either 0 & M or reductions in rents. A recent 221d3 project
which contemplated conversion estimated that rents could be reduced by
$19 to $39 dollars per unit. Projected rents were:*
type of unit 221d3 rent 236 rent savings
low-rise:
2-bedroom $164 $145 $19
3-bedroom 190 166 24
4-bedroom 214 188 26
high-rise
1-bedroom $154 $115 39
2-bedroom 176 144 32
The federal government would also benefit from conversions. They
would initially bring a new flow of dollars into the U.S. Tresury. The
inflow would result from differences in federal financing for thetwo kinds
*
Urban Observatory data.
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of projects. In 22ld3 projects, the entire mortgages are purchased out-
right by FNMA (now GNMA), so the entire mortgage amounts are counted as
expenditures by the federal government when they reach final closing. In
236 projects, the government does not purchase mortgages outright. Instead,
it makes an annual contribution to the mortgagee as an interest subsidy:
the difference between the market interest rate on the mortgage and the 1%
paid by the project itself. This annual contribution decreases over time,
as more of the interest is paid off. So, if 221d3 mortgages were prepaid
and new 236 mortgages were taken out, the government would recoup its
initial outlay for the 221d3 mortgages, substituting an annual contribution
for the 236s. Politically, this change might be very appealing due to the
initial net return to the government. Political mileage might also be
earned from the fact that 236 subsidies are adjustable, linked to tenants'
As mcmes
incomes(rise, they pay more rent which is returned to the government to
cover a part of the public interest subsidy; while in 221d3 projects,
increased rents resulting from higher tenants' incomes do not reduce the
public subsidy.
Conversions are already permitted under existing FHA rules, but only
in projects which have not yet been finally endorsed. The conversion
a
rules are quite simple foriproject after initial endorsement: it merely
requests that the change be made, and if the project is feasible under 236
requirements and 236 funds are available, the conversion is affected.*
If occupied projects were converted, a number of difficulties would
have to be resolved. First, 236 projects pay mortgage insurance premiums,
which 221d3s do not, so their cost would have to be added into the expense
*
FHA pamphlet 4442.1, pp.9, 23-26.
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of the conversion. ( smcZxj c( cs e b 21Ai3 A .236
Second, income limits in the two projects are different. They tend
to be higher in 221d3 than in 236 since in the former they are established
by HUD as "the lower of either median income for families in a project's
area or the income necessary to sustain the carrying costs of a unit which
is minimally acceptable in the market,* while in 236 they are 135% of the
local limits for public housing occupants. For example, a two-bedroom
22ld3 apartment could house a family with an income of $7,972, but an
identical 236 unit could only take families whose incomes were under
$7,052. If 221d3s were converted, families who were above the 236 limits
might be able to stay as "over-income" tenants, although this status
would force them to pay more than the basic 236 rents. They would need
to pay 25% of adjusted gross income, or the so-called market rent, which-
ever was lower. (The market rent is that needed to cover amortization of
the mortgage at its full market interest rate.) This might result in rent
increases for many families. The project whose comparative rents for
22ld3 and 236 are given on page 15Z also estimated how many families would
be eligible for basic rents. Of 126 families in its low-rise buildings,
63 would have been eligible for basic rents. But the remaining 63 tenants
would have been subject to rent increase of $2 to $128, with an average
increase of $57! Faced with these increases, many families might have
left.
Third, projects might end up having higher management costs, since
the 236 program is more complex administratively than its predecessor.
*-
A Decent Home, pp.6 2-66
**
Urban Observatory data.
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Table 3-2: Summary of Major Differences Between the 221d3 and 236 Programs
22ld3 236
mortgage interest rate 3% market rate: 6-9%
interest paid by project
avg. mtg./anit*
level mtg. payment
average govt. subsidy/unit
time of govt's expenditure
final mortgagee
mtg. insurance premium
basic income limits
extraordinary income
limits
additional rent paid by
over-income tenants
3%
$18,600
$800
$671
at final closing
GNMA
waived - $0.00
established by HUD
established by HUD
25% of adjusted excess
income up to 20% of
the amt. of basic rent
1%
$26,400**
$800***
$1,288
annual contributions,
over the life of the
mtg.
FNMA or private lender
1/2 of 1% of mtg. =
$132/unit
135% of public housing
90% of 221d3 limits
25% of adjusted excess
income, up to the amt.
needed to support full
market interest rate
on mtg.
*
In Boston
**
The higher cost of the average 236 unit results mainly from inflation:
most were built later in time than 221d3 projects.
A similar level payment on a larger mortgage is brought about by a
larger federal subsidy.
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For instance, 236 tenants' incomes need to be re-certified annually,
while 221d3 are only re-certified bi-annually; excess income in 236
projects must be remitted to HUD, while 221d3 projects can keep it
in residual receipts. The conversion process itself would be expensive,
requiring coordination of all the public intermediaries involved in
projects and much planning by project sponsors. Final endorsement of
new mortgages would also entail expenses. These costs would, to some
extent, offset the additional funds made available for operations.
Fourth, the IRS would have to determine whether conversion constituted
a sale of the project for the limited investors. If it would constitute
a sale, limited partners would lose their accelerated depreciation benefits
and earlier benefits might be subject to recapture. If this were the
result, then investors and sponsors alike would doubtless try to prevent
the conversion.
Fifth, more 236 funds would have to be allocated by Congress. Until
and unless the present moratorium is lifted, this will not be possible.
All these issues would have to be resolved before conversions could
occur. Nevertheless, conversion seems a likely strategy for salvaging
221d3 projects with operating cost overruns.
Escrows for operating overruns could be built out of funds ordinarily
used to repay the mortgage, as described . above, or they could
be built into mortgages if and when they were refinanced. The Michigan
State Housing Development Authority already inserts them into new limited
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I*
dividend mortgages by establishing a 'development cost escrow'. This
escrow is equal to approximately 8% of the mortgage amount, or approximately
$1,700 per unit. The debt service on the escrow is paid by reducing the
return to limited investors from 6% to 3%. Thus, there is no rent
increase for residents. The reduction in cash flow to investors is
sufficient to pay the added debt service cost for the escrow.
If the development cost escrow is not needed for
operating costs, it will be available to fund
social and physical amenities, as well as to
provide for necessary future capital improve-
ments for the development.**
Although the higher mortgage would tend to increase HUD's subsidy costs,
it does not since the MSHDA has significantly lower interest rates than
does FRA.
The escrow has potential benefits for the developer, investors,
residents and HUD. For the developer; because it is a mortgageable item,
the total mortgage amount is increased and, therefore, the syndication
price (as a percentage of the mortgage amount) also increases. "In
*
MSHDA also seeks two assurances against rising operating costs from a
developer. First, he must guarantee to operate a development within
the agreed budget for a three-year period without any rent increases,
except for increases to cover rising real estate taxes and utility costs
which are beyond the developer's control. Second, the developer must
establish an 'equity escrow': he must arrange for 5/6% of the mortgage
amount received from syndication proceeds to be available each year for
six years to meet operating deficits. "In addition, he must post a letter
of credit in the total amount of 2-1/2% of the mortgage to cover any
operating losses occurring in the first three years. The exposure of the
developer is a maximum 5%, reduced by 5/6% for each year of successful
operation over a six-year period." (Explanation of Authority Program to
Provide Operating Assurances under Its Limited Dividend Housing Program,
p.3.)
**
Ibid, p.4.
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addition, it is a fair expectation that a higher price will be paid by
investors who understand that the . . .development cost escrow provides
significant protection." For the investor who is concerned primarily
with securing his tax shelter benefits, security against a project's
foreclosure also protects him against serious losses under recapture
provisions of the IRS code. Since the primary incentive for investors
is tax shelter benefits, rather than cash flow, a 50% reduction in the
cash dividend is not a material deterrent to most investors.
For residents, the escrow gives assurance that their rents won't be
increased as soon as costs rise. For HUD, the escrow supplies a good
chance of program success, decreasing the likelihood that it will become
the owner of foreclosed projects.
MSHDA has been relatively successful in obtaining developers' and
HUD's consent to this escrow. HUD has always been enthusiastic about it.
While developers were initially less eager to support it, the security
it brings has won their support.
Similar development cost escrows could be built into re-financed
236 mortgages which lacked them initially, if the Internal Revenue Service
would consent (1) not to treat the re-financing as a sale of the property,
(2) to allow depreciation benefits on investments with only a 3% cash
return, and (3) to permit the original syndication agreement to remain
in effect even though the mortgaged value of the property would have
changed. Investors would also have to agree (1) not to take any cash
benefits from re-payment of the first mortgage and (2) to waive half of
the 6% cash flow distribution.
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Table 3-3: Alternative Sources of Operating Funds at Meadowbrook
a 228 unit, 221d3 project in Fitchburg Massachusetts,
with a final mortgage of $4,056,000 and annual projected
operating costs of $920 per unit per year.
source of funds
I. Funds internal to the project
A. Funds held in the name of the project
1. Replacement reserves
2. Residual receipts
3. AMPO funds
B. Funds held by project's sponsor
1.
2.
3.
Limited dividend distribution
Syndication proceeds
Excess profits to wholly owned
subsidiaries
C. Funds available thru changes in
mortgage financing
1. Balloon mortgage principal payment
- after 1 year
- after 10 years
2. 3-month moratorium on debt service
3. Operating escrow built out of 1 yr
deferred debt service
D.Funds available early in a project
1. Construction cost savings
2. Liquidated damages
3. Performance & payment bonds
4. Construction guarantees
5. Completion assurance funds -
escrow for latent defects
6. Escrow deposit for incomplete
items
II. Funds external to the project
A. Operating subsidies
1. Straight operating subsidies
2. Tax payment subsidies
*
Assumes available funds are deposited in
is annual interest.
funds available f
only once
not available
$328,125 or
not available
43,666 or
174,666 or
not available
would be $900/day,
not available
not available
79,600**
38,000**
unds available
annually
$10,852
1,215
2,435
19,680*
54,300
71,000
2,620*
10,480*
but not available
1140-11,400
@$5-50/unit
6% savings account; this figure
**
These funds could be spent only on specified items, e.g. repair latent
defects.
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B. Federal mortgage subsidies
1. Payment of half the claims on
mortgage insurance
2. HUD take title from mortgagee
3. HUD take title from mortgagor
4. Operating loss loan
C. Refinancing of mortgage
1. Refinancing for 50 years
2. Refinancing at zero interest
rate
3. Refinancing as 236 (1% interest)
D. Development cost escrow
174,666 or
not available
324,480 or
87,333
0-174,666*
10,480**
18,000
735246
51,428
19,469*
Amount made available would depend on how much HUD would subsidize.
**
Assumes available funds are deposited in 6% savings account; this figure
is annual interest.
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Although escrows would increase mortgages and thereby theoretically
increase the replacement value of projects, they would not really increase
FHA's insurance risk since the escrows would remain assets of projects.
If projects were sold, escrows would be transferred to new owners along
with the physical property. Therefore, FHA should be able to maintain
its insurance on projects that incorporated operating escrows.
At Meadowbrook, a development cost escrow of 8% of the mortgage would
contain $324,480 or $1,425 per unit. If this escrow were invested in an
ordinary savings account with 6% interest, the annual yield would be
$19,469, which could be used for operating overruns without even touching
the principal of the escrow.
Conclusion
The central concern of this section has been to examine the implica-
tions, financial and otherwise, of alternative sources of operating funds
for 221d3 and 236 projects. The sources examined vary in their level of
assistance, the time pattern of their benefits, and the amount and timing
of additional public subsidies required. But all of them share one quality.
They all depend upon tinkering with the existing housing subsidy system.
They would further complicate the already complex 221d3 and 236 programs.
They would continue a long American pattern of trying to correct deficiencies
in the market, in general, and in housing programs, in particular, through
incremental changes which push and pull at institutionalized financial
arrangements, rather than drastically re-structuring them to eliminate the
problems which initially caused the deficiencies. Whether or not it is
worthwhile to tinker further with 221d3 and 236 programs depends on how
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much money is actually needed to help projects survive. If projects can
be saved with small increments in available funds, then further tinkering
with their financial arrangements might be useful. (Provided, of course,
that it is deemed desirable to maintain projects under their present
ownership and subsidy arrangements, in general). But if projects need
very large sums of money, then they also require cataclysmic changes in
their subsidy and financial arrangements. Further convolutions of the
existing subsidy system would notrelieve their financial distress.
Given the marginality of proposed changes, the greatest financial
benefits would come from those which depend upon more external inter-
vention in projects. They rely on the application of additional subsidies
by the federal government, which makes them further dependent on public
funds. By reference to Table 3-3, which summarizes the monies that could
be generated on behalf of a 228-unit 221d3 project near Boston, it can be
seen that the largest, continuing sources of additional funds all entail
mortgage modifications. Modifications would require the cooperation of
both HUD and mortgagees, primarily GNMA and FNMA. HUD would have to
supply additional mortgage subsidies, picking up a larger tab for interest
or part of the principal, while mortgagees would have to accept deferred
payment. The greatest additional sums of operating money would come from:
- partial payment of claims on mortgage insurance, amount o a
pre-payment by HUD of half the mortgage. At Meadowbrook this
would free $383 per unit per year, of 41% of the projected annual
per unit operating expenses, exclusive of debt service and bad
debts.
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- refinancing the mortgage at a lower interest rate, either
zero percent or one percent, the latter representing
conversion to 236 financing. Approximately $321 per unit
per year (equivalent to 35% of projected operating costs)
or $226 (equivalent to 24% of projected operating costs),
respectively, would be released by these changes.
Whether or not these amounts would be sufficient to keep Meadowbrook
our of financial difficulty would depend, of course, on how greatly its
operating expenses increased. No figures are yet available on Meadow-
brook's actual operating costs since its mortgage was closed less than a
year.ago. Nevertheless, some representative costs are available from a
national HUD audit of the 236 program and from The Subsidized Housing
Study now being conducted by the Boston Urban Observatory. The HUD audit
showed that, nationwide, the majority of projects' estimated operating
costs were 20% under actual costs during the first one to three years of
occupancy. The Urban Observatory study of 221d3 and 236 projects in Boston
found that average costs rose 14.5% between 1969 and 1970, and another 13%
between 1970 and 1971, or 27.5% during the first three years of occupancy.
If Meadowbrook's cost increases paralleled these typical figures, then
they could be covered by the 20-40% additional operating funds released
by mortgage modifications. However, if Meadowbrook's costs escalated at
45% annually like the more sorely pressed developments around Boston, then
mortgage modifications would not suffice. Given that Meadowbrook's
projected operating costs were reasonbly set at $920 per unit annually,
cost increases would probably not be more than could be covered by
mortgage modifications.
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Because mortgage modifications' large benefits come only at the price
of extra government subsidies, they would probably be more difficult
politically to institutionalize than many of the other less profitable
sources of operating funds. Congressional approval of more subsidy funds
would be prerequisite to refinancing mortgages at lower interest rates.
Congress would have to commit annual appropriations for the next 35-40
years. During that 35-40 year period, more subsidy dollars would be
expended in toto than would be spent on outright repayment of half the
value of mortgages. However, pre-payment would require immediate federal
expenditures which are usually less palatably politically than larger
deferred expenditures. The issue of immediate payments could be kept
out of Congress if HUD-FHA had sufficient funds in its mortgage insurance
pool to repay partial mortgages on projects which wanted to tap that
money. But if HUD-FHA tried to salvage all projects in financial trouble,
its insurance pool would be severely depleted, and it would probably have
to seek special funding on Capital Hill.
Before mortgage modifications could be effected, many layers of
government would have to be pierced:
- HUD would have to decide how to implement the modifications;
- FHA would have to reckon the figures involved;
- Congress would have to appropriate more funds;
- GNMA or FNMA would have to agree to defer receipts;
- IRS would have to rule on how these changes would affect investors.
Additional red tape and operational controls would have to be bourne by
project sponsors and managers. Their costs of dealing with public
agencies would doubtless increase as they manoeuvered modification requests
through the various bureaucracies.
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The other strategies for obtaining more operating funds would
require less public subsidies, but individually they would yield fewer
dollars. The largest of them, syndication proceeds, would produce
roughly $19,700 or $86 per unit per year, enough to cover a 9% rise in
operating costs. If it were combined with all other funds now available
through projects' financial structure (i.e., replacement reserves,
residual receipts and limit dividends), $34,100 annually or $150 per
unit per year could be found without the addition of any public monies.
This amount could cover a 17% increase in operating costs. Before all
these funds could be tapped, both HUD and project owners would have to
consent to anticipated income. Their consent would probably not be too
hard to obtain, since they both currently forgo these monies under some
circumstances.
The practice of combining a number of sources of income might be
fruitful in some projects that need more funds than could be provided
through a single source of income. However, it would never be possible
to combine in a single project all the potential sources discussed in
the preceding chapters. Some of them are mutually exclusive. For example,
if a development cost escrow whose debt service took half the dividends
normally given to project's owners, were included in a mortgage, then
the dividends could not be applied toward operating costs; they would be
needed for debt service.
If 221d3 mortgages were refinanced as 236 mortgages, they could
probably not then be refinanced at a zero interest rate. If mortgages
were refinanced, HUD and mortgagees would probably not then consent to
balloon mortgage principal payments. Such an involution of a convolution
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would likely seem too baroque. Furthermore, while the existing subsidy
programs already seem very complicated, they would appear simple compared
to the intricate ramifications that two successive, complex mortgage
modifications would have on the status of limited investors, on mortgagees'
trading position in the mortgage market, and on managers' dealings with
public agencies.
The most sources that would likely be feasible at Meadowbrook are:
replacement reserves $10,852
residual receipts 1,215
limited dividend distribution 2,435
syndication proceeds 19,688
refinancing as a 236 51,428
TOTAL $85,618
Since this total amount could cover a 40% operating cost jump, at
Meadowbrook, it would probably be sufficient to cover operating cost
increases for several years. If they increased annually at 13-14%, which
is the general trend in Boston, this $85,618 would be sufficient for 3-4
years. If gradual, moderate rent increases were also instituted during
that time, operating costs could be kept under control even longer. But
in projects whose operating costs are rising much more rapidly than 13-14%
per annum due to initial underestimation of expenses, marginal tinkering
would probably only delay foreclosure. With one exception: projects
whose expenses are increasing due to the repair cost of major latent
construction defects could be saved by tinkering if the object of the
patching were to have contractors, builders, and architects make good
on the various construction guarantees and escrow accounts which already
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exist. This would not supply more general operating funds, but it would
avert one of the more serious causes of operating cost increases in
Boston.
As this discussion hias suggested, the ramifications of diverse
sources of operating funds are many and complex. Their details are
beyond the scope of this paper, although they would have to be thoroughly
investigated before any changes could be implemented. Nevertheless, I
have tried to suggest the costs and benefits, plus the limitations of these
alternative funding sources. They are incapable of saving from foreclosure
projects whose operating monies are grossly inadequate. Because they are
only marginal changes in the present subsidy system, they are insufficient
to mend projects which are suffering from larger operating deficiencies.
These projects are being bankrupted by the present subsidy system. Only
drastic alterations which attack the causes of extreme expense increases
can help these projects. However, projects whose operating cost squeeze is
less severe can be salvaged by tinkering with existing subsidies, particu-
larly if all the people involved in housing development--HUD, FHA, sponsors,
builders, contractors, and managers--accept increased responsibility for
projects' fiscal problems.
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Afterword
This thesis has examined two areas in which the existing housing sub-
sidy system does not function adequately. Both are related to the costs
of managing publicly-assisted, privately-owned rental housing: 22ld3 and
236. The first was the cost to projects of regulatory actions by public
agencies with official authority over subsidized housing. The second
was the need for more operating funds in many 221d3 and 236 projects,
along with potential sources of revenue which could provide additional
monies. The first, then, concerned an unintended and often expensive
side effect of housing subsidies, while the second concerned deliberate
strategies to alleviate the pinch of high overall operating costs.
For relief in both areas, I suggested the possibility of restructuring
existing patterns of responsibility for subsidized housing. Given the
management costs and problems resulting from many public regulators, it
seems desirable to lessen the amount of government intervention, perhaps
by consolidating the agencies which oversee subsidized projects. This
would, hopefully, cut down projects' friction of doing business with
public agencies. Doubtless this friction could never be eliminated
entirely, for the combination of private ownership and public regulation
leads inevitably to some conflicts. Housing sponsors and managers looking
for successful businesses, on the one hand, and public agencies seeking
complex public policy goals, on the other hand, are not always going to
agree on their mutual rights and responsibilities. Nevertheless, present
housing programs have laid an excessive administrative burden on develop-
ments, particularly the smaller ones. Exacerbating managements' expenses
are the number of agencies which claim jurisdiction over them. Inter-
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agency disputes cause costs that are inappropriate for projects to bear.
While behind the disputes each agency has at least some praiseworthy
motives -- to ensure that housing managers and other public bureaus give
adequate services to tenants -- it is time for projects to stop paying
the price for agencies' good intentions.
This is not to say that public intervention should be eliminated.
Instead, I am advocating that public funding and regulation of housing be
rationalized and coordinated. In some instances, this might even entail
increased supervision of developments. For example, as suggested in
Section 3, it is apparent that greater watchfulness is needed to secure
adequate construction of buildings in 236 projects. But the large over-
head costs of a multi-tiered system of subsidy and regulation should not
be perpetuated.
Behind this statement lie larger public policy issues concerning the
nature of the federal system that allocates responsibility among different
levels and branches of government. While these issues are beyond the scope
of this paper, changing the regulatory pattern of subsidized housing, never-
theless, seems desirable.
It also seems desirable to restructure the financial liability of
other participants in subsidized housing; owners, sponsors, builders and
architects. At a minimum, HUD should pressure sponsors, builders and
architects to fulfill their present, often unsatisfied requirements to
design and build housing adequately. Preferrably, HUD should restructure
both their and limited investors financial obligations, so all four
share in providing adequate operating funds for 221d3 and 236 projects.
0 & M outlays maintain sponsors' and owners' investments just as much as
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they supply housing services to tenants. Perhaps the cost should be
shared accordingly.
A number of changes that would spread financial liability were
outlined in Section 3 of this paper. The potential sources of operating
revenue discussed in Section 3 represent the financial limits of current
federal rental assistance programs: The limits to the dollars which can
be leveraged by tinkering with these programs. Although more operating
funds could be released by reworking 221d3 and 236 projects' fiscal
arrangements, these funds are finite. They are probably not sufficient
to save projects in the worst fiscal condition, that is, projects whose
operating deficits are increasing much faster than can be absorbed by
regular, modest rent increases. Because most of the funding sources
are fixed amounts that would not increase with time, they generally could
not offset continuing, lar e, inflationary cost increases. They could
more likely erase deficits due to operating problems that can be solved
by a single input of money, such as defective heating systems or
inadequate building security. In other projects whose projected operating
budgets were underestimated before occupancy, these funding sources could
cover the discrepency between projected and initial operating expenses--
provided that most on-going cost increases could be covered by rent
increases. Thus, these incremental additions of funds could not save all
projects from foreclosure. Since they bring only marginal changes in
revenues, they could only resolve certain kinds of operating problems.
There are projects whose incomes are so far below actual expenses that
they could not be saved from foreclosure even by tapping all available
sources of operating funds. With these projects, the existing housing
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subsidy system has failed. In them, it has created problems that cannot
be resolved except through cataclysmic alteration of public-private
housing activities.
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